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Drastic changes in charging and pricing policies in the water sector of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have taken place since 1989 and are likely to
continue. Increasing importance is being given to the environment at a national
level, reinforced by the process of accession to the European Union (EU). For
example, the Water Framework Directive, recently adopted by EU Member
States, specifies the need for water pricing to provide incentives for consumers
to use water in a more sustainable manner; in addition, financial resources will
be required to aid governmental compliance with the environmental acquis.
The conference Economic Instruments and Water Policies in Central and
Eastern Europe: Issues and Options was organised by the Regional Environ-
mental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) and DG Environment of
the European Commission. The main objectives of the conference were:
• To review existing water pricing policies in CEE countries and in European
Union Member States;
• To identify the key factors (technical, socio-economic, institutional) that
explain existing water pricing policies;
• To assess the adequacy of existing water pricing policies for addressing
present and future challenges faced by the water sector in CEE countries,
with particular emphasis to the enlargement process; and
• To identify the key constraints, and also the potential for adapting water
pricing policies to these objectives, and the challenges that lie ahead.
Those attending the conference included stakeholders and specialists from
EU Member States as well as CEE countries. Many showed significant interest in
using the framework of pricing to address environmental and economic issues in
the water sector of the CEE. The conference also identified areas for future mon-
itoring and research to ensure that pricing policies can be effectively designed
and implemented.
We are very pleased to present the proceedings of this conference. We hope
that this document will be a key to increasing awareness of the role pricing can
play in enhancing the sustainability of water resources in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. 
J.F. Verstrynge Jernej Stritih
Deputy-Director General Executive Director
DG Environment The Regional Environmental Center 
European Commission for Central and Eastern Europe
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BACKGROUND
1. Drastic changes in water pricing policies are likely to occur in the coming
years in Central and Eastern Europe. These changes will result from the need
to implement the Water Framework Directive, and more particularly its water
pricing article (Article 9).
• Water pricing needs to act as an incentive for achieving the environ-
mental objectives of the directive.
• An adequate recovery of the costs of water services is required for each
economic sector (i.e. industry, households, agriculture).
2. Also, large financial resources will be required for maintaining and renewing
the existing water services infrastructure, and to build (and maintain) new
infrastructure to comply with the environmental acquis, e.g. the Urban Waste
Water Treatment Directive. Pricing will play a key role in the provision of
some of these financial resources.
3. In this context, the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern
Europe (REC) and DG Environment of the European Commission organized
a Conference entitled Economic Instruments and Water Policies in Central
and Eastern Europe — Issues and Options in Szentendre, Hungary,
September 28 and 29, 2000.2
4. The objectives of the conference were:
• To review existing water pricing policies in Central and Eastern Europe
and compare them with existing policies in Member States of the
European Union.
• To identify the key factors (technical, socio-economic, institutional, etc)
that explain existing water pricing policies.
• To assess the adequacy of existing water pricing policies for addressing
present and future challenges faced by the water sector, with particular
emphasis to the enlargement process and the implementation of the
Water Framework Directive.
Fifty points for a synthesis
Stefan Speck, Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe, 
and Pierre Strosser, DG Environment, European Commission1
1. The synthesis was based on the contribution of the rapporteurs to the technical sessions of the Conference. These
were: Jim McNicholas (REC), Krzysztof Michalak (OECD), Charlie Avis (WWF, Hungary), Erich Unterwurzacher (DG
Regio, European Commission) and Mojca Luksic (State Water Directorate, Croatia). 
2. Financial support to the organisation of the Conference was given by the European Commission (DG Environment)
the Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office (TAIEX), the Danish Environmental Protection Agency and the
Ministry of the Environment of the Czech Republic via their support to the Sofia Initiative on Economic Instruments.
• To identify the key constraints and potentials for adapting water pricing
policies to these challenges and objectives.
5. To achieve these objectives, the conference combined a number of technical
sessions with presentations and discussions, two panel discussions on exist-
ing water pricing policies in Central and Eastern European countries and
Member States of the European Union, a series of interactive case studies and
a field visit to the Budapest wastewater treatment plant.
6. Overall, around 60 participants, from 20 different countries ,3 attended the
conference. Both the speakers and participants represented a wide range of
stakeholders (ministry experts, researchers, environmental NGOs, industry
representatives, consultants) from both Central and Eastern European coun-
tries and European Union Member States. 
7. This report summarizes the presentations and discussions that took place
during the two days of this Conference.
THE CONTEXT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
8. Steep increases in water service prices have been recorded in all Central and
Eastern European countries since the change of the political regime, at the
end of the eighties and beginning of the nineties.
9. A significant decrease in the demand for water has been recorded during the
same period, particularly for large water users (e.g. industries).
10. However, the change in water prices is not the only factor explaining the
decreasing demand. In fact, little is known on the marginal impact of price
changes on water demand. The overall economic recession and changes in
incomes are, among others, key factors explaining the observed reduction in
water demand. 
11. Prices for agricultural water/irrigation have not followed the same trend and
have been kept at very low levels. However, this sector has also recorded a
decrease in its water demand. Privatization of large farms to smaller units led to
changes in agricultural approaches leading to a reduction in the water demand.
Overall, water use by agriculture is limited in most countries as compared to the
situation in southern European Union Member States, for example.
12. Because of the prospect of enlargement, and the need to upgrade the quality
of the environment, very large (but not yet identified) investments will be
required in new water infrastructures and the protection of the quality of
waters. Financial resources from external sources, however, will not cover all
these costs.
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3. Countries represented included: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom.
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EXISTING WATER PRICING POLICIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE AND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
13. There is a wide diversity of water prices in Central and Eastern Europe and
in the European Union, both in terms of price structure and price levels.
14. Overall, the recovery of financial costs (operation and maintenance, invest-
ments) is stricter in the Member States of the European Union than in Central
and Eastern European countries. However, there is a wide diversity of situa-
tion on both sides.
• The full recovery of financial costs is stricter for households than for
agriculture in the Member States of the European Union.
• On the contrary, it is stricter for industries as compared to households in
Central and Eastern Europe.
• Some farmers pay for their full financial costs in Member States of the
European Union, while others hardly cover the operation and mainte-
nance costs of irrigation systems. Further, in some water stressed regions
of southern Europe, recovery can be less than one percent.
• Full recovery of financial costs exists for some large cities in Central and
Eastern Europe (e.g. Gdansk) as opposed to smaller cities or rural areas
(when piped water services exist at all in these areas).
• In cases where water services are provided by public entities or where
prices are tightly controlled by state authorities, water prices have some-
times been used to pursue broader policy objectives to the detriment of
the financial viability of the service provider, such as reducing inflation
or before elections.
15. However, comparing cost recovery levels remains difficult and has to be
made very cautiously, as the costs considered are rarely specified and likely
to vary among countries or economic sectors.
16. Many countries use environmental (abstraction, pollution) charges or taxes.
However, the environmental impact of these is unclear, partly as a result of
their low level, to act as incentives. Also, these so-called ‘environmental’
charges or taxes are sometimes developed primarily for financial reasons to
enhance revenues to the general budget (e.g. the groundwater abstraction
tax and the water supply tax in the Netherlands).
17. Thus, existing environmental costs are rarely assessed/evaluated for
designing the structure and level of these ‘environmental’ charges or
taxes; i.e. there is no attempt to internalize external costs. Furthermore,
revenues collected through such means are rarely ‘earmarked’ for funding
measures aiming to redress the environmental damage for which they
were imposed.
18. The review of existing pricing policies stresses the diversity of the institu-
tional framework supporting these policies. In some countries, the private
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sector has a key role in water services (e.g. the United Kingdom) and the state
only regulates water prices. In other countries, the management of water 
services and the control of prices are entirely the tasks of municipalities and of
the government (e.g. Romania).
IMPACT OF EXISTING WATER PRICING POLICIES
19. On average, water prices have a clear impact on water demand. However, the
order of magnitude of this impact (and of related price elasticity of demand)
varies widely between suppliers of water services, economic sectors, river
basins, countries, and the time scale (long-run vs. short-run).
20. At present, there is little knowledge of the factors that explain the magnitude
of the impact of prices on the water demand. In the case of agriculture, for
example, land ownership, the access to alternative water sources, and the
types of crops are factors likely to influence the magnitude of this impact.
21. Changes in water prices and reduction in water demand can have a clear
impact on the environment. The case study of the city of Gdansk illustrated
changes in the groundwater recharge and showed that groundwater levels
were restored to past levels. It should be stressed that information on the
environmental impact of water prices (e.g. on groundwater levels, river
flows, groundwater quality or wetland status) is indeed very rare in the liter-
ature: analyses stop too often at the impact on the water demand per se and
do not investigate related environmental impacts.
22. Transparent water prices can also have an impact on water demand through
their information role, given that price structures and levels can have a psycho-
logical impact on consumers and users and thus modify their behaviour. 
PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF WATER PRICING POLICIES
23. Water as a good has many facets: as a support to life, provider of environ-
mental services, as a transport medium, an economic good, an element of
social cohesion (or conflict), etc.
24. To consider water globally (globally being defined as looking at the different
facets of water, at both surface and groundwater sources, at the river basin
scale, at more general macro-economic policies, etc.) is the key to adequate,
effective and successful water pricing policies.
25. As a result, water policies in general and water pricing policies in particular
attempt to achieve a wide range of objectives, be they environmental, eco-
nomic, financial or social.
26. All stakeholders recognize this diversity of objectives. However, the weight and
priorities given to objectives vary widely among stakeholders. For example:
• Pricing is primarily a financing tool for the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development; for the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
it is primarily seen as contributing to the fulfillment of environmental
objectives. 
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• Water pricing policies are also used to satisfy industrial or rural develop-
ment policy objectives, which in some cases jeopardizes the efficient 
allocation of economic resources and environmental sustainability, e.g. in
the case of excessive irrigation. 
• Social issues and objectives are seen as particularly important for experts
from Central and Eastern Europe.
27. There is agreement on the need to reconsider subsidies and cross-subsidies
(mainly from industry to households in the case of Central and Eastern
European countries) related to water services. Subsidies should be better
targeted and made more transparent to consumers and taxpayers.
SOCIAL CONCERNS AND WATER POLICIES
28. Many experts have a great concern for social issues in the context of foreseen
future increases in water prices. Clearly, affordability and capacity to pay will
be key issues in future water pricing policies in Central and Eastern Europe.
29. Existing and future affordability were widely discussed, keeping in mind the
controversial threshold of four percent as the maximum share of water service
costs in total households income proposed and used by some institutions. No
agreement could be reached on this. 
30. The affordability figures cited during the conference were average figures for
the population of a given city or country. The sole use of average figures for
integrating social elements in water pricing policies is clearly inadequate
knowing the wide diversity of household income in most (all) areas of
Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere.
31. The use of direct financial compensation was seen as more effective in
addressing social issues.
THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS
32. The state has a clear role to play in water pricing policies: establishing 
legislation, regulating, providing expertise, and safeguarding social and
environmental concerns.
33. Municipalities can also play a key role in the regulation of water prices.
34. The role of consumers and users was widely discussed during the confer-
ence. Some felt that consumers were only asked ‘to pay and to reduce
demand’ in most Central and Eastern European countries. However,
examples of consumers/stakeholders/users’ participation were presented
for different countries.
• Participation and control by consumers through the democratic process
in the case of the Netherlands (state level and local level) and the city of
Gdansk (municipal level). 
• Direct consultation of consumers in the case of the Compagnie du Bas-
Rhône Languedoc (intensive discussions take place between the company
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and farmers before any significant change in price structures and levels is
proposed).
• Participation of stakeholders in river basin committee in the case of
France (comité des agences de bassin) and Romania (pilot project).
35. However, no information was provided on the relative effectiveness of these
different forms of participation to account for users and consumers’ views
and problems.
THE NEED FOR INFORMATION AND RESEARCH
36. Common definitions and concepts (which costs, what is cost recovery, etc.) are
now required for EU Member States and Central and Eastern European coun-
tries to ensure the economic elements of the Water Framework Directive can
be consistently implemented.
37. Methodologies for assessing the financial costs of water services need to be
homogenized. 
38. There is also a need to further develop and make operational methodologies
for assessing environmental costs and benefits. Such methodologies and
their application were little discussed during the conference (although three
case studies were mentioned in the WWF presentation). Strategies for using
water pricing to achieve environmental objectives need more attention. 
39. More research is required to better understand the factors influencing water
demand and pollution, and to assess the impact of price changes on water
demand under a variety of conditions. This represents a challenge in coun-
tries such as those of Central and Eastern Europe where the entire economy
has experienced significant changes recently. 
40. Further efforts should be put into better measuring water uses and pollution,
both in the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Although con-
troversies may exist regarding the role of metering to reduce water demand,
there is clear agreement that metering is key to building the information base
necessary for taking policy and management decisions effectively.
MOVING TO NEW WATER PRICING — THE FIRST STEPS 
41. The participants identified several steps for improving the role and effective-
ness of existing water pricing policies and for moving to water pricing poli-
cies that better account for the environment. These include the need to:
• Improve transparency and the information available for consumers, users
and taxpayers on who uses, who pollutes, what does it cost and who pays
for these costs. This can be done without any change in pricing policy.
• Share bad and good experiences between stakeholders and countries
with regards to water pricing policies in place and the role of key factors
explaining their success or failure.
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• Move to better pricing policies in a very practical way, i.e. using first the
existing information and methodologies (e.g. for evaluating environ-
mental costs and benefits) without waiting for further research and
information.
• Account for existing water pricing policies in the development of new
policies, and to implement these policies in a phased manner.
• Enhance interaction and collaboration between government depart-
ments and agencies representing different interests in water resource
management (e.g. agriculture, environment, health).
42. There is a need to introduce consumers and users into the design process of
new pricing policies. To understand consumers’ rating of the varying quality
of water services and the link they make between water service quality and
prices is key to integrating consumers into water pricing policy design. In this
context, users’ and consumers’ willingness to pay needs to be more systemat-
ically investigated. Often, however, there is limited capability to carry out such
investigation, especially for small water service suppliers and municipalities.
43. Also, in the long run, the development of knowledge requires research activities
on water economic issues to be strengthened. The Fifth Research Framework
Program of the European Union provides opportunities for supporting such
research in Central and Eastern Europe.
44. Pilot projects by a wide range of stakeholders can be effective means for test-
ing new approaches (e.g. pricing policies, participation of consumers in
design of these policies, pricing and river basin management, etc.), sharing
experiences and demonstrating the benefits such approaches can have for
users and for the environment. The Life Programme of the European Union
provides opportunities for supporting such pilot projects in Central and
Eastern Europe. 
45. Pricing policies will need to be integrated into the development of river basin
management plans. This integration remains a key challenge for the imple-
mentation of the Water Framework Directive to be addressed from the
beginning of activities aimed at developing guidelines for implementing the
economic elements of the directive.
46. Finally, pricing policies need to adapt over time to changes in economic,
hydrological and social conditions. The example of the compagnie du Bas-
Rhône Languedoc was very illustrative in this regard: this company has used
four different pricing structures since its creation, the existing pricing struc-
ture being similar to the first pricing structure in use in the company a few
decades ago! Thus, to integrate economic analysis into routine activities for
designing pricing policy is as important as to identify the price level and
structure that will address today’s issues. 
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WHICH FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE
47. The REC and DG Environment will publish the proceedings of the conference
by the end of the year. These proceedings will be widely distributed to the 
participants of the conference and other economic and water policy experts in
Central and Eastern Europe and in the European Union. 
48. The REC and DG Environment will disseminate the final results of their on-
going studies on water pricing in Accession Countries and agricultural water
pricing when finalized.
49. A key outcome of the recent Lille II conference, organized in Lille, September
13 and 14, 2000 under the auspices of the French Presidency of the European
Union, is the agreement among experts on the need to develop practical guide-
lines for implementing the economic articles of the Water Framework Directive.
The discussions during the Szentendre conference clearly stressed that:
• There is a clear demand for (and need to) involving experts and stake-
holders from Central and Eastern Europe in the process of guideline
development.
• This involvement should start immediately, to ensure understanding,
input into, and appropriation of these guidelines by users in Central and
Eastern Europe. In this context, it is important to associate the experts
that attended the Szentendre conference to all networking activities and
discussions that may follow from the Lille II conference, and to publicize
the process in order to invite contributions from those not able to attend
the Lille II or Szentendre conferences.
• The guidelines should not only discuss what the economic analysis
should aim at, but also (and more importantly) how to achieve this eco-
nomic analysis.
50. There is a need to compile (and regularly update) the list of existing studies
and activities linked to economic issues (i.e. economic analysis, water pric-
ing) undertaken by stakeholders and organizations in Central and Eastern
Europe. In this context, the possible setup of a sub-working group on eco-
nomic issues led by the Danube Commission was mentioned. Also, a study
on water tariffs in the Danube Basin is currently ongoing, which would com-
plement the study by DG ENV on water pricing in Accession Countries.
BACKGROUND
Economic instruments are increasingly applied in the context of environ-
mental policies. This is particularly true for the water sector where the application
of abstraction and pollution charges, or incentive price structures is favoured to
promote the efficiency of water use and reduce the discharge of harmful pollu-
tants into the natural environment.
The Water Framework Directive (WFD), recently adopted by the Member
States of the European Union, clearly integrates economic concepts and
approaches into water policies. Firstly, it promotes the use of economic analyses
to identify measures for achieving the environmental objectives of the directive
cost-effectively. Secondly, it advocates the use of water pricing as an incentive
encouraging the sustainable use of water resources. Also, the directive makes
compulsory an adequate recovery of the costs of water services from each eco-
nomic sector, i.e. household, industrial, and agricultural. 
In the Accession Countries to the European Union, incentive pricing and
cost-recovery are likely to soon become key policy (and political) issues. There
will be a need to implement the charging/pricing article of the Water Framework
Directive. This is likely to be extremely sensitive in the context of the high costs
of implementing the overall environmental acquis (e.g. the Urban Wastewater
Treatment Directive). Thus, cost-recovery and affordability issues will gain
prominence on the policy agenda.
METHODOLOGY, INFORMATION
Today, there is little knowledge on existing water pricing policies in Central
and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Information is scarce also on their
social, economic and environmental impact, and on the changes that would be
necessary for the implementation of the environmental acquis and the charging/
pricing article of the Water Framework Directive. In this context, DG Environ-
ment has launched a preliminary study2 with the following objectives: 
• To collect information on water and wastewater pricing in selected countries
from Central and Eastern Europe;
• To analyse current water pricing policies and trends in the use of pricing
mechanisms in the water sector; 
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Water pricing in selected accession 
countries to the European Union — 
current policies and trends1
Pierre Strosser, DG Environment, European Commission
1. This paper is based on a study funded by European Commission DG Environment, and contracted to the
Krakow University of Economics. For more information on the results of the study please contact Pierre Strosser,
Tel: (32-2) 296-8743, Fax: (32-2) 296-9559, Email: pierre.strosser@cec.eu.int. 
2. The study was initially planned for a five-month period. The work was restricted to a review of existing
documentation, reports and grey literature, and to the collection of information for some well-selected case studies.
• To acquire a better understanding on how the relevant information and data
are gathered in these countries.
The study has investigated water pricing policies in ten Accession Countries to
the European Union; Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Information has been collected
for the main water use sectors referred to in the pricing article of the WFD, i.e.
household, industrial and agricultural.
The information used in this study has been collected from the following
sources:
• Existing comparative studies (e.g. OECD, World Bank);
• National reports and documentation;
• Studies by water suppliers or water supplier associations (existing in some
countries only);
• Case studies produced by researchers and consultants (often in the context
of projects funded by international lending agencies);
• Direct interviews with experts, ministry officials, water suppliers, etc.
Many problems have been faced with the information collected and analysed.
The information is highly heterogeneous, with different definitions, data collection
methods or levels of aggregation being used in different countries. In some cases,
problems are faced in accessing existing information. Thus, it is difficult to make
in-depth comparative analyses between countries.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Some preliminary results are presented below. These refer to household
water pricing, the sector for which the set of information is the most complete for
the ten countries considered. 
• Metering
Metering of water supply to households ranges from 62 percent in the Czech
Republic to 100 percent in Slovenia. However, reliable information on meter-
ing is scarce. Difficulties arise with regard to the way rural and urban areas are
considered or with problems presented by multi-apartment houses.
• Pricing structure
Pricing structures in Central and Eastern Europe make wide use of volumetric
pricing. However, flat rate pricing, linked to the number of users, the type and
capacity of the equipment or the size of the area served, continues to exist.
In many countries, households pay a fee for water abstraction. These
abstraction fees often differentiate between surface water and groundwater
supplies. In Estonia and Romania, abstraction fees vary among river basins,
as a function of water scarcity.
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• Average water supply price
On average, water supply prices range from EUR 0.14 per cubic meter (m3) in
Slovakia to EUR 0.47/m3 in Hungary. However, there is a high diversity of
prices within each country. Although many factors may explain observed price
differences (e.g. density of supply network, age and level of maintenance, etc),
it was not possible to make in-depth comparative analyses because of differ-
ences between countries’ base years and sampling rules. 
• Wastewater charges
Wastewater charges in CEECs range from EUR 0.07/m3
of water to EUR 0.47/m3 of water. The table below
presents the best available estimates for the ten coun-
tries considered.
• Share of water expenditure in household budgets
On average, water expenditure, i.e. water supply and
wastewater, represent 2.1 percent of the total house-
hold budget in the ten countries investigated. The
lowest value is found in Slovakia with 0.6 percent
while Romania records the highest value with 4.5
percent. 
CONCLUSION
The preliminary results presented in this paper will be
refined and expanded to include information from other
economic sectors, i.e. industrial and agricultural. Key to the study and analysis will
be the identification of existing information gaps in anticipation of the forthcoming
implementation of the WFD and of its pricing/ charging articles. The reduction of
information gaps will be required to ensure the implementation process can be
effectively monitored and assessed. 
TABLE 1
Wastewater charges 
(in EUR/m3)
Country Charges
Bulgaria 0.07
Estonia 0.28
Hungary 0.45
Latvia 0.38
Lithuania 0.37
Poland 0.29
Romania 0.41
Slovenia 0.10
Czech Republic 0.09
Slovakia 0.47
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The role of prices in irrigation in 
Central and Eastern Europe1
Judit Rákosi, ÖKO Inc., Budapest, Hungary
1. ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE WATER SECTOR
Modification of ownership structure has brought about changes which have
fundamentally affected farming conditions in Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs). Ownership reform has resulted in the fragmentation of land
and a drastic reduction in the average size of holdings.
Service facilities, machinery and equipment, designed for large holdings,
could not be used by small-scale farms. Due to a lack of capital, the purchase of
a machine fleet, appropriate to land size, could be effected only with difficulty.
Irrigation schemes, developed in the previous period, have not been operating or
have been operating only partially. Yields have also fallen short of those in the
years 1988-89. All this has resulted in a lower level of mechanisation in produc-
tion, less irrigation and fewer developments not directly related to production. 
Water consumption for irrigation is a proportionately insignificant component
of water use in the economies of CEE countries. The highest percentage of water
used for irrigation is observed in Romania, 6.7 percent in 1998; the next in Slovakia,
3.7 percent in 1999; then Hungary, 2 percent in 1998; and, lastly, in Bulgaria, 1.4
percent in 1997 (Reference 2). Water consumption in agriculture includes the fol-
lowing activities: irrigation, livestock breeding, and fish farming. The breakdown
for water consumption in these categories varies from country to country.
Comparative figures for some CEE countries (1997) are indicated in Table 1.
In Hungary, agriculture is one of the largest consumers of water sold by the
water supply sub-sector. Agricultural water consumption is practically equal to
the quantity of drinking water supplied.  Most (some 60 percent) of the water sold
to agriculture is used for fish pond supply; 15 percent to 30 percent is used for
irrigation purposes, depending on weather conditions.
2. INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS
In all CEE countries, the institutional and legal framework of water manage-
ment had usually been established prior to the changes in economic and political
systems. Irrigation activity shows similar and differing features in each country.
In Bulgaria, there are basically two well-established forms of irrigation. One
of them is the responsibility of the Irrigation System Company (ISC), owned by
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MuoAF). Its area of activity includes the
operation and maintenance of state-owned irrigation schemes in an area of about
600,000 hectares (ha). The other is the responsibility of the water users associa-
1. This paper is based on a study funded by the REC. For more information on the result of the study, please contact
Stefan Speck, Tel: (36-26) 505-056, Fax: (36-26) 311-294, E-mail: sspeck@rec.org.
tions (WUA), representing associations formed by small-scale farms to facilitate
irrigation. ISC provides assistance for the operation of WUAs. Interestingly,
according to the findings of investigations conducted in the years 1998-99, WUA’s
irrigation costs are 55-80 percent lower than those of ISC. On the basis of these
investigations, it is evident that bigger irrigation systems provide irrigation water
more expensively (owing to the long distances and several pumping stages).
Smaller irrigation systems using groundwater wells are more effective and, thus,
the price of irrigation water is more economical.
In Hungary, actors in irrigation are highly diverse. Basically, a distinction can
be made between irrigation supplied by piped water and that drawn from natur-
al water resources. Irrigation based on the piped water supply takes place
through state-owned main works; water is supplied to the site of irrigation by
WUAs, business or the farmers themselves. Two-thirds of irrigation takes place in
this form. In the case of water withdrawal from natural water resources, an asso-
ciation, business or the farmer himself abstracts water. The choice of option (of
course, only after the water licence has been obtained) is influenced only by the
criteria of economic efficiency. In practice, water may be delivered in many ways
from the site of water withdrawal to the site of irrigation. In these cases, the
required facilities belong to the supplier. 
In Romania, the key institutional structure in irrigation activity is the National
Society of Land Reclamation (NSLR). It has branches (former Land Reclamation
Operation Enterprises) at a local level. Another important stakeholder will be the
association of irrigation water users. This association will share the process of
decision-making on basic issues with the NSLR.
In Slovakia, the Slovak Water Management Enterprise is responsible for
water delivery. It operates in two ways:
• Operating its own systems for abstracting, purifying and supplying water
(about ten percent of areas). 
• Contractual arrangements with other service companies, providing services
for farmers; with agricultural companies, either users or owners of the land
under irrigation (about five percent of areas).
Differences among irrigation systems in Slovakia are negligible. The irriga-
tion system consists of two main parts:
• The main irrigation system: water resource; pumping stations; and under-
ground pipeline network. 
• Irrigation facilities and equipment, on a farm level. 
The main irrigation systems (MIS) are owned by the state. Since 1994, the
Slovak Water Management Enterprise, together with its local representatives, the
river basin administrators, has become the manager of MIS. Irrigation facilities
and equipment are owned by legal persons.
Government bodies have a major role to play in irrigation structure. Main
works are owned by the state in all countries. Government bodies play a key role
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in price setting (except Hungary) and subsidies. It would be worth reconsidering
the institutional system and hierarchy of irrigation activity.
3. IRRIGATION PRICING POLICIES
The raw water price is not a major component of irrigation costs (20 percent
in Hungary, 25-30 percent in Slovakia). 
In Slovakia and Romania, the government fixes prices, whereas, in Hungary
and Bulgaria, market forces largely determine prices. In Hungary, irrigation charges
fall within the free price category; consequently, prices vary from supplier to 
supplier. They usually cover operating and maintenance costs, as well as a portion
of development costs; the development of state owned main works is financed by
the state budget while the development of irrigation works, by WUAs, is financed
mainly by members’ contribution fees and state subsidy. A water resource fee is
also charged, which is a state revenue and covers part of the costs of water resource
conservation. 
In Slovakia and Romania, where the price is established by the state, uniform
charges are applied countrywide, and the only difference is occasioned by the
source and purpose of water withdrawal. Prices cover only a portion of costs. In
Romania, a raw water price is applied. 
Subsidies
Subsidies for irrigation, and other incentives, exist in many countries. In
Slovakia, supports may cover the price of irrigation water, the energy cost of irri-
gation as well as the operating and maintenance costs. The level of support may
be as high as 70 percent of the price of irrigation water and the energy cost. 
Regarding expenses connected to irrigation, state contribution is very consider-
able in Romania. Electricity costs and the costs of water delivery to the site of use are
paid for by the state. In Hungary, supports are granted primarily for development
and, in certain cases, for maintenance activity, but an operating subsidy, for 
example, a price subsidy, has not been available to date (except for drought peri-
ods). In conclusion, improving the water pricing system and establishing prices that
cover costs may have an important role to play in irrigation development. Bulgaria
has no general subsidy system. Sometimes the ISC receives state subsidies.
In the countries considered, there are considerable differences in irrigation
water prices and water prices in general,. There is a discrepancy in both the adop-
TABLE 1
Comparative figures for agricultural water consumption 
in the CEE
Country Water for irrigation
(million m3)
Total agricultural 
water use (million m3)
Bulgaria 92.5 124.6
Romania 286.9 1030.0
Slovakia 47.0 86.0
Hungary 92.5 554.6
tion of market pricing and the recognition of costs. Table 2 presents a summary
of the main aspects.
4. IRRIGATION SCHEMES
An irrigation scheme has been selected in each of the four countries for
which case studies have been prepared. 
In Bulgaria, the area studied is a 1,510 ha area of farmland situated near the
village of Katunica (Plovdiv). Land reform has affected the total land area and now
720 private farmers and ten tenant farmers use the area for agricultural production.
There are 100 regular irrigation water users. Irrigation activity is carried out by the
Katunica Irrigation Water User Association, the first such type of association in
Bulgaria. The irrigation scheme was formerly operated by a farming co-operative.
The main crops are: maize, carrot, peppermint, peanut, watermelon, black pepper,
sunflower and tomato. In 1998, a reconstruction of the irrigation scheme included
the construction of open canals and advanced water distribution systems; the
reconstruction was financed by a World Bank loan. On average, the total irrigation
water quantity per hectare is 4,800 cubic meters (m3), and the total water quantity
is 2.8 million cubic meters. One thousand hectares are irrigated, out of 1,500 ha.
The average yield is higher than the national average. Following reconstruction,
some changes have occurred in the production structure with a reduction in the
maize and wheat producing area, while the peppermint producing area has
increased considerably and now peppermint is produced in an area of a size similar
to that of the wheat and maize producing area.
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TABLE 2
Country
Price setting
organisation
Cover for 
costs
Water price
structure
Difference in
price
Level of prices
(EUR m3) Support
Bulgaria ISCs at the
MoAF and
WUAs
(private
sector)
O+M costs
and in some
cases a part
of the capital
costs
According to
the source of
irrigation
(gravity feed
or pumping)
0.007-0.075
(permanent
maximum
price: EUR 5
per hectare)
No subsidy
for the private
sector. Some-
times state
subsidises ISC
Variable
price (per
hectare or
per m3)
Hungary Water
supplier
O+M costs
and in some
cases a part
of the capital
costs
Permanent
variable or a
combination
of the two
Depending
on the
different
cost level of
suppliers
0.004-0.036
(permanent
price: EUR
6-36 per
hectare)
Mainly for
development
(40% grant,
30% soft
loan)
Romania Government No direct
relationship
Raw water
price
According to
the purpose
of water use
and the
category of
water with-
drawal site
0.0004 Costs are
covered by
the state
Slovakia Government No direct
relationship
Maximum
price is set
According
to contract
range 0-2.0
0.048 Up to 70%
support is
available for
costs
In Hungary, the area studied is situated in the region of Dunaegyháza, close
to the Danube, and is farmed by a shareholders association. The shareholders,
who are all land owners, rent out their respective land to the association. The area
was formerly owned by a farming co-operative. Farming activity is carried out in
a 1,000 to 1,400 ha area. The area includes an irrigated area of 700 ha with the
rest of the area also being irrigable. The association’s typical crop is potato, which
has a high irrigation requirement. Potato is typically irrigated five to seven times
per year by sprinkler irrigation, delivering 20-30 mm water each time. In the case
of potato, there is no alternative to irrigation; irrigation was taken into consider-
ation from the outset when choosing the ‘main crop’. The need for crop rotation
requires the production of other crops also. The most important supplementary
crops include maize, wheat and green pea, of which, wheat requires minimum
irrigation or practically none at all. Irrigation activity can be considered econom-
ically efficient and effective where farmers who own lands are organised into an
association or business company, operating a specific irrigation scheme. The pur-
pose of the various forms of association may be irrigation only (Bulgaria,
Romania), or farming activity as a whole (Slovakia, Hungary).
In Romania, the area considered is relatively large (49,464 ha). It is situated
in Dambovita and Giurgiu counties in the south-eastern part of the country. The
yields in this area are much higher compared with the average yields achieved in
non-irrigated areas. Average yields for wheat, maize and green maize are over 60
percent, 130 percent and 450 percent higher, respectively, when an average
quantity of irrigation water is applied, than yields in non-irrigated areas. The irri-
gation scheme is operated by the National Association of Land Reclamation – S.A.
under a concession contract concluded for 49 years. Because of the large number
of farmers within the area, operating the irrigation scheme causes difficulties.
Typically, each farmer irrigates his own land and common use occurs rarely. The
irrigation scheme was formerly owned by a co-operative. Farmers in the area
consider irrigation as key to production growth.
In Slovakia, the area studied is situated close to the settlements of Kostoliste
and Jakubov on the West Slovakian Lowland. An association cultivates 1,935 ha.
Sixty percent of the land area is owned by members of the association and 40 per-
cent is leased. Most of the leased land is the property of the Slovakian Land Fund.
The land was formerly owned by a co-operative.
The irrigation scheme is operated by the association's own irrigation centre.
The association carries out water withdrawal from a surface water source (Morava
River) under a contract with the Danube River Basin Authority of the Slovakian
Water Management Enterprise. On the sandy soil, the main crops produced are
maize and wheat. Average yields are considerably higher than the national aver-
ages (by about 20-40 percent). These good average yields are mostly attributable
to irrigation, but, contributory factors also include high quality biological raw
materials; a liquid nutrient supply combined with composting; and a highly qual-
ified, co-operative expert team.
In all countries, the case studies demonstrate that irrigation activity was 
efficiently carried out when the farmers joined forces and formed some kind of
association. The association resolved the problem of the decline in irrigation after
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the change of the political and economic systems. The associations were able to
handle the previously developed irrigation schemes and overcome the problem
caused by separate small holdings. Common use allowed the functioning of 
systems. Case studies suggest the support, promotion and formation of irrigation
associations. This practice may be useful, not only in the countries considered,
but also in other CEE countries.
Problems, stemming from ownership and holding size change, greatly 
contributed to a decline in the use of irrigation schemes; these issues cannot be
eliminated but their effect can be tackled by irrigation associations. It would have
been more advisable to deal with the ownership and operation of irrigation
schemes when privatisation took place.
Government bodies have a major role to play in irrigation structure. Main
works are owned by the state in all countries. Government bodies play a key role,
except in Hungary, in price setting and subsidies. In practice, a multi-level 
management system seems to have been established which may hinder quick
and efficient progress (e.g. formation of associations). It would be worth recon-
sidering the institutional system and hierarchy of irrigation activity.
It is essential to solve the problem of capital shortage faced by farmers.
Capital shortage in agriculture, especially for small-scale producers, is a typical
feature in all countries considered. Co-operation within an association can only
partially solve this problem and the real solution would be the creation of ade-
quate credit conditions and securities. It is a problem to be solved in all countries
considered. Evidence of this can be found in the case studies prepared, all of
which analyse activities carried out by a number of associated farms. Country
experts consider the widespread introduction of some form of association as an
important element in developing irrigation activity. As the case studies demon-
strate, effective irrigation activity can be carried on, even now, in this way.
Average yields for irrigated crops are considerably higher than the national aver-
ages. The purpose of the various forms of association may be irrigation only
(Bulgaria, Romania) or the farming activity as a whole (Slovakia, Hungary). There
are successful models, highlighting that there are forms of farming which may
provide a solution to the problem of irrigation. One possible economic incentive
may thus be supporting the formation of farming communities, which are able to
use and operate irrigation schemes.
5. SUMMARY
• A downturn in irrigation activity can be observed in all selected countries.
• Causes of this downturn include inter alia a rise in water charges; this, how-
ever, is not the most significant factor to make the greatest contribution to the
decline in irrigation. 
• From country and case studies, one can conclude that irrigation activity can
be considered economically efficient and effective where farmers, who own
land, are organised into an association or business, who then operate a par-
ticular irrigation scheme. 
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• The raw water price does not represent a major share of irrigation costs (e.g.
20 percent in Hungary, 25-30 percent in Slovakia). 
• Irrigation charges vary widely among CEE countries. As far as irrigation is 
concerned, the state has a strong role in establishing the price of irrigation
water in all countries considered, except Hungary and Bulgaria (WUAs,
private sector).
• Some sort of incentive support exists in the countries studied. 
In conclusion, together with the establishment of adequate farming conditions,
the improvement of the water pricing system and the fixing of prices that cover
costs may have an important role to play in irrigation development.
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Summary of water pricing policies in Croatia1
Zeljo Ostojic and Mojca Lusic, State Water Directorate, Croatia
1. ADMINISTRATION OF WATER SERVICE
1.1 Governmental administration bodies
In the Croatian water sector, administration bodies are organized by the Act on
Organization and Scope of Ministries and other Government Administration Bodies
(NN 48/99 and 15/00). The Act defines their range of influence and responsibilities.
The Ministries and State Directorates exercising direct influence on water pricing
policy through regulations proposed to the Croatian government are, as follows:
The State Water Directorate, which is responsible for all activities related to
water management and the water management system: 
• The monitoring of watermanagement development and its harmonisation
with the requirements of overall economic development; 
• The regulation of watercourses and other water bodies, protection from
floods, ice, erosion and torrents;
• Hydroamelioration, irrigation and drainage;
• The management and use of the water-related estate; 
• The protection of water and sea from pollution by land, the supply of com-
munities with drinking water and industry with water appropriate to its needs; 
• The use of water power; 
• The planning and co-ordination of the development and construction of public
water supply systems and wastewater disposal systems on a national level;
• The inspection of water pollution controls and water use, and the protection
of water.
The State Water Directorate proposes the level of water use charges and the
pollution tariff. 
The Ministry of Public Works is in charge of activities related to the application
of economic policy in construction, housing and housing policy, and the imple-
mentation of special programs for the improvement of municipal services.
The Ministry of Environment and Physical Development carries out adminis-
trative and other tasks related to the general policy of environmental protection,
seeking to provide conditions for sustainable development through the integrated
1. This paper is based on a study funded by the REC. For more information on the result of the study, please contact
Stefan Speck, Tel: (36-26) 505-056, Fax: (36-26) 311-294, E-mail: sspeck@rec.org.
protection of air, water, sea, flora and fauna. In addition to the above mentioned
Ministries, the administrations of the 21 counties and of the City of Zagreb influence
the price of water by their decisions at a local level. 
1.2 Agencies and companies carrying out water management and
municipal activities
1.2.1 Agency for water management activities
Hrvatske vode is the government agency for water management. The task
of Hrvatske vode is to ensure the permanent and unimpeded delivery of public
services and the accomplishment of other strategic tasks in water management,
subject to the availability of funds provided for the purpose under corresponding
legislation. Within its legal remit, Hrvatske vode passes administrative and other
acts and decides on issues important to water management, such as: 
• The drawing-up of basic plans for water management; 
• The maintenance of water-related structures; 
• Water protection;
• Water use; 
• Water pollution control; 
• The management of the water related estate;
• The provision of know-how in management and engineering for the 
construction of water-related structures and the collection of funds for
financing its works and activities.
The seat of Hrvatske vode is in Zagreb, and there are five water management
departments: in Zagreb, for the Sava river basin; in Osijek for the Drava and
Danube river basin; in Rijeka for the Istrian and Littoral basin; in Split for the
Dalmatian basin; and in Zagreb for the catchment area of the City of Zagreb. 
1.2.2.Companies carrying out municipal activities
The Municipal Services Act (NN 36/95) defines municipal activities. These
services include water supply and wastewater treatment and disposal, among
others. Municipal services may be performed by:
• A company, founded by one or more local administration units;
• A public institution, founded by a local administrative unit;
• A service plant, established by one or more local administration units;
• A legal entity or a person, subject to a concession agreement.
Currently, services are mostly provided by companies, about 130 in number,
located in larger urban areas. The law stipulates the provision of funds from various
sources, but in the case of water supply and wastewater disposal and treatment, the
costs are returned by the price of the service.
The firm providing the service determines the price and method of payment.
In practice, this price is still controlled by the founder of the company.
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2. LEGISLATIVE BASIS OF THE ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
The regulations influencing the price of water are, as follows:
• Municipal Services Act (NN 36/95);
• Decree on municipal service price determined by the assembly of the munic-
ipal company, and other decisions of the company regarding development
of municipal infrastructure and its financial situation; 
• Water Management Financing Act (NN 107/95, 19/96 and 88/98); 
• Ordinance on the Level of the Water User Charge (NN 62/00);
• Regulations on Accounting and Payment of Water User Charge (NN 94/98);
• Ordinance on the Level of the Water Protection Charge (NN 58/00);
• Regulations on Accounting and Payment of the Water Protection Charge 
(NN 62/00);
• Decree on Conditions and Procedures for the Awarding of Concessions in
Water and the Water-Related Estate (NN 99/96).
Other important laws that may directly influence the price of water are:
• The Islands Act (NN 34/99);
• Investment Promotion Act (NN 73/00).
The above laws provide certain supports for the financing of infrastructure,
which results in lower loan repayments and, thus, directly affects the price of water.
The Program of Sustainable Development is prepared in accordance with the
Islands Act. This Program makes soft loans available to the islands; in addition, the
government prepares national programs of development for the islands, which
tackle water supply and the disposal of island wastewater, among other issues.
The Investments Promotion Act extends tax and customs privileges to newly
established companies carrying out specific activities, such as new companies
holding the concession rights for municipal service activities.
Also, the program of reconstruction of areas of particular concern facilitates
favorable investments in infrastructure, which may influence the final price of
water in such areas.
3. BASIC ECONOMIC REGULATORS (HOUSEHOLD TARIFF
STRUCTURES)
The basic economic regulators influencing the price of water are, as follows:
Price of municipal service
Source of revenue for municipal service fixed by the Municipal Services Act
(financing the service, repayment of loans for construction of facilities and munic-
ipal infrastructure). It is determined by the provider of the municipal service, with
the consent of the founder of the municipal company; paid by legal entities and
persons using the municipal service.
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Water use charge
Source of revenue for the finance of water management described by the
Water Management Financing Act (NN 107/95). The charge is fixed by the
Croatian Government and paid by legal entities and persons that abstract or
pump water from watercourses, lakes, storage reservoirs, ground aquifers and
other natural sources.
Water protection charge
Source of revenue for financing water management defined by the Water
Management Financing Act (NN 107/95). The charge is fixed by the Croatian gov-
ernment and paid by legal entities and persons that discharge wastewater or
other substances that pollute water.
Concessions on water and water estate
The concession provides the right of use of water and water-related estate,
i.e. the right to use water and water-related estate for economic and other pur-
poses; paid by concessionaires for:
• Water abstraction for public water supply;
• Use of water power for the generation of electric energy;
• Water abstraction for use in industrial and similar activities;
• Pumping of mineral and thermal waters, water abstraction for irrigation;
• Fish farming. 
4. ORGANISATION OF PAYMENT OF WATER SERVICE CHARGES
The price of the municipal service is paid to the service provider on the basis
of monthly bills. 
The water user charge is set by Hrvatske vode for one year or shorter, as
stipulated by the regulations. Hrvatske vode charges the bodies abstracting
water directly from natural sources. Water suppliers, supplying water to con-
sumers through public water supply systems, collect the charge and send it to
Hrvatske vode.
The water protection (pollution) charge is set by Hrvatske vode for one year
or less, as stipulated by the regulations. Hrvatske vode collects the water protec-
tion charge from companies discharging industrial wastewater, for which the
level of pollution is measured. The water supplier collects the water protection
charge and transfers it to Hrvatske vode.
The concession charge is fixed by the specific concession agreement. The
concession agreement is concluded with either the State Water Directorate or
Hrvatske vode, depending on who made the decision on awarding the concession
(parliament, government institutions, the State Water Directorate or the county
authorities). If the concession agreement is concluded by the State Water
Directorate (based on a decision made by parliament, government or the State
Water Directorate), the agreed amount of the concession charge is paid in favour
of the government budget. If the concession agreement is concluded by Hrvatske
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vode (based on the decision by the county authorities), the charge is paid in
favour of the county budget.
5. HOUSEHOLD WATER PRICING
Domestic water consumption has decreased in the last eight years.
According to a report of Hrvatske vode, the average price of the total household
tariff in Croatia is HRK 4.88 per cubic meter (m3) or approximately USD 0.57
(exchange rate, USD 1 is HRK 8.4535). The spread extends from HRK 2.44/m3 to
HRK 6.94 or, approximately, USD 0.28 to 0.82. 
6. INDUSTRIAL WATER PRICING
6.1 Direct supply via own intake
Industrial tariff structures include water management charges and the
concession charge. In general, they are estimated by Hrvatske vode for each
specific concession contract and paid on the basis of the volume of the
abstracted water.
6.2 Supply via public water supply system
According to a report of Hrvatske vode, the average price for the total indus-
trial tariff is HRK 7.69 or approximately USD 0.91/m3. The range extends from
HRK 4.89 to 11.88 or, USD 0.58 to 1.4/m3.
7. THE LEVEL OF COST RECOVERY
In general, the revenues of water and sewerage services do not fully recover
the costs of these activities.
Larger-scale activities are usually financed by local government and, in some
cases, by central government. There is a great difference between the existing
pollution charge tariff and the real cost of cleaning the polluted water, which is
estimated to be four times higher than the existing tariff.
Household use of water is subsidised: the water price for industry is higher
than that for domestic consumption. Now, due to the worsening economic situa-
tion there is a relative increase in domestic consumption and a reduction in indus-
trial consumption which causes a drop in the income of municipalities; this is one 
reason why the present situation is worse than before.
8. GENERAL TRENDS IN WATER POLICY IN THE COUNTRY
The Croatian government is adjusting regulations to make them conform to
EU requirements including the regulations relating to water management. Croatia
has ratified numerous international conventions and participates in the imple-
mentation of EU-WFD, which is expected to be adopted by the EU Parliament
Planning in water management is carried out on the following levels: the
national level, county level and on the city or local level. The purpose of plan-
ning is to provide adequate quantities of water of appropriate quality for all uses.
In that sense, the Croatian Water Master Plan, which is in preparation, and the
water supply plan, which forms a part of it, are elements of the wider planning of
the protection of the aquatic environment, and, thus, of the environment as a
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whole. The development plan includes: defining of objectives; analysis of tech-
nical and technological issues; methods of managing water supply systems; appli-
cation of market principles; environmental protection; implementation schedule,
and investment requirements.
It will also be necessary to review all legislation related to water management,
adjust it to EU requirements and define the possible deadlines for the fulfillment
of commitments towards EU as Croatia seeks EU membership. At present, the
major problem in the implementation of these goals is the shortage of financial
means. Also, it will be necessary, through international workshops, to educate
young professionals to work in accordance with EU requirements and to open
water management to new approaches, especially with regard to the environment
and sustainable economic development.
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The main objectives of existing 
water pricing policies
Gheorge Constantin represented the Romanian Water Resources Management Directorate at the 
Conference on Economic Instruments and Water Policies in Central and Eastern Europe held in Szentendre,
September 28-29, 2000. The following information is taken from the material Mr. Constantin used during his
presentation concerning water pricing policies in Romania.
THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF WATER PRICING IN ROMANIA
Economic objectives
Actual cost recovery of the operation to maintain and develop the water
management system; and efficient allocation of water resources.
Financial objectives
To make available financial resources for the water supply, flood control and
water protection activities.
Social objectives
Equitable access to a safe water source and protection against floods.
Environmental objectives
Quantitative and qualitative protection of water resources and the aquatic
environment, and environment and water resources conservation.
CURRENT ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
Current cost-recovery levels
The costs of maintenance and operation of water systems and a very small part
of the construction-development cost are recovered.
Incentive effect in price
Existence of the water price implies additional production costs (for water
abstraction and water discharge) which should be minimised. Complementarity
of pricing and charging with other measures exists to achieve key objectives.
Economic instruments
There are penalties and fines for non-compliance with the regulations as well
as allowances for better compliance; revenues from these fines are earmarked for
the Romanian Water Fund. There are permits and licenses for water abstraction
and water discharge. Water metering is compulsory.
Main actors
The Romanian parliament approves charges, penalties and allowances,
while the Ministry of Water, Forest and Environmental Protection establishes
the methodology of the water pricing system, and sets the rate for grant
allowances. Other actors also involved are municipal councils, municipal water
supply and wastewater treatment companies, the National Company for Land
Reclamation, industrial and agricultural units and the Competition Office.
What mechanisms are in place?
Charges for the abstraction of water are levied against consumers as well as 
polluters. Charges are differentiated by the type of water body (inland rivers,
Danube river and underground water); and by how the water is used. The fol-
lowing charges have been set by the government:
• Water effluent charges for discharge into the natural receivers. This charge
system comprises two components, a tariff for discharges within permitted
concentration levels and a penalty (over and above the tariff) for discharges
above permitted concentration levels.
• Drinking water charges for water delivered in the public network.
• Sewage treatment charges for wastewater discharged into the public sewers.
• Charges for water used for irrigation.
Water prices (raw water, drinking water and sewage water) are confirmed
by the Competition Office, in accordance with the Emergency Governmental
Decision no.7/1998, and at levels set by the previous consumer price index
published by the National Commission for Statistics. The request for price mod-
ification can be submitted by the producer (the National Company Romanian
Waters) to the Competition Office when the price index increases by more than
five percent.
The role of consumers
Consumers have to pay the bill. With the establishment of the basin commit-
tees, consumers will be involved in decision-making on the price of raw water.
Responsible institutions
National Company Romanian Waters is responsible for the effective imple-
mentation of water pricing policies.
Impact of prices/competition
The impact of the charge for water abstraction on the price of drinking water
is very small. The impact of the charge on competition is also negligable, when it
is taken into account that this charge has been set on a national level. The impact
of user charges for drinking water and wastewater is higher and varies according
to geographical area.
PRICING POLICIES
Past trends in pricing policies
Abstraction of water was not subject to any charge before 1989. User charges
levied on drinking water, sewage and irrigation were very low. The situation
changed with the governmental decision 1001/1990 concerning the establishment
of a unitary system for water management products and services.
Key factors determining past changes in pricing policies
Political and economic changes have been key determinants of pricing policy
change. This shift has been contextualised by the transition to a market economy,
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changes in financial policy and subsidies reduction. Other factors influencing a shift
in policy include new environmental and water management policies, privatisation
and public-private partnership. There has also been an increase in local authority
responsibility.
Problems associated with past changes in water prices
Widespread poverty and economic crisis have resulted in a huge decrease
in the consumption of water. Consumers are reluctant to pay for what they 
perceive as a ‘free good’; this is combined with a weak system for billing and a
low collection of payments. Meanwhile, maintenance and operation of the
existing water infrastructure, (mainly flood control works and monitoring), is
extremely expensive; infrastructure and water-use technologies are old.
FUTURE REFORMS IN WATER MANAGEMENT
Privatisation or partnership (public-private) in water services will be the
major change in water management over the coming years. Implementation will
be contextualised by: European integration in the field of environmental protec-
tion; future changes in environmental and water management legislation; the
necessity to reduce subsidies and reduce pressure on the state budget; our abili-
ty to rehabilitate existing infrastructure; pressure to provide a good financial envi-
ronment for foreign investments; the necessity to increase the quality of water, and
the service provided by the industry.
Limiting factors
There are huge costs involved in compliance with the EU water directives. Any
future changes in the ownership of the water industry and/or its pricing policy will
take place in the context of the structural crisis of the Romanian economy. There is a
significant lack of financial resources to implement changes, to rehabilitate decaying
infrastructure or to subsidise water consumpion strategically. We expect a further
decrease in water usage.
Proposals
A new pricing system is proposed based on two pricing components: one
component will be set at the national level, the other river basin specific. There
will also be a new tax levied on households protected from floods. The collection
system needs to be improved. Financial support is essential, and will be sought
from the European Union (ISPA, SAPARD, etc.). 
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Impacts of Bulgarian ’Law for the Waters’ 
on water pricing policy
Galia Bardarska, National Coordination Center for Global Changes,
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria
INTRODUCTION
The new Law for the Waters was approved by the 39th National Assembly on
July 13, 1999, and entered into force on January 28, 2000 replacing the old Law
for the Waters of 1969. The waters in Bulgaria shall be managed as a common,
national, and indivisible natural resource; individual river basins are to be man-
aged in an integrated way. Public interest requires cooperation at all levels of the
water system; between state administration, municipal administration, water
users and environmental organizations. Ownership changes of the water works
and the application of other economic regulators, affecting the use and the pro-
tection of the waters, could develop the existing pricing policy. 
This paper focuses on Bulgaria’s new approaches to water pricing and
obstacles encountered in their application.
INSTITUTIONS
Bulgarian waters are managed both at the national level (Council of
Ministers, and Ministry of the Environment and Water) and at the river basin level
(river basin directorates at the Ministry of the Environment and Water, and river
basin councils), (State Gazette, Vol. 67, July 27, 1999). The four river basin direc-
torates and the river basin councils have not yet been established.
The Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works (MRDPW) is the
main institution responsible for most of the water supply systems and sewerage
facilities in Bulgaria. Forty-eight water supply and sewerage companies provide
services for 8,268,171 inhabitants. Thirteen of the companies are entirely state-
owned through the MRDPW, nineteen are wholly in municipal ownership, and 
16 are in joint state and municipal ownership with the state holding a 51 percent
controlling interest. In case of wastewater discharge to the public sewerage system,
water supply and sewerage companies can launch a lawsuit.
As regards irrigation, there are 23 regional branch offices of the Irrigation
System Company (ISC), which is part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
that report to a central office in matters of policy and financial control. The ISCs
are responsible for the management, operation and maintenance of the 600,000
hectare (ha) state-owned irrigation area and the 130,000 ha of drainage systems,
as well as providing flood protection to 164,000 ha, mainly along the Danube.
They have made a significant effort in recent years to promote irrigation water
users associations (IWUAs), in an effort to group larger numbers of small farmers
into more effective units. In 1999, there were 176 IWUAs in a 100,000 ha area. The
development and creation of new legislation for the establishment and promo-
tion of IWUAs is needed.
The division of responsibility in the water pricing process is shown in Table 1.
We can see that the Ministry of the Environment and Water (MoEW) decides the
fees and penalties for abstraction and discharge. Penalties are paid for the pollution
of water. In the case of direct water discharge, the 15 regional inspectorates at the
Ministry of the Environment and Water, or the Minister, can launch a lawsuit against
a person or organization. Rivers in Bulgaria are categorized according to the vol-
ume of river water, measured in 1967, with minor amendments introduced in 1985.
Both the categorization of rivers (only three categories) and the values of their qual-
ity indicators differ from EU requirements. New regulations for a different catego-
rization of rivers in the updated Law for the Waters will be necessary.
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TABLE 1
Breakdown of responsibility in the water pricing process
Area Establishment of regulation Implementation Collection Receiving body
Calculation of
the prices for
water and
wastewater
services
Municipal councils and
regional water supply and
sewerage companies
(operators); regional water
supply and sewerage
companies (100% state
ownership); regional
irrigation systems
companies and irrigation
water users associations
Regional water
supply and
sewerage
companies
(operators);
regional
irrigation systems
companies and
irrigation water
users
associations
As with
implementation
As with
implementation
Issuing of
permits
Council of Ministers,
Ministry of Environment
and Water (MoEW),
Director of River Basin
Directorate, Ministry of
Defense and the Ministry
of Transport
MoEW and 
river basin
directorates
MoEW and 
river basin
directorates
National
Environmental
Protection Fund
Calculation of
the abstraction
fees (unit rate)
Council of Ministers,
Ministry of Environment
and Water (MoEW), by
January 1, 2001
As above MoEW and 
river basin
directorates and
municipalities
70% National
Environmental
Protection Fund;
30% Municipal
Environmental
Protection Fund
Calculation of
the discharge
fees (unit rate)
Executive Agency of
Environment at the
Ministry of Environment
and Water
As above As above
As above
Calculation of
penalties
Ministry of Environment
and Water (MoEW)
As above As above State budget
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WATER PRICING POLICY
Up to now, water supply and sewerage companies and ISCs have relied on
subsidies from state sources in order to cover their running-costs. The new Law for
the Waters introduced the principle of full cost recovery (Article 193. 1). The price
of water supply, collection and treatment is to cover the costs of the construction,
operation, maintenance and reconstruction of the installations and the systems
necessary for the provision of the respective services (State Gazette, Vol. 67, July
27, 1999). This revenue will not be enough, however, to finance the development
of the sustainability of water resources. 
At present, the water price levels do not recover the capital costs: the maxi-
mum range of the price of the drinking water has been set on the basis of the
recovery of the full costs of the production and sale of one cubic meter of water.
The average water charge represents 0.95-1.04 percent of average household
income and 1.13-1.25 percent of average household expenditure.
The low price of irrigation water led to the waste of an enormous volume of
water. By 1992, water pricing reform in irrigation had been introduced. The basic
principles of water pricing for irrigation are as follows:
• A water pricing system for irrigation which ensures the continued use of the
irrigation systems; 
• A water pricing system for irrigation which takes into account the different
sources of the irrigation water, gravity feed or pumping; 
• Equality of rights among the water users. 
A new element of water pricing is the fee for water abstraction, which 
will be charged from January 1, 2001 (State Gazette, Vol. 65, August 8, 2000). The
calculation of the fee for water abstraction is as follows :
T = ExWxK (1).
T is the value of the fee, BGL/year;
E is the tariff, BGL/m3 (Table 2);
W is the volume of water abstraction per year, m3/year; 
K is the correction coefficient according to the category of the abstraction’s source (Table 2).
No fees are paid for fire-fighting needs; nor for water use below 0.2 litres per
second (l/s) and not exceeding 10 cubic meters (m3) per day; nor for the irriga-
tion of individual farms smaller than 0.2 ha, using surface water drawn from the
property, provided the volume of water is less than 300 m3 monthly. In the
absence of sufficient controls, landowners’ wells can be big competitors with the
water supply systems.
The two- to threefold decrease in water consumption during the transition
period can be explained not only by the economic collapse and water price
increase but also by the liberalization of property laws: Article 23 states that the
owner of the land is the owner of the waters and the water-related estate on the
property unless they are the property of the state or municipality; and Article 24
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defines private property as including: 
1. Waters springing on the property, except mineral water, that are not part of
water supply systems;
2. Lakes, which are not fed by state or municipal waters, or which do not flow
through state or municipal waters;
3. Precipitation waters collected within the boundaries of the property and the
facilities constructed for that purpose,
4. Waters flowing out of items (1), (2) and (3), up to their inflow point into state
or municipal waters;
5. The beds of the waters of items (1), (2), (3) and (4);
6. Wells on property;
7. The facilities and systems for the use, transport and treatment of the waters
which serve the property, as well as the facilities for prevention and treat-
ment of damage to water (State Gazette, Vol. 67, July 27, 1999).
Additional revenues are needed to ensure the sustainable use of water
resources by different water suppliers and users.
ECONOMIC REGULATION
The new economic regulations for the use, protection and development of
water and the water-related estate are designed to serve the following goals:
• The availability of adequate supplies of water and mineral water for drinking,
medical purposes, recreation and countless other activities is of vital impor-
tance and should be protected;
• Payment should be calculated on the basis of the volume and the quality of
the used and discharged waters;
• The pollution or other damage of waters and the water-related estate, or their
disruption, should be fined;
• Economic incentives should promote the rational use, protection and
restoration of the waters and water-related estate.
There is a lack of accurate values for the actual consumption of water by
subscribers. Limiting the total water losses from the mains to 25 percent could
also be a big problem. For instance, asbestos-cement pipes, of diameter 80-500
mm and a total length of 12,236 km, supplying 20,190 habitants, produced water
losses of 20 percent to 49 percent of the supplied water (from 45 to 179
m3/d.km) with a pressure variation of 0.2 to 0.68 Mpa. Steel pipes, of diameter
80-2000 mm and length 2,200 m, covering a region with 2,885 habitants, produce
water losses of 14.5-43 percent of the total water consumption (29-130 m3/d.km)
with a pressure variation of 0.04 to 0.6 MPa (Dimitrov G. et al. 1996).
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Moreover, the quality of used and discharged waters does not correspond
very often to the EU directives. In 1997, only 43 percent of the total amount (1.152
billion cubic meters) of wastewater was in correspondence with Directive
91/271/EEC. The projected costs for the harmonization of the water sector with
the EU are shown in Table 3 (PHARE 1999).
There are 36 priority wastewater treatment plants in the National Development
Plan of Bulgaria for the period 2000-2006. The capital cost of the building of the
plants which will serve more than 10,000 inhabitants is approximately BGL 1.52 
trillion (EUR 7.6 billion), (Ministry of Environment and Water 1999).
It is evident that there is a need for significant investment. One possibility is pri-
vatization (Article 6). The waters, the water sites and the water systems and facilities
may be owned by the state, the municipalities, individuals and corporate bodies
TABLE 2
Breakdown of responsibility in the water pricing process
Prices in Bulgarian leva (BGL). EUR 1=BGL 2
Type of water users
Tariff E
BGL/m3
1. Water for households 0.02 0.01 1 0.5 0.3
2. Water for irrigation - - - - -
2.1 Water from surface waters* 0.001 0.0005 5 1.5 1
2.2 Water from ground waters** 0.005 0.0025 5 1.5 1
3. Cooling water 0.0001 0.0025 5 1.5 1
4. Water for recreation 0.04 0.02 1 0.5 0.3
5. Water for industry 0.008 0.004 5 1.5 1
6. Water for other uses 0.01 0.005 5 3 2
Tariff E
EUR/m3
Category
I
Category
II
Category
III
CORRECTION COEFFICIENT K
* The categorisation of the flowing surface waters is on the base of Regulation 7 (State Gazette, Vol.96, August 8, 1996).
** The categorisation of the ground waters is on the base of Regulation 1 (State Gazette, Vol. 57, 2000).
TABLE 3
Forecast of the needed costs for water sector according to EC directives
EUR million (Phare 1999)
EQUIVALENT ANNUAL COST
CapitalScenarioDirective
UWWTD High cost 2,360 98 225 211
91/271/EEC Baseline 1,750 78 172 161
Low cost 1,130 61 121 115
DWD 80/778/EEC - 135 2 9 8
Total High cost 2,495 100 234 219
Total Baseline 1,885 80 181 169
Total Low cost 1,265 63 130 121
Note: Equivalent annual costs include the full operating costs and do not allow for a slow build up of additional operating costs.
COSTS
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(State Gazette, Vol. 67, July 27, 1999). Concessions for the use of water, the water-
related estate and the existing publicly-owned systems and facilities connected with
them shall be granted; concessions will also be granted for the construction of new
hydro-technical, hydro-energy, irrigation, water supply and sewerage systems. The
payment for the right to use waters, which are exclusive state property and the
water-related estate, which is public property, shall include the fee for registration
and for the concession. The conditions of the concession are defined in the conces-
sion contract.
The ‘polluter pays’ principle has been mentioned but the economic situation
for the rational use, protection and restoration of the waters and the water related
estate still does not exist.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Bulgaria’s accession to the EC could have a very serious impact on the water
sector. Some of the very urgent activities are as follows:
• Establishment of a new national water pricing policy according to the EU Water
Framework Directive; 
• Fundamental revision of former investment practices (the construction of
over-sized water works and expensive water facilities not used on a perma-
nent basis);
• Implementation of cost-effective and environmentally-friendly technical solu-
tions for water treatment;
• Users’, consumers’ and stakeholders’ participation in water management
decisions as well as in the water pricing process at local level — river
basin councils, water users associations, water clubs managed through
global water partnership etc.
This process will be facilitated if there are European guidelines for economic
analysis and for integrated water resource management plans. A European direc-
tive for water quantity measuring is also needed. The process will be further eased
if the documents are translated into the national languages of the EC Accession
Countries.
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Water pricing in Estonia
Eva Kraav, Ministry for the Environment, Estonia
GENERAL OVERVIEW
In Estonia, the total volume of freshwater available is about 800 cubic meters
(m3) per capita/year, which is an average value compared to other European coun-
tries. Water is abstracted for different purposes: public supply; industrial production;
and agricultural and mining activities. It is abstracted from rivers and lakes and from
different groundwater levels. The amount of water abstraction and consumption has
changed in recent years: the decrease of industrial and agricultural production has
caused a drastic reduction in water use; higher prices and more accurate measure-
ment of water usage acted as an incentive on industry and the population to save
water. In 1998, water extraction was 1155 m3/capita. Domestic water use has
reduced tenfold to 110 m3/capita/year; water use in the mining, energy and fish
farming sectors remains high.
Water consumption in Estonia in 1999:
• Cooling water for power plants, 80 percent;
• Mine and open cast drainage water, 10 percent;
• Water for domestic and industrial purposes, 3-5 percent;
• Agriculture, 0.3-1.2 percent;
• Fish farming water, 5-7 percent.
Public water use by domestic and industrial consumers is to be paid for.
Companies that have their own well pay only a water abstraction charge.
Availability of central water supplies to the population
The central water supply system exists in all towns and in the majority of
small settlements. Nevertheless, not everybody uses the central water systems.
Central water supply covers 80-94 percent of the population in bigger towns and
59 percent on average in rural settlements. Approximately 77 percent of the pop-
ulation of Estonia is connected to the central water supply systems. Surface water
is purified and disinfected before use. Groundwater is usually used without treat-
ment. There are 23 water treatment plants in Estonia. In bigger settlements, 80-95
percent of the population is connected to the centralised water systems. 
The total length of the water supply network is about 3100 km, of which 25
percent is found in Tallinn. The pipes are made of steel and cast iron. Leakage is
relatively high, in some places up to 60 percent, due to the poor state of the water
supply systems. The mean age of pipes is about 30, of which 10 percent are older
than 60. The oldest ones, in Tallinn, date from the 1880s. Twenty-five percent of
the pipes need immediate reconstruction.
Central sewage systems
The central sewage system is available to approximately 77 percent of the
population in Estonia. In towns with over 5000 inhabitants, this figure grows to
87 percent. Nevertheless, 60 percent of the sewage system is technically amor-
tised and wastewater leakage occurs frequently. At many settlements the rate of
central sewage treatment is low and wastewater can leak into the ground. This
wastewater leakage represents a serious danger to the upper ground water layers
in some areas. 
WATER PRICING 
The objectives of water pricing policy are:
• Economic, to create the economic preconditions necessary to follow the 
EU water and waste water quality requirements;
• Financial, very large investments will be required in new infrastructures for
water and the protection of water;
• Social, prices must take into account people’s ability to pay;
• Environmental, encouragement of sustainable water consumption, the following
of environmental norms. 
The current policy for water management, in Estonia, is a system balanced
between the use of command and control (emission standards, permits for water use
and discharge, State Inspection) and economic instruments (water abstraction and
pollution charges, threshold levels, differential charge rates, fines, subsidies, grants
and soft loans). All ground and surface water use, both abstraction and discharge,
requires a permit from the Ministry of the Environment. This permit specifies the
water rights of the user: every town, settlement or enterprise using more than 30 m3
of surface water or more than 5 m3/day of groundwater must have a water use and
wastewater discharge permit. More than 1200 water permits were issued to enter-
prises in 1999.
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TABLE 1
Water tariffs as percentage of household income in Tallinn, Estonia
Size and income level of household
Average 
income and size of
household
Low income, 
average size 
household 
Large family, 
average income
household
Average monthly income EEK 450 EEK 1164 EEK 5540
Average household size 2.3 persons 2.3 persons 5.0 persons
Average water consumption 6.9 m3/month 6.9 m3/month 15 m3/month
Water tariff EEK 15/m3 EEK 15/m3 EEK 15/m3
Average water and sewerage bill EEK 103.5 EEK 103.5 EEK 225
Percentage of monthly income 2.2% 9% 4%
Mechanisms are, in general, in place. From the year 2000, the Act on Water
Supply and Sewage has regulated the main relations between state, municipalities,
water companies and customers as well as setting in place the main regulations for
water price control. The municipalities have various systems of charging, usually
combining water and wastewater services. 
Costs to industry, households or individuals for water have traditionally been
low in Estonia.
The dramatic increase of water prices during the last five years has been a
result of the complete or partial cut of state and municipal subsidies. The average
prices increased from between three to nine and a half fold. This gave rise to the
remarkable decrease in water consumption.
Limiting factors on water price formation are:
• Need for investments and cost recovery;
• Specific character costs of water management companies;
• Ability to pay;
• Firm conviction and support of the local politicians in power;
• Traditions of practice and public opinion.
Constant costs are the major budgetary expense of water management
companies, at about 80 percent. Variable costs, related to the amounts of water
consumed and wastewater treated, form only 20 percent of the total expenses.
This means that the drastic decrease in water consumption affects the level of
water prices remarkably.
ABILITY TO PAY
Ability to pay is an important limiting factor in implementing a ‘polluter pays’
policy. National statistics show that a relatively high part, 45 percent, of average
household incomes is spent on food and a further 20 percent for housing related
expenses. This is similar to the situation in other countries in transition. For the
poorest sections of the population (generally defined as the first and second per-
centile of income distribution) the proportions spent on essentials such as food,
rent and heating are significantly higher than average. Following a number of
studies on affordability, we assume that poor people will be able to afford to
spend no more than four percent of income on water, sewage and other envi-
ronmental charges (i.e. solid waste collection). Affordability studies show that
people will cut down on their consumption to what could be considered a bare
minimum. 
At current income levels, the Tallinn water tariffs are already too high for
low-income households (see Table 1). The water tariffs are not acceptable for
average income households either, according to Western European standards. 
On the basis of national income data for 1997, an average household on
average income would be paying 2.2 percent of its income for water and sewer-
age; an average household in the poorest 10 percent of income distribution
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would be paying nine percent and a large (five person) family on average income
would be paying four percent. The figures refer to an assumed average water
consumption of 100 litres per person/day.
Water tariffs and income levels differ considerably across Estonia. Income
levels in other towns and settlements are 40 percent lower than in Tallinn. Water
tariffs reflect this situation. The water tariffs vary from EEK 4 to more than EEK 21.
Prices for legal persons are twice as high, as a rule. 
In conclusion, Estonian water prices are already unaffordable for poor house-
holds and people on average incomes with large families. Consequently, it will be
very difficult to increase the water charges further, to full cost recovery levels, as
this would mean a relatively sharp increase in these charges, all across Estonia. 
THE APPLICATION OF THE FULL COST RECOVERY PRINCIPLE
The application of the full cost recovery principle would lead to annual
water sector charges of EUR 62 per person per year (EEK 930). For an average
household (2.3 persons), this would result in monthly costs for water supply and
sewerage of approximately EEK 390, 8.3 percent of monthly income, leading to
unacceptable social circumstances.
The full cost recovery principal cannot be implemented on short notice. The
use of standard EU technologies for water management will lead to EU level
water charges. The income level in Estonia is still considerably lower than in the
EU, leading to high water prices if the full cost recovery principle were applied.
Water prices should be increased in tandem with the increase of income 
during the coming years. Measures to support low-income households should
accompany price increases, as, otherwise, these households will pay too high a
share of income for water. If economic growth is sufficiently high, water prices
will reach the full cost recovery level after 10 to 15 years. 
The Act on Water Supply and Sewerage anticipates that a reform of water
prices will include three components:
• Water consumption;
• Fixed base water use figure;
• Connection charge.
The price shall be established such that the water company can:
• Cover production costs;
• Comply with quality and safety requirements;
• Comply with environmental protection requirements;
• Operate with justifiable profitability.
The price of the water shall not be discriminatory with regard to different
clients or groups of clients.
The procedure for regulating the price of the service shall be approved by the
local government council. The price shall be established by the local municipality
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and made public at least three months prior to making changes. Local government
establishes prices for water, wastewater and for connection with PWS. Generally,
these do not exceed four percent of the minimum income, and remain within the
World Bank guidelines on water tariffs, for countries such as Estonia.
In Tallinn, Tallinn Water Company’s current price covers:
• Operations;
• Approximately 35 percent of required investments;
• Repayments of loans from international banks.
Wastewater tariffs are collected together with charges for water supplies.
Generally they include an element for pollution charges, paid to wastewater treat-
ment companies for effluents discharged and for sludge disposal. Such charges are
higher for industrial customers as pre-treatment is rare and wastewater discharged
by industry to the sewer system tends to be combined streams (of domestic and
untreated process wastewaters). 
Price structure is as follows: Total water price = basic fee to cover the costs of
maintenance + water and wastewater treatment costs + environmental charges +
justified profit + VAT (for households).
The basic fee is the charge paid for water sold by the Public Water Company
measured by water meter. Meters have been installed continuously for several
years; having a water meter is more economical. At present, countrywide, more
than 50 percent of PWS water consumers have water meters, while in Tallinn,
more than 75 percent do. 
TABLE 2
Prices of water and wastewater
Water (W), wastewater (WW) per cubic meter. Prices in Estonian kroon (EEK). DEM 1=EEK 8
PRICE FOR HOUSEHOLD
INCLUDING VAT
W
Share of industry
in consumption/
discharge
Tallinn 411.6 8.3 6.7 15 17.05 12.7 29.75 24/27
Tartu 100.6 6.3 9.23 15.53 6.52 9.56 16.08 27/33
Narva 73.8 4.07 5.36 9.43 6.82 9.16 15.98 49/42
Pärnu 51.4 5.6 7.6 13.2 6.74 9.96 16.7 32/41
Viljandi 21.7 5.5 6.01 11.51 9.0 8.03 17.03 25/46
Haapsalu 13.6 7.2 15.3 22.5 6.1 12.97 19.07 28/26
Paide 10.4 7.4 13.22 20.62 3.7 28.3 32.0 17/23
Keila 10.0 7.4 10.4 17.8 6.25 8.8 15.05 27/41
Tapa 8.3 5.0 5.0 10.0 4.0 14.0 18.0 25/55
Polva 7.1 4.0 10.0 18.0 4.0 14.0 18.0 25/27
Tyri 7.0 5.0 7.0 12.0 6.62 8.97 15.59 24/25
Elva 6.4 6.8 9.2 17.0 8.69 17.8 26.49 40/40
Rapla 6.3 8.0 12.0 20.0 6.78 10.17 16.95 22/68
Paldiski 3.9 6.0 3.2 9.2 11.69 7.29 18.97 21/24
PRICE FOR INDUSTRY
EXCLUDING VATPopulation in
thousands WW Total W WW TotalCity
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Specific objectives for Estonian water management are:
• Provision of water services (water supply and treatment) to all households
and companies in the state.
• To ensure that the costs for the provision of water services are more or less
equal for all polluters in the same category. Preferably, the costs for water 
supply should be held within a certain range throughout Estonia. Water charges
in Estonia vary at present from EEK 3 to EEK 20, which seems too wide a range.
• Organisation of water service provision through independent companies
(private or municipal) making costs and incomes for these services clearly
visible.
• To set as a final goal, water services provided by private companies with full
cost recovery (to reach this situation a transition period is required during
which the regional authorities bridge the gap between the real costs and the
income from water prices).
• Development and implemention of a monitoring program providing a clear
picture of all emissions, which will allow proper control, and management
of water services.
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Economic instruments and 
water pricing in the Czech Republic
Miroslav Hajek and Miroslav Kopacek, Ministry for the Environment, Czech Republic 
1. INTRODUCTION
Ten years after the collapse of the totalitarian system and the introduction of a
market economy, the Czech Republic is already a fully transformed country which
wishes to enter the European Union and for this reason is implementing the envi-
ronmental acquis and trying to attain the limits set for macroeconomic indexes.
However not everything has succeeded, there is still a lot of work. Of all the regions
in the Czech Republic (NUTS 2), only Prague has attained a level of GDP that is
considered average in the EU; all other regions are below this limit and should
therefore be entitled to subsidies from EU structural funds for their development.
The Czech Republic is now quite successful in environmental protection and
great progress in this area has been made in the past ten years.
To realise such progress, annual expenditures of about CZK 25 billion
(EURO 750 million) are necessary for environmental protection. Other invest-
ment is also called for, for example, in the water management sector, especially
in water protection, where much investment is needed, a fact reflected in the
level of charges and prices in this sector. 
2. PRICING PROBLEMS
Three forms of prices were established with the Price Act No. 526/1990 Coll.: 
a) A maximum price, set by the Ministry of Finance,
b) A regulated price, which is determined by the supplier according to rules
given by the Ministry of Finance, 
c) Free market prices.
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for water pricing and co-operates with
other ministries regarding this issue.
The Water Management Act No. 138/1973 Coll. sets out the basic principles
and rules for water sector legislation, with the exception of the wastewater polluter
charges, which were fixed by Act No. 58/1998 Coll., as a new economic instrument
for protecting surface waters against pollution. From 2001, water-related economic
instruments will be amended by a new Water Act, its draft is already in the
Parliament of the Czech Republic; there will also be a new Act on Pipelines and
Sewage including provisions for the pricing and administration of water charges.
Current charges in the water sector include tariffs for drinking water provi-
sion, wastewater collection and sewage treatment; river basin companies are
required to pay a tariff on surface water abstraction. All these prices are regulated,
as it is necessary to have some state control in the pricing policy of this sector,
owing to the presence of natural monopolies in the market. 
3. PRICE REVOLUTION
The last year of the centrally planned economy was 1989. Between the years
1989 and 1999 the inflation rate was 3.691, meaning an average price growth of
269 percent, according to figures from the Czech Statistical Office.
3.1. Surface water
In 1989, the fixed price of surface water was CZK 0.46 per cubic meter (m3)
in all river basins; for steam power plants the fixed price was CZK 0.05/m3, which
was subsidised.
In 2000, the prices are regulated. The River Basin authorities calculate the
tariffs for the five main River Basin regions; the value is between CZK 1.55 and
2.53 per cubic meter, which includes a profit of about 20 percent of total costs.
The growth in the price index between the years 1989 and 2000 was 5.5, which
is approximately 450 percent. Subsidies have been given to river basin author-
ities for the maintenance of waterways and the removal of flood damages.
A discount in water prices has also been given to heat/power stations.
A decreasing trend has been observed in surface water withdrawal. In 1989,
the amount of water withdrawn by consumers was 2.6 billion cubic meters,
while, in 1998, the amount of water withdrawn was only 1.7 billion. This means
that the consumption of surface water is now almost one billion cubic meters
lower (a 35 percent decrease). The reasons for this are: the decrease in energy
production and the decrease of production in the metal industry; water users
have also introduced water saving measures. 
3.2. Drinking water supply and sewage collection 
3.2.1. Drinking water 
In 1989, the fixed price of water was CZK 3.70/m3, for industry, and CZK 0.60
for households. Subsidies were at a level of about CZK two billion. 
In 2000, there are about 5000 entities which supply drinking water. Of these,
the 90 biggest companies are centrally monitored. The average price of drinking
water is CZK 18.0/m3 with a small difference between the price for households
(CZK 17.44/m3) and other consumers (CZK 18.96/m3). This difference will soon
be eliminated.
The growth index between the years 1989 and 2000 for other consumers is
5.12, which means a growth of 412 percent. This growth is very striking com-
pared to the inflation rate. Many subsidies and soft loans have been given to this
sector in the form of investments into wastewater treatment plants.
A decreasing trend is also observed in drinking water supply. In 1989, the
total withdrawal of drinking water was 917 million cubic meters, of this, house-
holds used 523 million. In 1999, the total withdrawal was only 526 million cubic
meters, of which, households took 331 million cubic meters. The total decrease in
supplied drinking water is about 43 percent and for households this figure attains
37 percent. Drinking water consumption per inhabitant has decreased from about
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180 litres per day to about 120 litres. This strong trend in economising on drinking
water consumption is due mainly to higher prices.
3.2.2 Sewage collection
In 1989, the fixed prices were CZK 0.80/m3 for industry, and CZK 0.20/m3 for
households.
In 2000, prices are regulated. For the 90 biggest companies, which are cen-
trally monitored, the average price is CZK 15.11/m3, households have a slightly
lower price, CZK 14.20/m3, while other entities pay CZK 16.16/m3. The growth
index in these prices for industry between 1989 and 2000 is 20.20, which means
an increase of 1920 percent and the figure for households is 71.0, which means
an unbelievable increase of 7000 percent.
In 1989, households paid CZK 0.80/m3 for services in the water sector (supply
of drinking water and sewage collection). In 2000, an average of CZK 31.60 is paid,
which is approximately one EUR per cubic meter.
4. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
In 2001, two basic pieces of legislation will come into being: the new Water
Act, which will completely integrate all economic instruments in water legislation
except payments for drinking water supply and sewage collection; and the new
Act on Water Supply Systems and Sewage, which will cover these payments. In
the Water Act, the price for surface water consumption will be established as an
annual charge fixed by Government Decree; the reason for this is that the river
basin authorities will change form from joint stock companies to a form of state
company, in 2001. Thus, the tariff can act as an economic instrument. In this Act
environmental charges for polluting surface water will also be implemented.
In the Act on Water Supply Systems and Sewage, the regulated price for
drinking water supply and sewage collection remains; there is an option for a one
component price or a two component price (consisting of a fixed component and
a variable component relating to the volume of drinking water supplied or the
amount of sewage collected).
5. CONCLUSIONS
Looking at the new water legislation, we can see that neither prices nor
charges will suffice to cover the new financial requirements in the water sector
relating to the implementation of the EU’s environmental acquis. About CZK 100
billion is needed for wastewater treatment plants and wastewater pipelines, and
about CZK 30 billion for drinking water supply.
The State Budget and foreign sources can cover approximately 30 percent of
this. The remaining 70 percent of the money needed must be provided by com-
mercial loans which means paying interest at current rates. So, it is possible, that
the total price for implementing the environmental acquis of the EU may come to
CZK 200 billion (EUR 5.7 billion). This is the main reason why the Czech Republic
needs a delayed deadline for the full application of the environmental acquis in
the water sector. A gradual growth of prices and charges in the water sector is
therefore very probable.
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Water pricing in England and Wales
Charles Whitworth, OFWAT, Birmingham, UK 
1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE WATER INDUSTRY
The structure of the water industry varies in the different parts of the United
Kingdom, as follows:
• England and Wales, (connected population 52.3 million); ten privately owned
water and sewerage companies and 15 water-only companies;
• Scotland, (population five million), three statutory; publicly owned water
authorities;
• Northern Ireland, (population 1.7 million); single government agency
(Northern Ireland Water Service).
This paper deals only with the tariff and pricing structures of the privatised
water industry in England and Wales (E&W). 
In England and Wales overall price limits are set, on a five yearly basis, by
the economic regulator, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat). Ofwat is a non-
ministerial government department, based in Birmingham, England. It is headed
by the Director General of Water Services. There are ten regional Customers
Service Committees (CSCs).
Annual price limits are set, for each of the privatised water companies, under a
system of price-cap regulation (RPI-X). Prices are set so as to enable an efficiently
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Average water and sewerage household bills in England and Wales
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TABLE 1.A
Sample annual non-household water bills based on annual
consumption of 1,000 m3
Prices in pounds sterling (£), May 1999
Water authority 1995-1996 1999-2000 2000-2001
Anglian n/a 738 655
Welsh 1,142 1,103 1,085
North West 811 801 824
Northumbrian 1,238 1,026 717
Severn Trent 818 884 819
South West 1,164 1,017 915
Southern 1,057 1,165 1,007
Thames 913 927 845
Wessex 1,120 1,165 1,047
Yorkshire 943 1,024 897
Industry average 947 933 857
Assumptions: 50 mm meter size; 1,000 m3 water used.
TABLE 1.B
Sample annual non-household sewerage bills based on an
annual consumption of 1,000 m3
Prices in pounds sterling (£), May 1999
Water authority 1995-1996 1999-2000 2000-2001
Anglian n/a 1,056 937
Welsh 1,120 1,208 1,103
North West 6,902 9,040 7,697
Northumbrian 6,001 7,222 4,902
Severn Trent 4,804 4,762 3,794
South West 2,447 1,991 1,582
Southern 1,398 1,602 1,436
Thames 1,108 1,151 1,009
Wessex 1,558 1,584 1,484
Yorkshire 1,042 1,087 933
Industry average 3,111 3,343 2,758
Assumptions: £20,000 rateable value (property value); 50 mm meter size; 1,000 m3 water used. 
All sewage is domestic strength.
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run company to earn a rate of return equal to the cost of capital. The current system
of price-cap regulation has been in place since 1989 (see Future Water and Sewerage
Charges 2000-05, pp. 86, 87).
2. KEY FACTS ABOUT THE INDUSTRY IN ENGLAND AND WALES
• There are 20.8 million household and 1.6 million non-household connected
customers.
• Ten large regional water and sewerage companies serve customers across
England and Wales.
• There are fifteen local water-only companies mainly in the south and east of
England.
• Turnover in 1999-2000 was GBP seven billion (45 percent water, 55 percent
sewerage).
• Annual projected capital expenditure in 2000-2005, GBP 3.1 billion.
• Regulated capital value in 1999-2000, GBP 27 billion (GBP billion in 1989-90).
Note: all data is for the latest full financial year available i.e. 1999-2000. All
values in May 1999 prices. Financial year runs from 1 April – 31 March.
3. THE CUSTOMER CHARGING BASE
Households
There were 20.8 million households in 1999-2000 (mid year estimate) divided
for charging purposes as follows:
• 16.7 million (83 percent), receiving unmeasured supplies;
• 4.1 million (17 percent), receiving measured (metered) supplies.
Most unmeasured household customers pay water and sewerage charges
related to the value of the property receiving a supply (rateable value based
charges).
All newly built properties (with very few exceptions) since 1990 receive a
metered supply. From 1 April 2000 all customers in England and Wales may opt
for a meter free of initial charge. Most companies require customers with swim-
ming pools and garden sprinklers to be metered.
The annual rate of tariff switching from unmeasured to measured (metered)
supplies is currently around two percent. The proportion of water customers tak-
ing metered supplies by company area varies from over 40 percent in the east of
England to five to ten percent in the north and north-west.
Non-households
The large majority of non-household customers are metered (on average, 86
percent in 1999-2000). The proportion varies from over 90 percent in the Anglian
Water and Severn Trent Water areas to 65 percent in the Northumbrian Water area. 
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FIGURE 2
Large user tariffs: percentage of bill saving over standard
volumetric tariff for customers using 300 ml/annum
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All unmeasured non-households pay water and sewerage charges related to
the value of the property (rateable value). Most companies have programmes to
complete the metering of non-households over the next five years,
4. ANNUAL TARIFF SETTING
Tariffs for households and non-households are set on a decentralised com-
pany basis in England and Wales as follows:
1. Each of the companies sets its tariffs on an annual basis at levels that do not
exceed, on an average charges basis, the annual price limit set by Ofwat for
the company.
2. These tariffs are then subject to approval on an individual charge basis by
Ofwat, having regard to any guidance that may be issued by the Secretary of
State for the Environment for charges in England and the Welsh Assembly for
charges in Wales.
3. Following approval by Ofwat each company is obliged to publish on 1 April
each year an annual charges scheme setting out the individual tariffs and the
charging principles it will apply for that year (1 April – 31 March).
5. PRICING PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED BY THE REGULATOR (OFWAT)
The broad principles followed by Ofwat when regulating tariffs in England and
Wales were set out in Paying for Water (1991) and in a letter to the companies in
1999 (MD 152). These can be summarised as follows:
• Prices to be related to costs (i.e. tariffs should be broadly cost reflective);
• Prices to give incentives to sensible use (i.e. tariffs should encourage efficiency
of use);
• Price structures to be transparent and easy to understand (i.e. tariff structures
should send clear signals to users).
In addition, tariffs should be structured so as to give protection where prac-
ticable to vulnerable customers. This should relate both to tariff structures (as in
general support for regional averaging of charges) and to methods of payment
(i.e. free cash payments).
6. MEASURED TARIFF STRUCTURES
Households
Typically, household measured tariffs consist of a two-part structure:
• A standing charge, set to recover customer-related costs; and
• A volumetric rate, set to recover the balance of operating and capital costs.
In the current year, 2000-01, the average combined standing charge was GBP
47 or 25 percent of the average water and sewerage measured bill of GBP 189.
Typically, the standing charge will include an allowance for surface (and high-
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way) drainage costs. Typical volumetric rates will vary between GBP 0.55 and
0.85 per cubic meter (m3).
Non-households
The typical non-household measured water and sewerage tariff has a similar
two-part structure to that for households (see above).
In the case of non-households the standing charge will vary according to
meter size (25 mm, 50 mm etc). The volumetric rate will generally be set at the
same level as for measured households. 
Drainage charges may be recovered either in the sewerage volumetric rate
(four companies) or in the meter related standing charge (three companies) or in
a separate site area charge (one company) or according to the property value
(two companies).
Large users
Since the mid 1990s, most companies in England and Wales have developed
special tariffs for large users (both water and sewerage), offering lower volumetric
rates. These generally take one of two forms:
• A falling block tariff which offers a lower volumetric rate above a qualifying
threshold; or
• An optional tariff which offers a fixed charge and a lower volumetric rate for
all volumes for qualifying users
In general, the qualifying threshold is around 75-100 Ml/year. Typical 
volumetric rates will vary between GBP 0.35/m3 and 0.55/m3. Since 1997 com-
panies have been expected by Ofwat to set their large user tariffs with reference
to long-run marginal cost or LRMC (see MD159).
7. TRENDS IN PRICES AND BILLS
Overall trends
Prices and bills in England and Wales, since 1989, have tended to follow the
overall price caps set for the industry as follows (annual average, constant prices,
percent):
1990/91 to 1994/95 5.2 percent
1995/96 to 1999/00 1.3 percent
2000/01 to 2004/05 -2.1 percent 
Households
Household bills rose steeply in the first ten years after privatisation in 1989
(by about 40 percent in real terms). In 2000-01, the first year of new price limits,
household bills have fallen by an average of nearly 13 percent.
Figure 1 shows the trend in average household water and sewerage bills in
England and Wales in May 1999 prices for the period 1989-90 to 2000-01.
Non-households
Tables 1a and 1b shows the level of average non-household water and sew-
erage bills for the three years 1995-96, 1999-2000 and 2000-01 for the ten largest
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companies (WaSCs). On average, water bills for non-households, in constant
prices and rising 1000 m3/year, have fallen by 9.5 percent and 11.3 percent
respectively between 1995-96 and 2000-01 (Table 1a/1b).
Large users
Figure 2 shows typical bill savings (in percent) for large user water tariffs in
1999-2000 and 2000-01. This shows that, at an industry level, typical savings over
the standard tariff increased from 21 percent in 1999-2000 to 24 percent in 2000-01. 
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Water pricing in France
Bernard Kaczarek, French Water Agencies in Brussels
MAIN OBJECTIVES OF WATER PRICING POLICY IN FRANCE
In France, water pricing, has always been considered a political issue.
Firstly, local communities, which are in charge of supplying drinking water as
well as sewage and wastewater management, could not avoid the financial
aspect. Investments are often very costly; running costs must be covered.
However, domestic water users are also voters and it was necessary to consider
the economic and social dimension in water pricing. That’s why we find subsi-
dies from the local municipal budget in many towns; in this way drastic price
increases can be avoided. Of course, industry connected to public networks can
indirectly benefit from those subsidies.
In agriculture, the importance of irrigation for some specific cultures is
essential. Farmers have always considered water found near their properties as
belonging to the property. Consequently, they thought they could use this water
‘free of charge’. Even when the State was investing in large irrigation systems,
users covered only a fraction of the running costs.
The financial aspect of the question gains prominence, again, as significant
investments are necessary to update systems in order to comply with standards
for drinking water supply or sewage; and as we see the entrance of the public
sector in this area, local communities being able to contract with private compa-
nies for water services.
Usually, in water pricing, neither environmental costs nor resource costs are
taken into account in the total costs to be recovered. Costs to be recovered include
financial costs, running costs (operation and maintenance) and capital costs.
Cross-subsidies still exist. The State, as well as the Regions, participates finan-
cially in some huge investments, like dams, or smaller ones, such as irrigation
works or rural wastewater treatment plants. Here, French Water Agencies play an
important role by subsidising many waterworks such as wastewater treatment
plants, municipal or industrial, or sewage networks, dams and others. Those sub-
sidies (or soft loans) come from revenue collected on the basis of the polluter pays
principle or the user pays principle and can cover more than one third of the total
amount of investments.
According to studies recently carried out in France, the approximate recovery
level of those financial costs is, on average, nearly 90 percent. Important disparities
are to be observed: the drinking water supply sector is the one where the recovery
rate is the highest (nearly 100 percent). The sewage and wastewater sector has a
high level (more than 80 percent) but with a disparity between the urban sector
(where recovery is substantial) and the rural sector (still receiving some subsidies).
For household water services, prices are usually calculated by adding a fixed
element to a variable one, which is strictly proportional to the consumption. Large
use of water meters in individual households, as well as in an increasing fraction of
flats, is an important element of public information and even awareness.
In irrigation, farmers pay a very low part of the costs (from 35 to 40 percent),
at the moment, state subsidies still remaining very important. Lastly, the industrial
sector covers about 70 percent, benefiting too from transfers coming from the
household sector. In this sector, permits and taxes play an important complementary
role, promoting a greater awareness of water issues, while still taking economic
realities into account, the lower the price the better.
PRICE REGULATION
In the 36,000 local communities existing in France, the mayor, who is elected
by the citizens, has a major role to play. He can contract private companies, create
a joint public company with other local communities for various water services and
is always responsible for the overall level of prices in water services. The role of
water users, being also voters, is, of course, essential. In order to facilitate open-
ness, a recent law, adopted in 1994, requires the mayor to produce a yearly detailed
report which is presented and discussed by the members of local council. This
report is also published in local newspapers.
This same law created a more rigid framework for the contracting policy
adopted by mayors when dealing with private companies in order to avoid non-
balanced public-private partnerships. This is particularly important as private
companies, which are subsidiaries of only four major industrial groups, handle
more than two-thirds of water supplied to households.
A new water law, which could be adopted in 2001, seeks to expand this
regulation process by creating a high council for water services. This new insti-
tutional body will try to improve the quality of contracts signed between local
communities and private companies, as well as develop a fair competition
between the four industrial groups mentioned.
Water prices are strictly monitored by the French Water Agencies. This
allows the comparison of various neighbouring situations and ensures the biggest
transparency, which is essential in the price regulation process.
TREND AND HISTORY OF PRICING POLICIES IN FRANCE
Drinking water supply, sewage management and irrigation have always
been considered essential tasks to be handled by political decision-makers (from
a local, regional or even national level).
One of the first major steps was taken after the Second World War, when the
State greatly subsidised drinking waterworks when financing the reconstruction
of local communities damaged in the war. Many networks and water towers were
built or rebuilt. As subsidies were important, water prices only covered a small
part of capital costs.
The promotion of agriculture was also considered as an essential part of
economic activity. Irrigation received huge subsidies, being an important tool
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to increase production; farmers had to pay only a symbolic part of the financial
costs of irrigation works. The development of the Common Agricultural Policy,
ensuring revenues proportional to production, supported this process by
encouraging farmers to increase the irrigated surface.
Another important step was made with the creation of French Water
Agencies in the sixties. Taxes and fees, collected in households and industries,
not agriculture, were used to subsidise waterworks. A main consequence was the
decrease of state subsidies, the government arguing that money could be found
by water agencies.
A third step occurred, in the beginning of the eighties, with the process of
decentralisation. At that time, the State decided to give more power to regional and
local bodies and stopped subsidising some major sectors, such as urban sewage
management. Of course, local communities had to ensure the continuation of 
public water services. Some of them gave substantial grants to those services in
order to avoid price increases; in doing that, they used the municipal budget and
the taxpayer was paying for the remaining part of services, which was not covered
by water users. In other local communities, the mayors decided to increase the 
privatisation of water services, trying by that to let the private sector bear the 
burden of new investments. In many cases, necessary price increases were spread
out over a number of years in order to avoid a more extreme increase.
The implementation of the new urban wastewater treatment directive began
in the nineties and led to huge new investments and a knock-on effect of addi-
tional price increases. At the same time, a new law introduced regulations pre-
venting local communities from granting public water services. Consequently, at
the beginning of the last decade, water prices for households grew yearly by
nearly 10 percent (not including inflation). Nowadays, this rate is much lower but
always higher than the inflation rate.
Water prices, paid by households, are approximately EUR 2.8 per cubic meter.
These prices cover drinking water supply as well as sewage. They vary widely and
depend on the level of recent investment. By paying the costs for wastewater treat-
ment, we can consider that a part of environmental costs are now covered, thanks
to the implementation of the urban wastewater treatment directive.
In agriculture, farmers are not yet ready to pay a price covering the full
financial cost of services in irrigation. But, it can be seen that some political
decision-makers believe that water prices must increase and they must stop
most subsidies. They are also trying to introduce new taxes penalising diffuse
pollution from agriculture. 
The next decade will be particularly important when implementing the new
framework water directive, which proposes a better use of economic instruments
in water management. The first step necessary will be the stimulation of a better
understanding of costs and the development of a new transparency.
In this context, the new water law, which is planned to be adopted in 2001,
will be the main tool for action on national level. The above mentioned creation
of a high council for water services, a development of new taxes, particularly in
agriculture, and the implementation of the new framework directive will be the
main issues tackled by this law. As always in water issues, a new law is highly
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sensitive and a political consensus must be found. Nevertheless, whatever the
result, this will be a new step in the development of the use of economic instru-
ments in water management. 
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Water pricing policies in the Netherlands
Erik Mostert, RBA Centre, Delft University of Technology, Netherlands
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses water pricing policies in The Netherlands. After 
presenting the organisation of Dutch water management (§ 2), it discusses the 
different economic instruments (§ 3) and the way in which tariffs are set (§ 4).
Furthermore, this paper presents the development of costs and tariffs, the effects
of new (EU) requirements, and possible institutional and policy changes. Despite
significant increases, public support of the tariffs is generally still sufficient (§ 5).
Based on an explanation of this phenomenon, the paper formulates an agenda
for the coming years to ensure continued support. It is argued that this agenda
applies to other European and non-European countries too (§ 6).
Unless otherwise stated, the financial data in this paper come from the Dutch
Central Statistical Office <http://www.cbs.nl/>.
2. DUTCH WATER MANAGEMENT
Dutch water management has a long tradition. An important role is played
by the water boards (57), which are responsible for flood protection, drainage,
regulating emissions and sewage treatment. Individual landowners are respon-
sible for the maintenance of the smallest drainage canals. The management of
the ‘state waters’ (e.g. the main rivers) and the connected infrastructure is the
responsibility of Rijkswaterstaat, the national water management agency. The
provinces (12) are responsible for groundwater management and supervise
the water boards and the 537 municipalities. The latter are responsible for the
sewerage system. Drinking water supply is the responsibility of 20 publicly
owned private companies, one municipal service (Amsterdam) and one very
small private company. Water management policy is made primarily at the
national and provincial level through a system of multi-level planning. Perdok
1998, Mostert 1998a).
The total costs of water management are approximately EUR 5,700 million
(Commissie Water-beheer 21e Eeuw 2000). This constitutes 1.5 percent of the
gross national product.
3. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
Most economic instruments in Dutch water management have a financing
function. In addition, there are two ‘green’ water taxes and one mineral tax with,
at least officially, an incentive function.
3.1 Financial instruments
ASWP charge (EUR 999 million; 2000)
The ASWP (Act on Surface Water Pollution) charge finances all water quality
tasks of the water boards, including sewage treatment, and some water quality
tasks of Rijkswaterstaat.1 The charge is based on the number of ‘pollution units’
(p.u.), whether discharged directly or into the sewerage system. One-person
households are charged for one p.u., and larger households for three or 3.5 p.u.
Small industries are charged for a number of pollution units that is based on sim-
ple tables, using parameters such as water use or volume of production. Large
industries pay for the pollution, which is measured. The water board’s tariff equals
the total budgeted costs for water quality management divided by the total num-
ber of pollution units. In 1997 it ranged from EUR 30 to 61. The tariff of
Rijkswaterstaat is set primarily political and is presently EUR 32. 
Water board charge (EUR 549 million; 2000 )
The water board charge finances surface water quantity management
(drainage, flood protection) by the water boards. Dyke reinforcement along the
main rivers and the sea is, however, heavily subsidised by the national govern-
ment through the provinces. The tariff of the water board charge is calculated in
a complicated way. Five overlapping categories of users are identified: owners of
land, renters of land, owners of buildings, users of buildings for commercial pur-
poses, and the inhabitants of the water board area. The costs of the water board
are first allocated to specific tasks and then allocated to the categories that bene-
fit from these tasks. Afterwards, the tariff per hectare (land), guilder (buildings)
or person (inhabitants) is determined. The tariffs differ significantly between cat-
egories and between water boards, depending on the natural circumstances and
the exact allocation of the costs. For instance, in 1997 the tariff for the category
inhabitants ranged from EUR 7.2 to EUR 41.7 (Stevens 1997, Van Elk 1997).
Groundwater abstraction charge (EUR 15 million; 2000)
The groundwater abstraction charge originally financed only provincial
research for groundwater quantity management and compensation payments of
damage that could not be attributed to individual groundwater abstractions. Since
1997, the revenue can also be used for financing so-called ‘anti-desiccation’ 
projects, such as the construction of weirs to maintain surface and groundwater
levels and thus protect nature.
Sewerage charge (EUR 651 million; 2000)
The sewerage charge is levied by 96 percent of the Dutch municipalities and
finances, on average, 73 percent of the maintenance and replacement costs of the
existing sewerage system. Twenty-seven percent is financed from the municipal
real-estate tax or from other sources, such as subsidies. The costs of new sewers
are recovered from the proceeds of the sale of building plots developed by the
municipalities. Households usually pay a fixed amount and industry a fixed
amount plus an additional amount based on water use. In 1996, the tariff was on
average EUR 82, ranging from EUR 45 to EUR 272, (Elshof and Oomens 1997).
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1. The administrative costs of permitting can be recovered though administrative fees.
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Drinking water price (EUR 1,366 million; 1997)
The drinking water price finances water production and distribution by the
public water supply companies and includes the different taxes that the compa-
nies have to pay (§ 3.2), (VEWIN 1999). The drinking water price usually consists
of a standing charge and a price per cubic meter; large users often get some
deduction. In 1997, the standing charge for households ranged from zero to EUR
75 per year and the price per cubic meter from EUR 0.71 to EUR 1.57.
Cost recovery
In total, these financial instruments finance around 75 percent of the costs of
public water management. Often, however, there is no close match between the
actual water pollution or use and the charges paid (Mostert 1998, CIW 1999). For
instance, farmers do not pay for pollution caused by pesticides. Moreover, the
users and polluters experience other costs as well. These include the costs of
maintaining the small drainage canals, the costs of industries abstracting or treat-
ing their own (waste) water, and the costs of complying with environmental
requirements and land-use restrictions. In addition, they have to pay the two
water taxes discussed below.
3.2 Incentive function and/or revenue raising
Incentive effect
Several instruments with a financial function have an incentive effect too. The
effect of the ASWP charge on pollution by large industries has been very signifi-
cant, especially since the tariff includes more than only sewage treatment and is
therefore relatively high (Bressers 1983; Commissie onderzoek financiering 1999).
The drinking water price probably has very little effect on domestic water use but
more on agricultural and industrial water use (see also below). The water board,
the sewerage and the groundwater charge have no incentive effect. The last two
are independent from actual water use or pollution, and the tariff of the latter is
very low.
In addition to these financial instruments, three taxes with an official incen-
tive function should be mentioned: the groundwater abstraction tax, the water
supply tax and the mineral tax.
The groundwater abstraction tax (EUR 163 million; 1999)
The groundwater abstraction tax was introduced in 1995 as one of several
‘green taxes.’ At the time the planned increase of the fuel tax, introduced in 1992,
was cancelled because of the effects further increases would have on economic
sectors using much fuel. To compensate for the revenue foregone, the green
taxes were introduced. However, the green taxes were also meant to have an
incentive effect. Contrary to, for instance, income tax, which ‘discourages’
employment, the green taxes were supposed to discourage environmentally
harmful activities and, in the case of the groundwater abstraction tax, reduce
groundwater use in favour of surface water use.
The revenue of the groundwater abstraction tax goes into the general budget.
The tariff per cubic meter is EUR 0.16 for public water supply companies and EUR
0.12 for others (next year EUR 0.16 too). For environmental reasons, the tariffs are
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lower for installations cleaning recyclable bottles, for instance. Companies, abstract-
ing less than 40,000 cubic meters (m3) per year, and pumps, with a capacity of less
than 10 m3/hour, are exempted (VROM 2000a). This has stimulated farmers to
reduce their drinking water use and increase their, exempted, groundwater abstrac-
tions, sometimes piercing though protective layers (IWACO 1997).
The water supply tax (EUR 113 million; 2000)
The water supply tax was introduced in 2000 as a green tax (VROM 2000b).
Presently, drinking water deliveries are taxed at EUR 0.285/m3 up to 300 m3, minus
EUR 11.34. In 1999, the VAT on drinking water supply had been increased from
six percent to 17.5 percent and income tax had been lowered simultaneously.
However, since drinking water is a primary need, parliament decided that the tar-
iff for the first 27 EUR should continue to be six percent. However, according to
EU law, it is impossible to use two tariffs for one product, so the tariff for all sup-
plies became six percent again. To compensate for the lost revenue and meet the
quantitative goal that government had set itself of ‘greening’ the taxes (EUR 318
million per year), the water supply tax was then introduced.
Both the water supply tax and the groundwater abstraction tax got much crit-
icism from the Dutch Consumers’ Association and the VEWIN, the Dutch
Waterworks Association. Comparing water prices and water use in different parts
of The Netherlands, the VEWIN concluded that the price elasticity of domestic
water use is zero and, consequently, no reductions in use can be expected.
Moreover, the VEWIN argues that the environmental effects of drinking water
production in The Netherlands are limited, and that the taxes result in an unfair
shift in the tax burden from small households to large households and from high-
er income groups to lower income groups (Waterspiegel, October 1999; higher
income groups in The Netherlands use ten percent less water per capita, perhaps
because of better appliances).
Mineral tax
The mineral tax was introduced in 1998. Farmers have to pay for the amount
of nitrates and phosphates produced on their farm (manure) or brought onto
their farm, minus the uptake by the crops and the ‘allowed losses’ per hectare
(presently 35 kg for phosphates and 275 kg for nitrates). The exact amounts are
calculated using either actual measurements or fixed standards per animal (pro-
duction), cubic meter (agrochemical additions) and hectare (uptake). The tariff
for 2000 is EUR 0.68 per kilo (k) for nitrates, EUR 2.27/k for the first ten kilos per
hectare of phosphates and 9.08 EUR for any additional kilo of phosphates. Data
on the revenue, which goes into the general budget, is not yet available.
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4. PRICE REGULATION
There is limited need for price regulation in The Netherlands. Water manage-
ment is still in public hands, and tariffs are usually determined following democratic
processes.
ASWP charge
The tariff for the ASWP charge for the state waters is set by law and follows
the usual legal procedure. The tariff is a political decision that balances environ-
mental benefits (the revenue is spent on removing polluted sediments and other
things) and the wish to limit the tax burden. The tariff for the regional waters is
set by the water board concerned in a water board bylaw, adopted by the (demo-
cratically elected) council of the water board. After, the bylaw has to be approved
by the (democratically elected) provincial council. It has to be noted, however,
that many Dutch citizens hardly know what the tasks of the province or the water
board are, and that the turn out at elections is relatively (the province) or very
(the water board) low.
Water board charge
The water board charge is also determined in a water board bylaw. The tariffs
obviously depend on the planned expenses and on the budget, which is adopted
by the council. In addition, the bylaw setting the tariffs has to conform to the 
so-called ‘allocation bylaw’, which regulates the allocation of costs to the different
categories of users. Both the ‘tariff bylaw’ and the ‘allocation bylaw’ have to be
approved by the provincial council.
Groundwater abstraction charge
The groundwater abstraction charge is set in a provincial bylaw, adopted by
the provincial council. The possibilities that this charge offers for financing anti-
desiccation projects are usually not used as groundwater is already taxed through
the groundwater abstraction charge, because of all other new environmental
requirements that agriculture has to comply with, and in the light of the (albeit
decreasing) lobbying power of agriculture. Many small agricultural abstractions
do not even have to be registered.
Sewerage charge
The tariff for the sewerage charge is set in a municipal bylaw and depends
on the costs of the sewerage system and on municipal politics. Insight into the
development of costs has been increased significantly by the municipal sewerage
plans, which are obligatory since 1994 (Elshof and Oomens 1997). The level of
local taxes and charges is, however, politically sensitive. Moreover, it is often not
politically advantageous to invest in invisible sewers, and the supervision of the
municipalities on this point is limited.
Drinking water price
The drinking water price is usually proposed by the director of the water
supply company and adopted by its shareholders (the municipalities and/or the
province) or a board representing the shareholders. The aim is to recover the
costs and not to make a profit; dividends paid to the shareholders are low
M O S T E R T
E C O N O M I C  I N S T R U M E N T S  A N D  W A T E R  P O L I C I E S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E70
(Cramer 1999). The involvement of municipalities and provinces is supposed to
prevent monopoly abuse. In addition, voluntary benchmarking of performance
and efficiency has been introduced recently (VEWIN/Anderson Consulting 1999).
Presently, there are ideas to make benchmarking obligatory and to establish cus-
tomer service committees.
The three green taxes
The groundwater abstraction tax, the water supply tax and the mineral tax are
national taxes and therefore set by national law. The tariffs are set primarily politi-
cally. The tariff of the water supply tax was set specifically to replace the revenue
of the high VAT-tariff on drinking water. As explained in the previous section, the
high VAT tariff was introduced simply to meet the quantitative goals for greening
the taxes.
Social considerations
For social reasons citizens with a household income, on or below the mini-
mum wage, may be exempted from paying the ASWP charge, the water board
charge or the sewerage charge. The water board or the municipality concerned sets
the exact criteria. Exemptions from the drinking water charge are not possible. In
addition, water boards and municipalities may decide to postpone investments to
ease tariff increases. This has happened, for instance, quite often, in the case of the
sewerage system.
5. DEVELOPMENTS
The development of water prices and pricing policies can be discussed
under four headings: cost accounting and subsidies, new (EU) requirements,
institutional changes, and social acceptability.
Cost accounting and subsidies
To understand the development of costs, it is in the first place necessary to
understand how the costs are calculated. Water boards, municipalities and water
supply companies take operational (personnel, consumables etc.), as well as cap-
ital costs (depreciation and interest), into account. However, depreciation is
based on the acquisition costs, which are usually much lower than replacement
costs, especially in the case of assets with a long life span. Moreover, a net sys-
tem is used. This means that not the full acquisition costs are depreciated, but the
acquisition costs minus financial contributions received. These used to be signif-
icant (27.5 percent or even 90 percent subsidies for sewage treatment plants, 100
percent external financing for sewers). Consequently, capital costs and therefore
tariffs increase considerably, after replacement.
To prevent sudden increases, either reserves have to be formed, or invest-
ments have to be scheduled in such a way as to prevent peaks. However, financial
reserves are usually limited and the planning period for investments is usually
much shorter than the economic lifespan of the infrastructure, with the possible
exception of the sewerage system.
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New (EU) requirements
Another factor is the need for investments. Significant investments have been
made to meet the requirements of the Urban Wastewater Directive (91/271/EEC)
and implement the national policy to reduce stormwater overflows. Further,
many Dutch sewers are ageing and will have to be replaced in the near future.
Large increases are expected in costs and tariffs. The largest increase is
expected for the sewerage system. For the period 1996-2005, investments worth
EUR 7,500 million have been planned: EUR 3,400 million for replacement (8.5
percent of the total length), EUR 2,600 million for reducing stormwaters, and EUR
1,500 million for connecting presently unconnected premises. After 2005, the
need for replacement will increase further. In the municipality of Tilburg, for
instance, the annual costs in 2053 will be twice as high in real terms as in 1994 or
even four times as high, depending on how the costs are financed, (Tilburg 1993).
The costs of drinking water supply are expected to rise too, but less. No nation-
al data are available, but the groundwater tax and the water supply tax alone have
been responsible for a price rise of more than 20 percent (VEWIN/Anderson
Consulting 1999). The costs of sewage treatment (EUR 697 million annually,
1998) have risen mainly because of the stricter standards for nitrogen (N) and
phosphate (P) removal required by the Urban Wastewater Directive. However,
there are no detailed cost estimates for this. The main problem is that investments
often serve several purposes simultaneously: extension, replacement, and N and
P-removal.
Quite different requirements are Articles 4, 5 and 9 of the Water Directive
Framework. Article 4 requires the Member States to reach a ‘good status’ for all their
waters. Nobody knows how much this will cost The Netherlands, as it is still unclear
to what extent the different derogations can be invoked. Article 9 requires the
Member States to develop economic instruments that (a) have an incentive effect,
and (b) ensure adequate cost recovery at least from the household, industry and
agriculture categories. This may necessitate the introduction of more charging for 
diffuse pollution, directly or though product charges. Article 5, finally, requires an 
economic analysis of water use to support the application of article nine. Here, too,
some changes may be necessary.
Institutional and policy changes
From 1997 onwards, there have been discussions on privatising the water
supply companies and sewage treatment (Mostert 1998a). For the time being, this
has been stopped by parliament, but if eventually privatisation is introduced,
price regulation will become necessary.
In the meantime, and probably partly in reaction, initiatives have been taken
to improve co-operation between drinking water companies, water boards
(sewage treatment) and municipalities (sewerage system). Reputedly, this can save
millions or even billions of Euros (KIWA/Stichting RIONED 1998). Co-operation
has been difficult for several reasons. Often it is not clear where exactly the (finan-
cial) responsibility of one water manager stops and the responsibility of another
begins. Moreover, many municipalities have little knowledge of and interest in
water management. In addition, the water boards are wary of loosing their waste-
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water treatment tasks. The Dutch water boards both operate the treatment plants
and regulate their emissions, unlike in many other countries, where infrastructure
management and regulation are separate. Some fear that the privatisation of water
supply would make co-operation more difficult.
In addition, possible simplifications of the financing system of the water
boards are being discussed (Commissie onderzoek financiering 1999, Admiraal
and Havekes 1999, CIW 1999). The main issues are the allocation of the costs of
water quantity management to the different categories of users, which is seen as
very complex and lacking in transparency, and the high tariff of the ASWP charge,
(Hijum 2000). The allocation of the costs touches upon the discussion of the gov-
ernance structure of the water boards, which is also under discussion. Presently,
the different categories of users are represented in the board more-or-less in pro-
portion to their financial contribution. Changes that are being considered include
a reduction in the number of categories of users and a simpler system of allocat-
ing the costs.
The present ASWP charge may lead industry to pretreat its own wastewater or
disconnect from the public infrastructure altogether (estimation: 500,000 p.u.). This
leaves the water boards with the costs of coping with relatively clean wastewater
flows and the capital costs of the existing infrastructure. This increases the tariff even
further. A solution that has been proposed is to replace the ASWP charge with an
(on average 40 percent lower) sewage treatment charge that finances only sewage
treatment in a strict sense, and include the costs of coping with stormwaters and
other aspects of water quality management in a new water board charge. For direct
emissions an emission charge would have to be introduced. In addition, the ‘pollu-
tion units’ could be replaced by ‘costing units’ that are in closer relation to treatment
costs (CIW 1999). For instance, the volume of wastewater in cubic meters would be
taken into account, but heavy metals would not be taken into account any more,
because they do not influence treatment costs.
For the short term, a different solution has been chosen. From January 1,
2001, the water boards will be entitled to use the revenue from the ASWP charge
for subsidising industry, if they continue to use the public infrastructure (in fact a
reduction of the tariff). Moreover, in the future, only water boards will be allowed
to treat the wastewater of small companies and households, thus prohibiting
water industry offering cheap wastewater treatment services.
Another change that has already been agreed upon is to allow experiments
with the ‘water track’ from 1 January 2001 onwards. In specific cases, the ASWP
charge can be made volumetric and combined with the drinking water bill and the
sewerage charge. In effect, this would increase the marginal cost of water use and,
thus, it is believed, reduce water use. Yet, some doubt that the reduction would be
significant (low price elasticity). They argue that the financial burden for large fam-
ilies will increase and that the costs of sewage collection and treatment hardly vary
with water use (e.g. Hoogendoorn, Dijkgraaf and Versteeg, 2000).
Social acceptability
In any democracy, pricing policies can only be ‘sustainable’, if the resulting
prices and tariffs are accepted by the population at large. From this point of view,
the situation in The Netherlands is still rather favourable. In 1999, Dutch con-
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sumers were reasonably to very satisfied with the drinking water quality. Some 70
percent thought the water supply should remain in public hands, and 51 percent
thought the price of drinking water was exactly right. (However, only ten percent
knew what the price was. (H2O 2000, No. 3, p. 4). Local authorities and water
boards do get a lot of critical attention, but this has not yet lead to serious prob-
lems. Possible reasons are the following:
• There is not one water bill but several bills. Consequently, the individual bills
are usually much lower than for instance the municipal real estate tax.
• The level of water services provision is very high, especially in the field of
drinking water supply.
• There is a long tradition of cost recovery in Dutch water management, and
price increases have been significant but gradual.
• Water management is public and water prices are not seen as ‘paying for the
director’s Rolls Royce’.
Still, the present relative complacency may not last forever. There has
already been quite a lot of criticism against the groundwater abstraction tax and
the water supply tax and farmers are very wary of any tariff increases. Moreover,
recent protests concerning the fuel price and the fuel tax have shown that incen-
tive taxes are not always very popular, further, the environment is presently less
an issue than 15 years ago.
6. THE AGENDA FOR THE COMING YEARS
In the coming years several activities will have to be undertaken to foster
public support of Dutch water management, ensure its financial sustainability and
facilitate the use of incentive taxes and charges. Based on the preceding discus-
sion, eight tasks can be formulated:
1. To continue the provision of good quality water services that meet public
demands with the least financial and environmental costs possible.
2. To explain what the revenue of the financial instruments is used for.
3. To explain the purpose of instruments with an incentive function and pre-
vent the introduction of ‘fake’ green taxes that give green taxes a bad name.
4. To increase environmental awareness.
5. To make the necessary changes for implementing the Framework Directive
Water.
6. To simplify the financing system and, whenever possible, the institutional
structure (transparency).
7. To promote the active involvement of the public through public information,
consultation and participation.
8. In general, to maintain the legitimacy of and trust in water management.
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Some of these tasks deserve separate attention and research, such as (1), (5)
and (7). All tasks, however, should get attention whenever the position and financ-
ing of the water boards is discussed, the privatisation of the drinking water sector
is debated, systems for river basin management planning are designed, or any
other aspect of water management is at stake. Furthermore, it seems that these
eight tasks are important not only for The Netherlands, but for all European and
many non-European countries. The priorities and concrete solutions chosen will,
of course, have to depend on the specific national circumstances.
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1. The International Conference Lille 2, ‘Europe of Water, Water of Europeans
— Integration of Economic Assessment in the Decision-Making Process’,
took place in Lille (France) under the auspices of the French Presidency of
the European Union, at the invitation of the French Ministry of Land Planning
and Environment, the French Water Agencies, the Region Nord-Pas de Calais
and the European Commission (DG Environment and TAIEX1).
2. The participants included representatives of: the French government; the
ministries of environment of the Member States of the European Union 2
and the Accession Countries ;3 the European Parliament, the European
Commission and other European institutions; as well as representatives
from environmental NGOs, farmers associations and industry, researchers
and consultants.
3. This conference was a first step in the implementation of the economic 
elements of the Water Framework Directive (WFD). The Conference’s objec-
tive was to identify practical options for implementation, and to understand
their strengths and limitations. The conference focused on the following
aspects: 
• Economic analysis of water uses in river basin districts; 
• Cost recovery, including the internalisation of environmental and
resource costs; 
• Incentive pricing for a rational use of water;
• The next practical steps in promoting the implementation of the WFD. 
4. This report is a record of the presentations and discussions that took place
during this two-day event. 
PREAMBLE
5. The participants agreed that water is a natural resource and a common heritage,
which must be treated as such, and not a commercial product like any other.
This resource needs to be protected, defended and managed in the interest of
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1. Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office.
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the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
3. Accession Countries represented were: Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
the environment, public health, food production and other activities. In addi-
tion to the setting of quality and emission standards and the identification of
best practices in water management, a just and rigorous economic assessment
of water use is one of the instruments for ensuring a high level of protection of
water resources. 
6. The Conference Lille 2 showed that the implementation of effective protec-
tion and sustainable management of water resources is one of the most
important challenges in the years to come. For this, it is vital to:
• Develop new economic instruments; 
• Ensure efficient and equitable pricing policies which take account of 
different users;
• Apply the polluter-pays principle and the resource-user-pays principle;
• Integrate economic assessments into decision-making at all levels.
7. Finally, it is evident that the new WFD is only a first step towards a sustainable
management of water resources and that additional efforts will be necessary,
particularly in order to integrate water resource protection requirements into
all other policies. 
8. Many uncertainties remain, however, concerning the application of economic
analyses and instruments. Evaluations of practical experience are needed before
any guidelines for implementing the economic elements of the Directive can be
developed.
THE ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF THE WATER FRAMEWORK
DIRECTIVE: FACT AND TRENDS
9. The new WFD, which was adopted after a long negotiation process, reinforces
the role of economics in water policies by key provisions.
• Water management is not only an economic issue. However, the use of
economic instruments (Article 9 WFD), such as prices and charges, are
a useful means for ensuring cost recovery and achieving efficient and
sustainable use of water resources. Revenues from economic instru-
ments should remain in the water sector and be appropriately ‘ear-
marked’, rather than go into the general budget. 
• The economic analysis of water use (Article 5 and Annex III WFD) is to
support the development of sound pricing policies, and to identify the
most cost-effective measures for achieving the environmental objectives
of the WFD.
10. Over time, the use of these economic instruments should substantially modify
the behaviour of the different stakeholders and reduce pressures on water
resources. The instruments thus have a triple function: to establish economic
incentives for achieving environmental objectives, ensure stable finances, and
K R A E M E R ,  M A Z U R E K ,  H A N S E N ,  I N T E R W I E S
E C O N O M I C  I N S T R U M E N T S  A N D  W A T E R  P O L I C I E S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E78
K R A E M E R ,  M A Z U R E K ,  H A N S E N ,  I N T E R W I E S
E C O N O M I C  I N S T R U M E N T S  A N D  W A T E R  P O L I C I E S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E 79
improve information. Therefore, economic considerations should be integrated
into decision-making at all levels.
11. Other economic instruments are not specifically listed in the WFD but offer
opportunities for improving water management. Practice shows that markets
for transferable water permits could be developed, for instance.
COST RECOVERY AND INCENTIVE PRICING
12. Case studies show that the implementation of (full) cost recovery for water
services and incentive pricing policies might prove to be rather complicated.
In effect, cost recovery implies that there are methods for assessing the full
economic cost of water services. Cost assessments, however, need to be
established for each sector (households, agriculture and industries) before
specific sectoral cost recovery and incentive systems can be designed.
• Households : Evidence shows that water demand is responsive to price
changes in the short and even more so in the long run. Social concerns must
be considered in designing tariffs and pricing policies. Furthermore, cost
recovery and pricing policies should operate at appropriate spatial scales.
In most cases, the level of technical supply systems may be adequate.
• Agriculture : Agricultural water use is highly diverse and can be quite
responsive to price or tariff changes. The economic analyses required under
the WFD, to be undertaken before 2004, will be a sound basis for develop-
ing adequate pricing policies. They will also feed into the deliberations on
the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in the years to come.
• Industry : Much industry operates its own water supply and effluent
treatment systems and pays its own costs. Due to the heterogeneity of
the remaining industrial sectors that rely on public water services, and
the specific situation in Accession Countries, cost recovery and incentive
pricing may be difficult to establish in some cases. It may be necessary
to allow for a period of transition and to develop water policies coher-
ently and consistently. 
13. An overview of tariff structures shows a wide variety, which must be accept-
ed as a starting point for the development of new policies. Implementation
must be flexible and allow for differences among countries. Pricing policies
should be built on an understanding of the many factors that influence water
use, and willingness to pay. 
14. In the development and implementation of cost recovery and incentive pric-
ing policies, transparency, accountability and public participation, as well as
phasing-in and earmarking of revenues are essential. In some cases, institu-
tional systems for water services and water management may need to be
reviewed.
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ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS, BENEFITS AND DAMAGES
15. Economic analysis can be applied to groundwater protection and manage-
ment. Here, and in other cases, economic analyses should systematically
consider preventative measures, including zoning, in order to redress the
current practice giving priority to curative action. 
16. Economic analyses are sensitive to the spatial scale and the time periods
considered. They should also include risk assessments, which can be an
important aspect of environmental externalities. 
17. The analysis and allocation of costs and benefits is being practised in water
user associations, and have proven to be adaptable to changing needs. In
particular, the collective power of members over their association’s budget
ensures that willingness and ability to pay are reflected in decision-making. 
18. Economic analyses have to be based on solid methodologies, some of which
have yet to be developed or refined. In this context, Annex III does not at
present offer operational guidance. Suitable and practicable methodologies
and standards must be developed and tested as a matter of urgency.
Otherwise, there is a risk of not meeting the WFD deadline for economic
analysis of water uses in 2004.
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT AND DECISION-MAKING
19. Economic assessments can provide an important part but not all of the back-
ground for political decision-making. Their usefulness depends on the
choice and quality of the approaches and methods applied. 
20. More data on costs, damages and benefits as well as socio-economic 
information, such as on the determinants of the willingness to pay for
water services, are required for improving decision-making and setting the
right incentives. 
21. However, improving the information basis may not be sufficient if only
cost-benefit analyses are applied. These alone cannot address the actual
complexity of water management issues and decision-making processes
(information asymmetries, multi-level systems etc.). 
22. However, economic assessments are an integral part of water resource man-
agement at the operational level, and are used as a matter of course in the
operation of water services infrastructure.
23. The present need for economic analyses of water use, required under the
WFD, can be met only by the pragmatic application of existing methodologies
on the basis of available data. Such pragmatic application will improve 
economic analyses and may the even more useful for decision-making.
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EXPECTATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND COMMITMENTS FOR
FURTHER ACTION
24. In view of the WFD requirement to carry out economic analyses for all river
basin districts before the year 2004 and the insufficiency of Annex III WFD,
there is an urgent need to identify and share experiences, learn from policy
successes and failures, establish best practices and minimum requirements,
and draft practical guidelines on economic analysis and pricing.4
25. The participants of the International Conference Lille 2 would welcome the
establishment of a network of experts from member states, the European
Commission, and accession countries (the ‘Lille Network’) as an informal and
effective means of supporting the proper implementation of the economic
aspects of the WFD and the development of practical guidelines.
26. In the medium term, the Lille Network could contribute to reviews of:
• Existing water tariffs and pricing policies; 
• Economic instruments for internalising environmental and resource
costs, including the use of revenue (earmarking);
• Subsidies, both in the water sector and in sectors having an impact on
water resources;
• Methodologies for economic analyses of water policies. 
Minimum requirements for economic analyses as well as examples of best
practice may evolve as a basis for validation and formal quality control.
27. The Lille Network should be based on open collaboration and the involve-
ment of water users, stakeholders and the public, in order to cover the widest
possible range of interests and expertise, and thus secure the quality and
acceptability of resulting guidelines. Its aim should be to drive a process of
convergence in water policies, in economic analyses and the financial impli-
cations of river basin management plans and programmes of measures, and
the consistent application of European environmental legislation.
28. It is vital that Europe develops effective pricing policies to provide a model
for other regions of the world in fighting water pollution and scarcity and
establishing economically and ecologically sound water policies. The Lille
Process is meant to facilitate Europe’s global role.
29. This memorandum will be presented to the next informal meeting of
European Water Directors on October 23-24, 2000, in Paris.
4. There appears to be no alternative because of the likely difficulty to amend Annex III of the WFD before it is put in
use, or to negotiate and adopt a daughter directive on the economic elements of the WFD. 
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Irrigation water pricing at BRL
Jean-Pierre Nicol, Member of the Executive Board of BRL, France
1. PRESENTATION OF BRL AND LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON
BRL is the official acronym of ‘Compagnie Nationale d’Aménagement de la
Région du Bas-Rhône et du Languedoc’, which means ‘National Company for the
Development of the Languedoc-Roussillon Region’. It is a Regional Development
Company, i.e. a commercial company with a majority of public shareholders, run
under special controls by the State.
• Languedoc-Roussillon is a region situated in the south of France, along the
Mediterranean. The region is like an amphitheatre around the Mediterranean,
with mountains in the north and west (with the Pyrenean and Spanish border
in the south-west), and plains near the coast. To the east, we find the river
Rhone, which is one of the most powerful rivers in the Mediterranean, particu-
larly in summer (average flow: 1,700 cubic meters per second (m3/s); 500 m3/s
in summer). It is a very typical Mediterranean region, very dry in summer, with
the possibility of short but devastating floods in winter (October/November). 
BRL was created in 1955, within the framework of a strongly backed national
policy for regional development, with two main objectives: 
• To supply water to all those who needed it, particularly to agriculture and to
the new towns to be created on the coast for tourism;
• To contribute to the modernisation and diversification of agriculture,1 diver-
sification being made possible by irrigation water.
Since then, BRL has built, and still operates and maintains six dams, 105 km
of canals, 125 pumping stations, 5,000 km of pressurised pipelines, six drinking
water treatment plants among other projects completed, supplying drinking
water to 500,000 people in peak periods (seaside tourism in summer) and raw
water to 130,000 hectares (ha) of land. 
In the eastern part of the region, water is withdrawn directly from the river
Rhone, and is conveyed to all users through several pumping stations, canals and
pipe networks. In the western part of the region, as the summer flow of the rivers
is very weak (or nil), water is stored in dam-reservoirs during the rainy season, so
as to sustain those rivers in summer; it is then conveyed through diversion weirs
and pumping stations on the rivers and pipeline networks. Irrigation water is
delivered, under pressure, to the farmers, individually, through hydrants (‘in the
1. At the time, agriculture was mostly based on the vine, which was the only medium added-value crop resistant
to drought.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of water supplies according to use
State Concession, 1996
Number of
clients
Discharge
subscription
(m3/h)
Volume
(m3/h)
Irrigation 5,400 145,000 51.0 59.8 1.17
Gardens 4,600 32,000 3.9 15.8 4.05
Untreated water in bulk 60 10,200 16.3 26.4 1.62
(cities, industry)
Drinking water in bulk 70 2,200 6.8 19.0 2.79
Total 10,130 189,000 78.0 121.0 1.55
Turnover 
excluding taxes
(MFRF)
Average
price
(FRF/m3)
TABLE 2
Irrigation tariffs
1992, not including water agency taxes. 
Prices in French francs (FRF). FRF 1 is nearly equal to EUR 0.15. All prices per m3 per hectare/year
Contract duration Five years
Normal irrigation 
Subscription fee FRF 250 FRF 300 FRF 340
Volume fee FRF 0.40 FRF 0.40 FRF 0.40
Supplemental irrigation
Subscription fee FRF 150 FRF 200 FRF 240
Volume fee FRF 1.00 FRF 1.00 FRF 1.00
One year Emergency (after May 1)
TABLE 3
Examples of irrigation water prices (for one year)
Prices in French francs (FRF). FRF 1 is nearly equal to EUR 0.15
Subscription Volume/ha
Peaches Normal irrigation 4,000 m3 750+1,600= FRF 0.59
Five years, 3 m3/h/ha FRF 2,350
Lettuce Normal irrigation 2,000 m3 2,400+800 FRF 1.60
One year, 8 m3/h/ha FRF 3,000
Vineyard Supplemental irrigation
Wet year Five years, 5 m3/h/ha 0 m3 750 FRF Infinity
Dry year Five years, 5 m3/h/ha 1,000 m3 1,750 FRF FRF 1.75
Price/ha Price/m3
corner of the field’) equipped with meters, pressure regulation and flow limita-
tion devices.
Over 40 years, agriculture has changed in the region and irrigated crops now
represent an important part of its agricultural gross product and employment.
Languedoc-Roussillon has become the first producer of peaches and apricots in
France.
The experience of the last decade shows that the region is now ready to face
severe droughts without damage.
2. Irrigation tariffs
2.1 Deliveries of water in BRL’s State Concession schemes
Table 1, presents the distribution of water supplies among users, in BRL’s
State Concession, for the year 1996 (which was a rather rainy year).2
2.2 Water tariffs
When a farmer wants to irrigate with BRL’s water, he applies for a water con-
tract and chooses between different possible tariffs, presented in Table 2.
These base tariffs are indexed to inflation each year,3 according to an index for-
mula representative of BRL’s costs (hydraulic works, electricity, salaries and so on).
‘Normal irrigation’ tariffs are aimed at the majority of irrigating farmers, for
crops that need irrigation as a necessity. These tariffs are binomial (i.e. composed
of the sum of two different terms), with: 
• A subscription fee, based on the subscribed flow, which is the maximum
instantaneous flow that the farmer will be authorised to use.4 This subscribed
flow is chosen by the farmer, according to the characteristics of his field, crop
and irrigation equipment;5
• A volume fee, based on the volume actually used6 by the farmer.
Subscription fee rates vary according to the duration of the contract, which
is chosen by the farmer, as an incentive to long term contracts.
‘Supplemental irrigation’ tariffs are aimed at farmers who don’t need a lot of
water, and sometimes not every year (for crops like vines, activities like fertilising
solution preparation, herd watering). These tariffs are also binomial, but the sub-
scription fee is cheaper than normal irrigation and the volume fee is higher, so
that if the farmer starts to use a greater quantity of water, there is an incentive for
him to turn to a normal irrigation contract.
2.3 Price of water
Table 3 shows some examples of irrigation prices, estimated using the tariffs
above, for different cases typical of Languedoc-Roussillon, for one hectare of land.
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2. The State Concession represents nearly three-quarters of BRL’s water supplies.
3. In 2000, prices are nearly 10 percent higher than 1992 prices.
4.This maximum instantaneous flow is controlled by a special device, called a ‘flow restrictor’, installed by BRL on
the farmer’s hydrant according to the farmer’s subscription.
5. Of course, on request of the farmer, BRL will assist him for the technical design of the on-field irrigation equip-
ment and the choice of the adequate subscribed flow.
6. This volume is checked at the end of the year by the meter set on the farmer’s hydrant.
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Some comments about these examples:
• The peach is a perennial crop; a five year normal irrigation contract is perfectly
convenient. Its on-field irrigation equipment (drip irrigation, below-foliage
sprinklers) is permanent and automated; it allows a very continuous use of the
available water (20 to 22 hours per day), and therefore a low subscribed flow
per hectare (3 m3/hour/ha). The volume of water consumed per year is high
(4,000 m3/year).7
• Lettuce is an annual crop, and farmers will not grow lettuce in the same field
for more than two successive years to avoid exhausting the soil; the contract
will be an annual, normal irrigation contract. For such types of market gar-
dening, farmers need flexibility in irrigation, with high subscribed flow per
hectare (8 m3/hour/ha): they want irrigation of a short duration, so as to be
able to work in the field the rest of the time. The annual volume of water is
not very high (2,000 m3 per year).
• The vine is a drought resistant crop. It only needs irrigation in drier years,8
requiring small volumes, in order to regulate grape quantity and quality. 
A five year supplemental irrigation contract would be appropriate. The on-
field irrigation equipment is generally not so sophisticated and automated as
in orchards, and the required subscribed flow is medium (5 m3/hour/ha).
The example shows two cases: a wet year (no use of irrigation water), and 
a dry year (1,000 m3/ha).
These different examples clearly show that, with the same tariff system for all
farmers, the price of irrigation, per hectare or per cubic meter, would vary signif-
icantly according to the specific cases. The comparison of peaches and lettuce
shows the importance of the subscription fee: although peaches use twice as
much water as lettuce (4,000 m3/ha vs. 2,000 m3/ha), the price of water for one
hectare is 27 percent lower because of the subscribed flow (FRF 2,350 vs. FRF
3,200), and the price per cubic meter therefore varies in a proportion of nearly
one to three (FRF 0.59 vs. FRF 1.60). For vineyards, supplemental irrigation con-
tracts allow a smaller price per hectare when the use of water is nil or low; but
the price per cubic meter is, of course, higher.
2.4 Payment recovery
Invoices are sent to farmers twice a year: the subscription fee in May, at the
beginning of the irrigation campaign, and the volume fee in December after
meter reading.
The payment recovery rate evolves with time and actions undertaken by BRL:
• At maturity (30 days after billing): 26 percent;
• Two months after maturity (follow-up letters): 85 percent;
7. As a perennial crop, it must be irrigated after the harvest, so as not to jeopardise the production of the next year.
8. Vineyards may do without irrigation even in dry years, but with a degradation of quality and an important
decrease in the quantity of grapes.
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• One year after maturity (agreement on payment schedule, water cut): 
92 percent;
• Final recovery (action at law): 97 percent.
3. KEY FACTORS EXPLAINING WATER PRICING POLICY
Here, we shall list some of the main factors explaining BRL’s water pricing
policy (the order of presentation of the different factors has no significance).
• No problem of water resource. This is why the tariff is not particularly aimed
at promoting water savings, although the volume fee will be an incentive to
avoid any waste of water.
• Large overcapacity of existing main waterworks. The notion of development
cost is not relevant. The problem is how to cover the existing fixed costs of
the system.
• Necessity of cost recovery. The price of water must cover the costs of opera-
tion, maintenance, renewal of equipment, and part of the initial investment,9
without any subsidy.10
• Wish for a single tariff system for all farmers. This is clearly a political will, aim-
ing at equity among farmers, whatever their distance from the water resource.
• Wish to limit the inter-annual variations of earnings and securing income.
As the volume of water used by irrigation may vary to a great extent from one
year to another depending on the climatic conditions, this wish explains the
importance of the subscription fee versus the volume fee. It is also the rea-
son for encouraging long term contracts.
• Character of relationship between BRL and the farmer : contractual. Farmers
have the choice of applying for or not applying for a contract. They are not
obliged to use BRL’s water. In many places, they can use underground or
river water, which is generally cheaper (even though it causes problems to a
scarce resource), or they may practise rain cropping with no irrigation
(durum wheat, vine, etc.). This makes it important to propose different types
of contracts adapted to the different situations of farmers. It explains the sup-
plemental irrigation contract, because generally farmers do not sign long
term contracts for vineyards with the normal irrigation tariff as it would be
too expensive for their low and variable use of water.
• Contributive capacity of farmers. The price of water cannot exceed the
profit margin of the farmer (if so, he would stop his activity!) or the addi-
tional profit he obtains with irrigation (in this situation, he would turn to
rain cropping). This is a very important factor for BRL, because our irriga-
tion tariffs are already quite high, and we consider that we can no longer
9. Initial investment is subsidised up to 60-80 percent for agriculture and 50 percent for urban waters; there is no
subsidy for industry. The remaining part is financed by loans, borrowed by BRL. 
10. At the beginning, there were subsidies to cover part of those costs. These subsidies were stopped progressively
from 1983 to 1988, and there have been no more such subsidies since 1989.
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increase them easily. In confirmation of this supposition, we note that: (1)
Between the years 1989-1992, the irrigation of maize disappeared from
BRL’s schemes, because water prices had become too high compared to
the gross product of maize; (2) In 1993, the tariffs were changed, with an
average increase of 20 percent. Previous subscriptions were not recovered
in totality; and (3) We also note a small but constant erosion of subscrip-
tions (nearly two percent per year) in recent years.
4. PARTICIPATION OF DIFFERENT ACTORS IN DEFINING WATER
PRICING POLICIES
The proposal of new tariffs is not a frequent exercise: the tariff system
includes a base tariff and an index formula, so that prices evolve automatically
according to inflation. The tariff system in effect at present was put into force in
1993; the previous one dated from 1970 and lasted 23 years! 
Formally, it is the supervisory board of BRL who decides on the new tariffs,
which must then be approved by the government. The supervisory board is com-
posed of eleven members, with representatives of regional and departmental coun-
cils, one representative of the Chamber of Agriculture, and one representative of
BRL’s farmers union. It is clear that farmers have a voice, directly and indirectly, in
the final decision.
In practice, before its presentation to the supervisory board, the new tariffs
are fully discussed with farmers unions, so as to reach a kind of consensus, or at
least an acceptable compromise, between the necessity for BRL to balance its
accounts while respecting the wishes and constraints of farmers.
5. HISTORY OF BRL’S WATER PRICING POLICIES
Since the beginning of its supplies of water (1960), BRL has experienced four
successive tariff systems for irrigation:
• 1960: pure binomial tariff (based on subscribed flow and consumed volume);
• 1965: monomial tariff (based on volume), with the price decreasing as the
size of the irrigated surface increases;
• 1970: binomial tariff (based on subscribed flow and consumed volume), with
a variable allowance of cost-free volume linked to the subscribed flow;
• 1993: pure binomial tariff (based on subscribed flow and consumed volume).
5.1 First tariff system — pure binomial
The first tariff system set up by BRL at the beginning of the project had a pure
binomial structure, based on the subscribed flow and on the volume actually 
consumed:
• FRF 140 per l/s (litre per second) per year;11
• FRF 0.042/m3 actually consumed.
11. This tariff is based on 1960 prices. 
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FIGURE 1
Irrigation prices indexation 1970-1999
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FIGURE 2
Price of water for one hectare 
Subscription: 4 m3/h/ha. Base 1992
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This pure binomial structure was chosen because it was considered to be the
logical tariff system, corresponding to the recovery of fixed and proportional costs.
This tariff proved unsuited to the situation. At that time, farmers were not
used to irrigation, they had not mastered the cultivation of the new irrigated crops
and they could not estimate their benefits and risks precisely. Therefore, they
were afraid of committing themselves to high fixed charges (subscription fees).
Furthermore, they experienced psychological difficulties in paying the subscrip-
tion fee, before any use of water had even begun, because they had the feeling
that ‘they were paying for nothing’.
As a result, subscriptions remained low; this tariff system hampered the
development of irrigation (and consequently BRL’s earnings). It was intended to
provide cost recovery (independent of wet or dry years), but was ineffective.
5.2 Second tariff system – monomial
The first tariff system was a failure. It was changed after five years and
replaced by a tariff based only on the volume of water actually consumed (mono-
mial tariff system), with the price decreasing as the irrigated surface increases:
• 0 to 1,500 m3/ha/year: FRF 0.13/m3
• 1,501 to 3,000 m3/ha/year: FRF 0.07/m3
• 3,001 m3/ha/year, and above: FRF 0.05/m3
This tariff system was aimed at developing irrigation and the new diversified
crops, by facilitating farmers’ subscription: there was no fixed payment; farmers
could then subscribe and only pay for the volume of water they used. Starting to
use irrigation was thus made much easier. 
FIGURE 3
Irrigation prices indexation 1992-1993
1.1200
1.1000
1.0800
1.0600
1.0400
1.0200
1.0000
1992
In
de
xa
ti
on
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
0.9800
0.9200
0
New irrigation tariff indexation
Previous irrigation tariff indexation
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year of measurement
N I C O L
E C O N O M I C  I N S T R U M E N T S  A N D  W A T E R  P O L I C I E S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E 91
It succeeded perfectly. Subscriptions rapidly increased, as did the develop-
ment of the new diversified and irrigated crops. But this tariff system had two
major drawbacks:
• The price depended heavily on the irrigated surface declared by the farmer12
even if the same volume of water was consumed. The only data metered by
BRL was the volume of water. Farmers could easily cheat by declaring surfaces
smaller than reality, so as to lower their bills; this was very difficult to control.
• Earnings were highly dependent on climatic conditions.
5.3 Third tariff system – binomial with free allowance of volume
Five years later, once the ‘take-off’ of irrigation had been ensured, the tariff
system was changed once again because of the two major drawbacks presented
above. The new tariff had a binomial structure, like the first one, with a slight 
difference: a free allowance of volume, according to subscribed flow, was intro-
duced. This tariff system was composed of: 
• Subscription fee : FRF 300/m3/hour; each cubic meter per hour gives the right
to a volume of FRF 300 m3 of water free of charge.
• Volume fee : FRF 0.32/m3 for the volume above the cost-free allowance.
In contrast to the situation ten years before, farmers had a better under-
standing of irrigation, and were ready to use it and pay a subscription fee. The
rationale for setting up a free allowance was purely psychological: it avoided the
farmers feeling that they were paying for nothing; when paying for the sub-
scribed flow, they had the impression that they were paying for water (the free
allowance) and it was easier to accept.
This tariff system proved to be well adapted and very robust: it lasted 23
years!
The problem with this tariff system appeared not to be its fundamental structure,
but the index formula. This formula did not reflect BRL’s costs, because it was partly
based on agricultural production indexes.13 Figure 1 shows the respective evolution
of tariff indexation and indexes based on BRL’s costs.
Furthermore, the government gradually stopped its subsidies for the manage-
ment of the schemes in the years 1983-1989. 
The important increase in productivity of BRL was not sufficient to cover the
losses in the end. 
5.4 Fourth tariff system – pure binomial
As a consequence, the tariff system was changed in 1993 to the current one. 
In fact, the new structure is quite similar to the previous one: it is still binomial,
based on the subscribed flow and the consumed volume. The free allowance of
12. For instance, the price for 4,000 m3, irrigating 2 ha, was FRF 460; the price for the same quantity on only one ha
was FRF 350.
13. Agricultural product indexes were inserted in the index formula because of the negotiation of the pricing
system with farmers’ representatives. It was supposed to establish a kind of solidarity between BRL and the
farmers. In fact, agricultural products’ prices decreased in real terms in that period, although the gross product per
hectare increased due to a heavy increase in yields. But, very unfortunately, BRL’s index formula was based not on
the gross product per ha, but on the products’ prices themselves.
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volume has been eliminated: it has no economic justification, and the concept of
paying a subscription, as for electricity or the telephone, is now common and
accepted by the farmers. Figure 3 compares the new tariff with the previous one.
On average, the new price of water is more or less 20 percent higher.
In reality, the most important difference between the new tariff and the pre-
vious one is not immediately visible: it is the index formula, that is now based
entirely on indexes corresponding to BRL’s costs. In only six years (1993 to 1999),
the Figure 2 shows the difference: ten percent! 
The fact that we have gone back to a pure binomial structure, like the first
tariff in 1960, is, of course, quite surprising. One could imagine that it is a kind of
cycle! In fact, we must remember that the structure of irrigation, which was very
well adapted to a pressurised network from a theoretical point of view, was not
adapted to its environment at the beginning, particularly because of the farmers’
difficulty to master irrigation. BRL went too fast! We can see that this is no longer
a problem now, and it is hoped that the new tariff system will last as long as its
predecessor.
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The economics of H2O
Jasper Dalhuisen and Peter Nijkamp, Department of Spatial Economics, 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
INTRODUCTION
Water, because of its scarcity, has become subject to the normal economic 
market rules of supply and demand for scarce goods. Nevertheless, in most
European countries, this scarcity is not reflected in the price of water. In some
situations, water is considered a free good, similar to air some decades ago. As
can be expected, this often results in the over-consumption of water, which in
economic terms results in inconceivably high inefficiency in the supply and the
use of water. An illustrative example of these market failures is the fact that in
Europe the percentage of leakage from the drinking water network varies
between ten and 75 percent.
The situation nowadays is changing; a real scarcity of water can be observed.
At present, a considerable number of issues concerning the supply and the need
for water have come to the fore. Cities like Seville and Athens are struggling to
meet the need for clean water while a city like Istanbul, with its current popula-
tion growth and available water sources, will probably not be able to meet the
needs of its inhabitants ten years from now.
The World Water Forum, recently held in The Hague, aroused great interest
in water issues. In many countries, including the Netherlands, the debate used to
concentrate on the privatisation of drinking water and possible taxes on water
use (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 1999). However, these debates lacked a
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well-structured economic analysis of water management and related decisions.
This article will focus on the various aspects of the economics of water. First,
a general analysis will be offered on water as a ‘normal’ economic good with dif-
ferent usage functions. Although many countries, like the Netherlands, have to
cope with a scarcity of water (in a qualitative and quantitative respect), the situa-
tion is not as threatening for them as it is for those living in the desert, for exam-
ple. That is why this article will take a look at the supply and demand of water
from an economic perspective. Also, a comparison will be made between water
as a specific good and a number of other 'normal' economic goods. Water, from
an economic point of view, can be considered as a normal, and thus expensive,
scarce good. It is necessary to focus on the price of water as a key issue in policy-
making. The article will finish with a number of conclusions.
DEMAND FOR WATER
The demand for drinking water is rather complex and shows much variation.
Figure 1 gives an impression of the water use per capita in a number of countries.
A great number of studies on water have appeared in the economic literature.
These tend to focus either on the elasticity of water demand or water demand
D A L H U I S E N  A N D  N I J K A M P
E C O N O M I C  I N S T R U M E N T S  A N D  W A T E R  P O L I C I E S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E94
TABLE 1
Overview of household demand elasticities
For household demand
Study
Details of study, model
and estimation
Price 
elasticity
Income
elasticity Sample
Hewitt and Hanemann
(1995)
D/C choice model -1.59 0.15 US panel
Howe and Linaweaver
(1967)
OLS -1.57 - -
Danielson (1979) OLS -1.38 -1.38 -
Deller et al (1986) OLS -1.12 - -
Grima (1972) Cross-section -0.75 (w)
-1.07 (s)
Urban demand in
eastern Croatia
Herrington (1982) Time-series 
(1962-1980)
-0.3 - Industrial consumption
in England and Wales
Nieswiadomy et al. (1989) - -0.3/-0.9 - US panel
Gallagher et al. (1981) Pooled cross-section
and time series
-0.26 9 (s) - 137 households in
Queensland
Martin et al. (1983) Pooled cross-section
and time series
-0.256 - 2159 households in
Arizona
Hanke and De Mare (1982) Pooled cross-section
and time series
-0.15 - 69 domestic residences
in Malmo
Laukkanen (1981) Time-series (1970-1978) -0.11 - Municipal demand in
Helsinki (Finland)
Howe (1982) Cross-section -0.06 (w)
-0.57 
(s; east)
-0.43 
(s; west)
- Residential use in 
eastern and western USA
Thomas et al. (1983) Cross-section -0.3/-0.9 - US panel
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forecasting itself. Remarkably, the outcomes of these studies showed rather low
price elasticity for water demand. Despite warnings about water shortages, the
water consumer does not react to price changes. This often goes hand in hand
with the political-economical belief that water is an essential good, and, thus, that
the price should not be high. Consumers are also often of the opinion that the
share of the cost of water in the household budget should not be too high. It
seems impossible to set a real market price because of the existence of public
monopolies. The pricing of water is determined by institutions, based on either a
small symbolic recovery of costs or their full recovery. However, the price is hardly
ever based on the balance of supply and demand.
During the recent World Water Forum there was a plea for full cost pricing,
although it appeared to be difficult to fit this into the decision-making process.
Nevertheless, it is important that water management is led by sound economic
principles. Some examples illustrate this. Cities in developing countries (espe-
cially the slums) do not have a drinking water pipeline system because the costs
of installation are too high. This results in the inhabitants having to buy their
water from water vendors at very high prices. If this money could be used for the
installation of a drinking-water pipeline system, the installation could, in princi-
ple, be profitable. Another example is in olive production. It is often supported
by EU subsidies, even though the market for olives is already satisfied. Useful and
clean water is lost through irrigation, which causes difficulties in the drinking-
water supply of these areas. Obviously, the combination of policy failures and
external effects results in inefficient markets for water with a considerable num-
ber of distortions.
Price elasticity
Most water demand studies record price elasticity around zero. However,
some studies have different outcomes. For example, Julie Hewit and Michael
Hanemann found price elasticity of around minus 1.5. Hewit and Hanemann
estimated the water demand with the help of the ‘two-errors models’ developed
in the literature on labour market economics (Hewit et al 1995). Often, in water
management, the price per unit is established with reference to a certain volume
of water consumed. If the threshold level is exceeded, the price per unit will
increase. This tariff structure is known as the increasing block rate structure and
is also used for other public goods, such as electricity. The budget curve of the
optimising consumer is characterised by a kink. In their estimations, the authors
assume that, besides the heterogeneity error due to data failures and other vari-
ables not included in the utility function, there is another error that plays an
important role: the optimisation error. The optimisation error is the difference
between the optimal volume of water and the consumed volume. The optimal
volume of consumed water should be lower than the maximum amount of water
supplied with a low price, while the observed value is higher than the optimal.
The estimations of Hewitt and Hanemann deviate from the results found in other
studies to a large extent. Table 1 shows a number of estimates from various stud-
ies on price and income elasticities. In order to obtain a better transparency of
water pricing, it would be useful to gain more insight into the variables that
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influence the variance in price elasticity. Techniques such as meta-analysis,
(Dalhuisen et al. 2000b), could be very helpful and could be applied to strengthen
water management basing it on sound economic principles.
THE SUPPLY OF WATER
The supply of water requires mainly the transportation, distribution and
abstraction of water. The sources for the abstraction of water are surface water
and ground water. Both sources have their advantages and disadvantages. For
example, in the Netherlands, surface water sources are available to a very large
extent. The Rhine and the Meuse rivers are used for the production of drinking
water for Amsterdam and Rotterdam, respectively. A main disadvantage is the
low quality of the sources. The quality of Rhine water was so low near the end of
the sixties, that it could not be used for drinking water anymore. In 1976 and
1987, the Rhine Action Plans caused significant improvement in the quality of
Rhine water through discouraging large-scale polluters, Nevertheless, small-scale
polluters, such as agriculture around the Rhine, resulted in a stagnation of Rhine
water quality. Drinking water companies that use surface water sources must
purify it at least four times more than those using ground water sources. Although
the quality of ground water sources is often high, the availability is less than sur-
face water sources. In the Netherlands, the purification of drinking water varies
widely. For example, in general, surface water companies use a large amount of
chemical substances, which are often unnecessary for ground water companies.
Water is transported and distributed via a network of pipelines. This means
transportation from the source to the production installation and from the pro-
duction installation to the consumer. As was mentioned before, large amounts of
water leak away during transportation. Moreover, within Europe, the differences
in efficiency are remarkable as well. The main causes for these differences are the
investment policy in networks and also the soil conditions. In Amsterdam, the per-
formance of the network is favourable because of the soil conditions, and because
pipelines are well maintained and often replaced. There, the average pipeline is
25 years old. In the United Kingdom, where the average pipeline is 100 years old,
the leak percentage is around 35 percent. The soil condition is of great importance
because it influences the time in which a leak can be discovered. If, for example,
a large leak appears in Amsterdam, huge parts of the topsoil can be removed, with
the consequence that the leak can be identified quickly. In other cities a leak might
remain undiscovered for a longer period, and, thus, a considerable amount of
water might get wasted.
Another important controlling instrument is the water meter, which measures
the water use of the consumer. It is surprising that, despite water scarcity, a number
of large European cities have no water meters. A special case can be found in
Amsterdam. In this city, the consumer does not pay for the amount of water used, but
the system depends on the number of rooms in the house and the existence of a bath-
room, kitchen, garage and garden. A person living in a large house will pay more
than someone living in a small house. At present, after debating for around one hun-
dred years, Amsterdam will have water meters installed gradually. The costs will be
high (around EUR 230 million). In London, another special case, the water bill is a
fixed amount included in the rent.
WATER AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD
Water is of vital importance for human existence. Without water there will be
no fertile ground and without clean water hygiene will be inadequate, which can
be seen in, for instance, the developing countries. Therefore, the supply of good
water has a high priority in the policy of water supply. In practice, this has led to
governments playing a rather important role in the production of water. Up to a
decade ago, water used to be considered as a public interest, which could be best
supplied via a natural monopoly, with all kinds of disadvantages.  
Water has different purposes, varying from cooking to cooling water for indus-
try. Furthermore, water has different values for consumers and producers. Every
task demands minimum quality standards. The quality standards for cooling water
are lower than those for drinking water. The quality of drinking water is influenced
by its chemical components. Different chemical and microbiological substances
may have significant consequences for the production of drinking water, because
water companies use different purification systems to reach legal water quality stan-
dards. Drinking water varies according to the quality of the water sources
(Dalhuisen et al 2000a). In the Netherlands, water quantity is not a problem. The
major issue there is the quality of water. Looking at the different actors, it must be
noted that shipping and pesticides form the major threats for the quality of surface
water and, to a lesser extent, of ground water. Quantity problems can be found in
the Mediterranean area, especially.
Worldwide, there is no real scarcity of water; it is more its distribution that
causes the problem. In the Netherlands, for example, half of the cost of the water
supply goes to the transport and distribution of water via the pipeline system.
This means that, in principle, different qualities of water could be supplied for dif-
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FIGURE 1
Estimated water use per capita per day
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ferent purposes. Nevertheless, in practice, the mono-functionality of a pipeline
system shows rigidity, which is why high-quality water is supplied, for example,
to brush your teeth, while the same water is also used for less high-value use, for
example, watering the garden, or washing the car. Because of the multiple uses
of water offered through the same network, it is not possible to fix an unam-
biguous price for different uses.
MARKETS
Water, in principle, can be subjected to market discipline. However, because
of the reasons mentioned above, many governments in Europe have decided to
include political considerations. In the Netherlands, the provinces and govern-
ments own most of the shares of the water companies. The main reasons for this
are the profit that a water company could have if privatised and also the possible
health risk that, perhaps, could not be checked easily otherwise. Here, as well,
several new trends can be observed. In the United Kingdom, the water compa-
nies have been privatised, following the trend of deregulation. Prices are fixed for
a certain period of time. When deciding prices, one factor used is the retail price
index of the cost of living and another factor, which concerns the comparative
quality of service, offered by the supplier (according to a benchmark analysis).
In France, local governments or provincial governments own the network.
Water companies can sign a contract for a fixed period. French water companies, in
general, have a high level of efficiency, which is why these companies tend to score
higher than British companies when a concession is granted. One disadvantage of
the French system, however, is that national contracts are rare. The Dutch drinking
water sector favours the French system, if competition in the drinking-water sector
is admitted. Major actors in the Dutch water-market, like the NUON, will be able to
achieve more synergy advantages, as a result of vertical integration, for example, in
the maintenance of the network. Nevertheless, a reliable mechanism for the regula-
tion of prices will be necessary and it is also essential that the law stipulates the
actors who will be responsible for the supervision of the water supply. A committee
of inspection could be established for the quality of water and an authority in the
field of competition could supervise the fair pricing of water. 
CONCLUSIONS
This article is an argument for a more elaborate use of economic analysis
within decision-making concerning water management. Striving for cost-effective-
ness often results in an inefficient use of water. Water can be regarded as an essen-
tial asset, which is not any different from other vital assets such as bread. An
important step in this process is the analysis of the influence of different tariff
structures. When tracing the price sensitivity of water for different uses or differ-
ent parts of society, synthesis techniques, such as meta-analysis, can play an
important role. 
It is to be expected that further privatisation of the water companies will
increase the efficiency of the production of water. The French system, because of
the reduction in the number of water companies and, because of the related
increase in scaling-up, seems to be a reasonable and interesting alternative. Clearly,
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governments need to guarantee a suitable controlling system for water quality.
The final conclusion is that the supply and demand of water is a very complex
matter. A justified price setting is not easy to find. Moreover, in most cases, there is
a linear relation between the water from the network and the amount of waste-
water, which, in principle, might allow for an incorporation of charges for 
wastewater in the pricing system. In this way greater efficiency, more transparency,
and better co-ordination can be achieved through a water board, which could then
provide an integrated water bill, which is used in some countries (for example in
Denmark). In various countries, there have already been proposals for projects
which would combine water consumption, the refuse collection rate and the 
surface water tax for the purification of the surface water all on one bill. If the con-
sumer had only to pay for the water consumption and the refuse collection rate
(‘small water bill’), the size of the bill would depend on the amount of water use.
If, on the other hand, there were a combination of all three, water consumption,
refuse collection rate and the surface water tax, a ‘broad water bill’, the costs for the
purification of the water would also be linked to consumption. The latter, howev-
er, is more complicated and may also lead to duplication of taxes. Plans to execute
this in the Netherlands have been temporarily abandoned, as owners of houses in
one county would not be treated equally for the experiment. It is most likely that
the last word about this matter has not been said in Europe.
As should be clear from the above, there are a growing number of initiatives
for a more economic-based view in water management. In the near future, clear
success can only be expected to a very limited degree. In principle, the growing
scarcity of water can be taken into account in a more responsible way on the
basis of a sound economic analysis. 
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The environmental impact of water charges:
agricultural water management policies in
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia1
Dr. Mihaela Popovici, Center for Environmentally Sustainable Economic Policy, Romania
1. INTRODUCTION
This review of water pricing policies in four selected CEE countries (Bulgaria,
Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) analyses the impact of changes in these policies on
the environment. Basin over-flooding and runoff irrigation systems have been and
remain most commonly used in the selected countries. This, together with inappro-
priate system maintenance, is one of the main causes of low irrigation efficiency. 
Irrigation produces both beneficial and adverse effects on the environment.
The first group of effects includes (i) the increase of groundwater recharging capa-
bility, (ii) regulation of flows within the river basin and (iii) improved restoration
capacities of neighboring wetlands. The adverse environmental impacts of irriga-
tion are mainly related to the effects on water quality and quantity, soil and water
pollution status or river hydrology.
2. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL WATER CHARGES
The environmental impact of agricultural water charges is influenced by the
response price of farmers. The farmers adapt their policies so as to maximize their
profit from irrigation water. The main questions in analysing the impact of the
water charge are: to what extent and to what price do the farmers respond? 
Economic theory suggests that farmers respond to changes in the water rate
but not to changes in the fixed charge. Once the farmer has paid the fixed charge,
he can use as much water as he wishes.
The farmer's sensitivity to changes in the fixed charge increases as the total
water bill makes up a larger proportion of the total costs thus decreasing the over-
all profitability of the farming operation.
Response price = (average price +water rate)/2. The average price is the total
revenue divided by the total water volume delivered. Elasticity tells us how much
water demand is going to change for a given change in price.
By analysing elasticity and the factors influencing elasticity, we may find out
how much water demand is going to change for a given change in price. 
Surface water and groundwater have different prices. For example, in Romania,
lower prices for surface water (1.5 times) encourage the use of surface water in the
economic sectors, keeping good quality groundwater for household needs and
human consumption. The demand for irrigation water in 1999 decreased by almost
30 percent as a result of the pricing policy. 
1. This paper is based on a study funded by the REC. For more information on the result of the study, please contact
Stefan Speck, Tel: (36-26) 505-056, Fax: (36-26) 311-294, E-mail: sspeck@rec.org.
2.1 Incentive pricing will have great impact on water use over the
coming years
The new incentive pricing policy will have a great impact on water use in the
next several years. In all selected countries, farmers have chosen to change the
type of irrigation system or crop grown in response. Elasticity is much lower in
the short term than in the long term. Farmers have less flexibility to adjust water
use over the course of one season than over several seasons. During one season,
the farmer can only respond by reducing water for crops if the crops tolerate less
water. However, in the long run the farmers can change the type of irrigation sys-
tem or crop grown.
Since the dissolution of the co-operative systems and the deterioration of the
irrigation system in Bulgaria, irrigation is practiced on only 50 percent of the irri-
gable area. This, together with a reduction in market opportunities, has led to a
change in the type of crops grown, especially a switch away from vegetable and
fruit production. Rain-fed crops, notably wheat, barley and oil seeds dominated
the rain-fed areas. Current levels of inputs and yields on rain fed crops are lower
than possible because of relatively low output prices and relatively high input
prices. The effects of this change may be measurable after some years.
2.2 Prices of agricultural produce
The rise in irrigation prices increases the prices of agricultural produce,
which diminishes sales. The market for agricultural produce is not sufficiently
large and competition at a national level is also significant because unemploy-
ment is high and people return from the cities to the villages. 
As a consequence of the unclear agricultural development strategy for
Romania, there is not much incentive for the increase of agricultural production
or for irrigation. In addition, because of the small size of holdings (two to three
hectares), farmers are primarily interested in providing food for their families
which does not require intense cultivation.
Therefore, we consider that a significant increase in irrigation water price will
lead to a further decrease in irrigation activity. Additionally, a decrease of the irriga-
tion water price would require an important financial effort from the state budget.
2.3 Availability of other water sources
The availability of other water sources is an important concern. If the farmer
can switch to other water sources, such as ground water wells, the relative cost
of the alternative water source will affect the elasticity. Therefore, elasticity is
higher for farmers with alternative sources of water. Again, in all situations, there
is real competition from private wells with irrigation schemes. For example, in
Bulgaria, gravity water was made available cost-free during the period July 12 –
August 31, 2000, which significantly affected water levels in the reservoirs and the
aquifers. Private wells dug by water users (BGL 300 or EUR 153) represent seri-
ous competition for the Katunica Irrigation Water User Association (KIWUA). The
KIWUA has a total cultivated area of 1510 hectares (ha) of which about 1000 ha
are irrigable gravitationally. The water sources include the river Chaya, ground
water and private wells. Water use, not exceeding 0.2 litres per second but of less
than ten cubic meters per day, is cost-free but it is difficult to regulate; this is an
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important issue in the decision-making process. 
In Romania, at the Titu-Ogrezeni-Jugureni-Corbii Mari irrigation system the
farmers take water illegally from the open transporting canals. The Dambovita and
Giurgiu branch of the National Society of Land Reclamation have no personnel or
authority to stop this kind of illegal activity, nor is there any legal framework to stop
this phenomenon. 
Presently, minimum prices for irrigation water (established at a national
level) in the given area, are as following:
• ROL 209,944/1000 m3 for open canals without pumping;
• ROL 257,161/1000 m3 at the hydrant without pumping.
The price of raw water destined for irrigation purposes is ROL 11,500/1000m3
(USD 1 = 23,000 ROL); the small influence generated by this component is obvious.
In all cases, efforts are undertaken to construct weirs, canal lining and retaining
walls in order to maximize efficiency. It is expected that the construction of division
boxes will help improve water distribution. In addition, improvement in water avail-
ability and distribution increased cropping intensity and yields per hectare, raising
the incomes of farmers.
2.4 Absence of metering
The absence of metering and the impossibility of measuring exact consumption
are main concerns in all selected countries. Moreover, the absence of water meters
precludes the implementation of volumetric pricing. The lack of water meters is 
due to their expense. Currently, in many situations, metering does not represent a
practical or economic option and alternative technologies are required for assessing
current water use. In fact, metering is a political issue.
2.5 Price structure and level
Theoretically, the weight of the variable element (i.e. volumetric rate, pollution
rate) in the price structure needs to be balanced against the need to ensure the
recovery of financial costs. A water price set at a level that ensures the recovery of
costs should lead to an effective reduction in consumption and pollution. 
In Bulgaria, water pricing covers the running costs only: starting from
December 31, 2000, there will be no fee for water abstraction. In Romania, the price
level influences the farmers’ decision to use water either from the river or reservoirs
or from groundwater sources. The structure of the water price allows irrigation water
price to be subsidised in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and partially in Hungary. 
2.6 Conditions imposed in the environmental license
As an element of licensing, farmers may be asked to use alternative water
sources, which also influences the water levels of aquifers. In Romania and
Slovakia, water users are requested to use surface water sources.
2.7 Crop value, intensity and diversification
The redesign of irrigation systems, initiated in all analysed countries, was
intended to achieve an increased cropping intensity and crop diversification
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through a more efficient and effective use of water while supporting self-reliance
in the organization and management of farmer-managed irrigation systems.
Agricultural development must be better integrated with irrigation development. 
When farmers are growing low value crops, such as pasture and hay, an
increase in irrigation water rates may significantly decrease profitability. 
2.8 Ability to change crops
The ability to select crops according to the climate, soils and market conditions
allows farmers to diversify. The main problems are: (i) the low prices, (ii) the lack
of markets for the products and (iii) the high prices of herbicides and fertilizers. The
reduction in market opportunities has led to a change in the type of the crops
grown especially to a switch away from vegetable and fruit production to rain fed
crops, notably wheat. 
2.9 Ability to change technology
Farmers may switch to less efficient but much cheaper irrigation technologies.
The greater the ability to introduce new technologies, the higher the elasticity.
The financial accounts of the three last years 1997, 1998 and 1999 show that
the loss of KIWUA came to BGL 923 (EUR 470) in 1999. 
The average irrigation water price is BGL 50/ha or EUR 25.5/ha. The official
irrigation water price of KIWUA is BGL 40 per hectare per watering or 
EUR 20.41/ha/watering for watermelon areas and BGL 60/ha/watering or EUR
30.61/ha/watering for all other crops.
2.10 High production costs
Within the accession countries to EU, production costs of the agricultural
sector are largely influenced by the varying application of the cost recovery
approach. If production costs are high, water costs are only a small percentage of
total costs. Even when the water rates increase, there will be only a small increase
in the total cost. Elasticity is low. This influences the competitiveness of the sec-
tor. In addition, a rigorous recovery of all costs would have an effect on the
affordability of water services for rural communities, which are not yet willing to
pay increased water prices. 
2.11 Reduction of pollution 
Reduction in emissions of pollutants is very evident in all selected countries
in the Danube river basin. Studies revealed that about 44 percent of the total
nitrogen input stems from agriculture and 58 percent in the case of phosphorus.
The new economic mechanisms, introduced in each of the selected countries,
contributed to a reduction of about 60 percent in the total nutrient content.
A recent Government Decision in Romania (GD 472/2000) established
penalties of four to five percent of the total farm revenues for polluting water
resources. Through the application of this regulation, N and P have been reduced
by more than 50 percent. 
Identifying the culprit causing diffuse pollution in agriculture is fundamental to
effectiveness. The individual farmer who pollutes must pay, based on the ‘polluter
pays’ principle.
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3. KEY ISSUES THAT EXPLAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRICING FOR
THE ENVIROMENT
The effectiveness of pricing for the environment depends on:
• The development and implementation of the pricing policy;
• The creation of water user associations in agriculture as an essential tool for
the implementation of pricing reform;
• Characteristics of the demand, in relation to the effective use of available
water supply and improved system and water supply reliability; 
• Characteristics of physical environment, in reducing drainage and erosion
control impacts, improving water quality and aquatic habitat;
• The combination of pricing with organizational, managerial, financial and
economic concerns, including strengthening communication with stake-
holders as a key link in developing the necessary understanding and support
for new goals and policies. 
3.1 The development and implementation of pricing policy
Bulgaria has recently developed a policy paper, Strategy for Irrigation
Development in Bulgaria Under Market Economy Conditions. The strategy out-
lines the aims and scope of the required structural reforms in irrigation and the
ways its management can adapt to new conditions in agriculture. The areas
equipped for irrigation, in which irrigation is profitable or can become profitable
within reasonable time limits, are also described, by region and in the country as
a whole. The strategy also sets the main development priorities, the methods and
organization of infrastructure use, and the objectives of the economic, pricing
and investment policies in the sector for both short- and long-term.
A program declaration of the Slovakian Government in 1998 is the main doc-
ument concerning agricultural policy. 
The creation of Water User Associations in agriculture is essential for the
implementation of pricing reform in all selected countries.
3.2 Characteristics of the demand
Like the farmer's demand for any other input, the demand for water reflects
how valuable water is in production. Irrigation water derives its value from the
contribution it makes to farm profits. When additional water is available with no
cost, the farmer will apply more water until there is no additional benefit to be
gained from doing so. At this point the farmer will maximize profit but may harm
others by taking water that would otherwise be used by a water-short farmer. 
The basic principle of incentive pricing is to set the water price to discour-
age inefficient use of water. Efficient water pricing will guarantee that water infra-
structures can be adequately managed.
For all selected case studies, the application of new water distribution
schemes and relevant pricing mechanisms which in the long-term shall fully
reflect water supply costs will allow water quality conservation and guarantee
equitability in satisfying user requirements.
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3.3 Character of the physical environment
The character of the physical environment acts as a beneficial or restrictive
factor on the production capacity of agricultural soils in the selected case studies.
Frequent droughts, soil excess, soil erosion and landslides, wind erosion or soil
chemical pollution strongly influence the effectiveness of a pricing system. The
application of an efficient pricing mechanism will facilitate improvements in
drainage, erosion reduction, improved water quality and a better aquatic habitat.
3.4 Combination of pricing with other measures
Proper pricing policy is a limited solution, encouraging a rational approach
to irrigation water use. When it is combined with institutional reforms and the
enforcement of legislation, a sustainable agricultural sector and a well-protected
environment can be achieved. 
Envisaged organizational, managerial, financial and economic measures are
correlated with contemporary policy principles of integrated and sustainable water
management and use. Reflecting historic and regional conditions, they aim at better
demand management to improve effectiveness; the decentralization of responsibility
and the adoption of the river basin as the basic management unit; a participatory
approach; the implementation of conservation activities; regional flexibility, etc.
Institutional restructuring and the development of new relations among
stakeholders in irrigation and drainage will make it easier for water users to par-
ticipate in decision-making at all levels. Their role and understanding of their
responsibilities must be increased. 
Efforts should be made to change public perceptions that agriculture wastes
water through public awareness campaigns. Users should understand that the
new water rates must recover all costs.
The case studies made clear that the proposed Water Framework Directive
offers an appropriate framework to ensure that the environmental, economic and
social objectives are met cost-effectively through the preparation of river basin
management plans to facilitate the integration of pricing policies with other mea-
sures. The management of the Tisza river basin could be the most appropriate
example for all selected countries. Water pricing is as an essential instrument of
the Tisza river basin management plan. 
Finally, communication between stakeholders is a key issue in developing the
necessary understanding and support for new policies and approaches. Through
involving farmers in the process, the following objectives can be achieved:
• Establishment of credibility;
• Identification of farmers’ concerns and values;
• Development of a consensus between the irrigation scheme and its customers.
3.5 Water measurement and accounting systems
A reliable water measurement and accounting system will facilitate:
• Conservation tasks;
• Changes in the use of water;
• Changes in users’ perception of water waste.
P O P O V I C I
E C O N O M I C  I N S T R U M E N T S  A N D  W A T E R  P O L I C I E S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E 107
3.6 Agricultural crops planning
Agricultural policies may strongly affect the environment through their impacts
on pricing strategy. Better planning of agricultural crops will allow a better use of
irrigation water. The selection of crops maximally suited to the individual irrigation
system is vital.
3.7 Participation improves planning
The clearest and most consistent benefits of participation in irrigation man-
agement have come from involving farmers in planning. The main focus needs to
be on the use of dialogue to learn about local priorities and obtain local infor-
mation on things such as past delivery problems, flooding patterns and land
tenure which can inform the design of structures and canals. In addition to activ-
ities during the design phase, meetings at the beginning of construction provide
a good opportunity to review issues, prevent problems and optimize the use of
local materials and labor. 
In all selected countries, already existing river basin committees or councils
facilitate the implementation of a bottom-up approach to water pricing through
public participation and transparent procedures. 
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Pricing policies for enhancing the 
sustainability of water resources1
Pierre Strosser, DG Environment, European Commission2
Water is of major concern for environmental policies in the European
Community and is one of the environmental priorities of the European Commission.
The main pillar of water policies during the coming decades will be the establish-
ment of a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (i.e. the
Water Framework Directive). 
In line with recent initiatives giving more weight to economic instruments in
environmental policies, the Water Framework Directive promotes the use of water
charging as an incentive for the sustainable use of water resources and the recov-
ery of the costs of water services by the economic sector. This will contribute to
meeting the environmental objectives of this directive in a cost-effective way. 
Against this background, the Commission has adopted a Communication
entitled Pricing Policies for Enhancing the Sustainability of Water Resources
(COM(2000)477) with the following objectives:
1. To clarify the main issues related to the use of water pricing for enhancing
the sustainability of water resources; 
2. To present the rationale behind the Commission's preference for a strict
application of sound economic and environmental principles in water pricing
policies;
3. To propose a set of guiding principles that will support the implementation
of the proposed Water Framework Directive and more specifically its water
pricing article.
The key messages put forward by the Communication are as follows.3
1. The sustainability of water resources is at stake in many river basins in
Europe, from both a quantitative and qualitative point of view. Appropriate
water pricing has a key role to play in the development of sustainable water
policies.
2. To play an effective role in enhancing the sustainability of water resources,
water pricing policies need to be based on an assessment of the costs and
benefits of water use and consider both the financial costs of providing 
services as well as the environmental and resource costs. A price directly
1. This text is a slightly modified version of the preface of the Communication by the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, COM(2000)477. 
2. For more information: Pierre Strosser, Tel: (32-2) 296 8743, Fax: (32-2) 296 9559, E-mail: pierre.strosser@cec.eu.int 
3. See also the accompanying document to the Communication entitled Water pricing policies in theory and practice
SEC(2000)1237.
linked to the volumes of water used or pollution produced can ensure that
pricing has a clear incentive function for consumers to improve water use
efficiency and reduce pollution.
3. The integration of economic and environmental objectives into Member States’
water pricing policies is highly diverse at present. Overall, the full recovery of
financial costs is only partly achieved, and environmental and resource costs
are rarely considered. The inadequacy of water pricing policies is striking for
the agricultural sector, especially in Southern European countries where it is by
far the largest consumer of water and where scarcity problems are the greatest.
4. Water pricing policies in countries where the EU has a particularly strong
involvement rarely integrate economic efficiency and environmental objectives.
This is true for Accession Countries, where pricing is an important issue in the
context of enlargement. It is even more valid for developing countries, where
the application of economic principles in water policies is in its infancy. 
5. Efficient water pricing policies have a demonstrable impact on the water
demand of different uses. As a result of changes in water demand, efficient
water pricing reduces the pressure on water resources. This is particularly
true for the agricultural sector. The available evidence suggests that farming
communities can be expected to adapt to certain price increases that would
result from a stricter recovery of the costs of water services. Different levels
of cost recovery among countries and economic sectors, such as agriculture
and industry, are likely to influence the competitiveness of these sectors both
in the internal market and international trade. 
6. Pricing policies that better account for the environment will build on: (i) a
firmer application of the principle of recovery of costs; (ii) a wider application
of pricing structures that provide incentives and the promotion of metering
devices; (iii) the assessment of major environmental costs and, where feasible,
the internalisation of these costs into prices; (iv) a transparent policy develop-
ment process with the participation of users/consumers; and, (v) a phased
implementation of pricing policies that better integrate sound economic and
environmental principles. 
7. Water pricing will need to be integrated with other measures to ensure 
environmental, economic and social objectives are met cost-effectively. The
proposed Water Framework Directive provides the right structure to do so in
the context of the preparation of the river basin management plans.
8. Other sector, structural and cohesion policies need to be designed and imple-
mented so as to ensure consistency and coherence with, and effectiveness of,
water pricing policies. As far as agriculture is concerned, reconciling water and
agriculture remains a key priority for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
and existing policy instruments (e.g. agri-environmental measures in rural
development programmes). The CAP should support the sustainable use of
water resources in line with the economic and environmental principles pro-
moted in the proposed Water Framework Directive and in this communication.
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The Commission fully recognises the sensitivity of the pricing issues dis-
cussed in this communication for a wide range of stakeholders and Member
States. This sensitivity should not be a reason for misreading the Commission's
message as an advocacy for a ‘pricing alone’ policy. Clearly, pricing is not the sole
instrument that can (and will) solve water resources problems in Europe and else-
where. However, pricing should be given due consideration to ensure it pro-
motes more efficient and less polluting use of our scarce water resources.
Overall, the communication aims at provoking a fruitful political debate and
sharing of views that will lead to the identification of practical steps and devel-
opment of guidelines for the implementation of the water pricing article of the
proposed Water Framework Directive. And the communication is hoped to play
an information role for stakeholders who will actively participate in the prepara-
tion of the river basin management plans and programmes of measures provided
for by the Water Framework Directive. 
The communication will also support the assessment of the role water pricing
may play in the context of enlargement and the implementation of the environ-
mental acquis in Accession Countries. Finally, it will supplement the EU guidelines
for development policy entitled Towards Sustainable Water Resources Management
by stressing the key components of sustainable water pricing policies.
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Environmental Development Fund of Slovenia:
economic instruments and water policies
Igor Cehovin, Environmental Development Fund of Slovenia
Summary
The Environmental Development Fund of Slovenia (the ‘Fund’) provides soft
loans for environmental protection investments, on the basis of public tender.
The main priorities for the allocation of funds are:
• Investment in environmenal preservation and development initiatives;
• Environmental soundness;
• Efficiency relative to the size of the investment;
• Financial viability.
The Fund carrys out its mission by awarding loans through three separate
loan programs. These are:
• The loan program for local infrastructure, which targets the environmental
investments of municipalities or actors in the public services, for example,
sewage/waste water treatment systems, solid waste disposals, drinking water
suppliers, etc;
• The loan program for environmental investments in industry, which supports
projects expanding the use of environmental protection equipment and tech-
nology, environmentally sound technology and products, and the realization
of corrective programs;
• The air pollution reduction program, financing investments which encour-
age cleaner heating energy sources, the creation of heating facilities using
renewable sources of energy and the installation of more environmentally
friendly heating systems in new buildings.
Prices in the water sector were administratively controlled in the past.
Nowadays, the price fixing mechanisms embrace market principles much more.
1. ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT FUND OF SLOVENIA
1.1 General
The Environmental Development Fund of Slovenia was established under the
Environmental Protection Act of 1993 as a public legal entity with SIT 10 million of
initial capital. The statute of the Fund was issued in the middle of 1994. The Fund
actually began operating at the end of 1994, the same year the first staff members
were employed. In 1995, the Fund's standing orders for the procedures and con-
ditions of the distribution of funds were adopted and published in the Official
Gazette. The Fund's capital increased in 1994, 1995 and 1996 through the transfer
of unpaid loan receivables from the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning
(MESP). These loans were previously granted by the MESP. 
The Fund is a non-profit financial organization, channelling finance for 
environmental investment projects. The basic goal of the Fund is to provide loans
on preferential terms for investment activities in the field of environmental 
protection from its own capital and from capital obtained from other sources.
Revenues generated from the interest rate on loans should allow the Fund to
maintain the real value of its capital and cover the operational costs of the Fund
without profit.
The Fund provides loans on the basis of public announcement (i.e., tendering
procedure) for purposes accepted as priorities by the Environmental Protection Act
and in the National Environmental Protection Program (NEAP).
1.2 Eco Fund's procedures
The first task of the Fund is the annual investment policy, adopted by the 
administrative board and confirmed by the government, in which the general out-
line of tenders for the given year is defined. After adopting the annual investment
policy, the administrative board appoints a Committee for Public Tender Imple-
mentation, which is composed of at least three members, including a minimum of
one representative of the MEPP.
The committee is responsible for the entire tender preparation and loan-
approval procedure, including: the preparation of the contents of public tenders; the
acceptance of applications and decisions on their formal eligibility; the evaluation of
applications and preparation of a priority list; and the approval of funds available. 
When preparing a tender, the committee defines the object of the tender (i.e.
type of project eligible for financing) and the amount of money to be available
under the tender. It specifies the conditions for loan provision, the requirements
for loan insurance (i.e. collateral), and the contents of the application to be sub-
mitted by applicants. The committee establishes the time limit and manner of
application and communicates relevant information to applicants.
The next step is the evaluation of all applications received. The evaluation
criteria are:
• Contribution to the preservation and development of the environment;
• Environmental soundness;
• Efficiency relative to investment costs;
• Financial viability. 
Loans are approved and contracts signed after the evaluation of applications.
The transfer of capital starts following the submission of appropriate collateral.
Funds are transferred as individual phases of the project are completed. 
The Fund supervises the progress of the investment and monitors the environ-
mental results of the investment three years after its completion.
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1.3 Description of the Fund's projects
1.3.1 Ozone depleting substances phaseout project
The Fund can function as a financial intermediary. It was appointed by the
government of Slovenia to act as a financial agent carrying out the supervision of
the implementation of the Ozone Depleting Substances Phaseout Project
financed by a grant from the Global Environmental Facility Trust Fund. 
The Global Environment Facility Trust Fund gave a grant of USD 6.2 million to
six Slovene companies in order to replace ozone-depleting technologies. The Fund
behaved as a financial intermediary ensuring proper procedures for collection and
payment. The project was completed successfully in 1998.
1.3.2 Air pollution reduction program (APRP)
In June 1996, the Fund signed a loan agreement for DEM 30 million with the
World Bank in order to finance the conversion of polluting heating systems. The
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TABLE 1
Industrial projects funded by Environmental Development
Fund, Slovenia 1996-2000
Prices in millions, Slovenian tolar (SIT)
Public tender
Amount 
approved
Amount 
paid
Number of
approved loans
04-IN96A 286 86 3
07-IN96B 39 12 2
10-IN97A 152 119 5
13-IN98A 1,469 1,469 19
14-IN98B 748 748 9
17-IN99A 4,597 4,395 15
20-IN00A incomplete - - -
Total 7,291 6,829 53
TABLE 2
Local infrastructure projects funded by Environmental
Development Fund, Slovenia 1996-2000
Prices in millions, Slovenian tolar (SIT)
Public tender
Amount 
approved
Amount 
paid
Number of
approved loans
02-LI95 691 619 54
06-LI96 758 738 31
09-LI97A 1,200 1,124 36
12-LI98A 450 308 15
15-LI99A 1,935 1,762 36
18-LI00A 1,119 853 20
Total 7,291 6,829 53
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Fund participated with its own resources: twenty-five percent of each loan is given
by the Fund and 75 percent by the World Bank. Approximately SIT 4 billion (DEM
40 million) has been extended to 4,819 households and 65 boiler houses since
September 1995 (even prior to the World Bank loan).
Soft loans have been granted for:
• Conversion from dirty solid fuels and heavy oils to more environmentally
friendly sources of energy, such as natural gas;
• Creation of heating facilities using renewable sources of energy; and
• Installation of more environmentally friendly heating systems in new buildings.
1.3.3 Industrial projects, reduction of pollution
The Fund started financing environmental projects in the industrial sector in
1996. The Fund has announced seven public tenders to finance the purchase of
equipment and technology for environmental protection, investments in envi-
ronmentally friendly technologies and products, and for the implementation of
regenerative environmental programs. The detailed data on each public tender
can be found in Tables 1 and 2.
The public invitation to apply for loans covering the environmental invest-
ments of companies (13IN98A) meant the execution of the Environmental Credit
Scheme project. Fifty percent of finance came from EU Phare grant funds.
The public tender 17IN99A was very successful. The amount available for
loan increased twice and it was closed one month ahead of schedule.
1.3.4 Local infrastructure projects
The Fund gives soft loans to public environmental protection services where
the actual borrowers are municipalities, municipal enterprises or other companies
performing such public services. 
The Fund has announced six tenders for municipalities and municipal service
companies. Loans have been sought for investment projects in sewage/waste water
treatment systems, solid waste disposal, drinking water supply, etc.
Detailed data for each public tender are seen in Table 3 opposite.
Public tender 18-LI00A was announced in January 2000 and will be open
until the end of the year 2000. The next table and picture show a breakdown of
all approved loans by purpose.
2. FIXING OF PRICES FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICES
2.1 Historical view
Until 1989, most municipal services were carried out by local public 
enterprises. Each municipality had a special consumer-worker council concerned
with local public services and consisting of representatives from all local public
enterprises. In principle, this council set prices for the services provided by local
public enterprises. In practice, the state had a great deal of formal and informal
influence, endeavouring to keep public service prices down. The councils were
dissolved in 1989 by an amendment to the constitution. One of the first acts of the
newly independent Slovenia in 1991 was to pass the Law on Prices, which
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TABLE 3
Loans approved by the Environmental Development Fund,
Slovenia
Prices in million Slovenian tolar
Purpose of investments
Amount 
approved
Amount 
paid Share
Wastewater treatment plants 537 462 8.7
Waste disposal 764 727 12.4
Gas and district heating 841 694 13.7
Sewage 996 762 16.2
Water supply 1,370 1,370 22.3
Public transport 1,377 1,121 22.4
Public area maintaining 268 268 4.3
Total 6,153 5,404 100.0
Wastewater treatment plants
0
Financing in million SIT
Waste disposal
Gas and district heating
Sewage
Water supply
Public transport
Public area maintenance
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
Approved amount
Disbursed amount
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allowed the government to transfer public-service price-setting authority to the
municipalities. This law was followed by a number of such decrees for specific
municipal services.
This experiment in municipal price setting was curtailed after about six
months when municipal service prices were frozen on January 1, 1992. Thereafter
increases were permitted only on the approval of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
The most common approach was permitting municipal service prices to rise at 80
percent of the general price inflation rate (as determined by the retail price index).
Most public service entities could not define or set prices, independently, based
on business activities and market principles. This was especially true for public
services active in the distribution of drinking water, waste disposal, and in all kind
of activities with wastewater, etc. The government reviews the maximum prices
every four months.
In October 1997, the new Fixed Prices Regulation was adopted. The regulation
has the following objectives:
• To stabilize the then market prices as the maximum prices;
• Payment conditions cannot be changed in the future;
• Delivery and procurement conditions cannot be changed in the future;
• Individuals that perform public services can be subsidized, etc.
If a company ascertains that the fixed prices do not allow profit, it can demand
the government to raise the prices. This procedure is however rather difficult and
therefore not very common.
Further, the Law on Prices allows companies that cannot obtain adequate
revenue from their commercial activities to apply for a subsidy. 
Local government cannot change fixed prices. All municipal services must
respect the maximum prices. Only if the local government set municipal taxes
before the regulation was issued can the companies performing public services
raise their prices but, even then, only to the level fixed by the regulation. Local
governments can prescribe a special tax for environmental stress. The
Environmental Protection Act is the legal basis for such acts (separate decrees for
specific areas: drinking and sewage water, waste disposal, air, etc.). Municipal
statutes also usually allow such taxes.
Taxes are charged and collected at the same time as the service is charged.
Their purpose is not to pay for the service. The amount of the taxes may differ
from one municipality to the other and so does the aggregate price for municipal
services. Usually, however, the price for the relevant service does not differ.
The main issue in Slovenia is that users do not pay the full costs of the services
they receive. The term ‘service they receive’ should also include expenses that will
expand production (so that the service can be successfully performed in the future).
Services cannot reach a higher level of quality as the charges only meet
production costs and generate no funds for new investments. Thus, users do
not know the legitimate price for the services that are provided to them.
Consciousness of users regarding environmental protection can be low as a
result of this ignorance. 
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This pricing policy, which allows such a discrepancy between actual costs
and imposed prices, causes a number of problems for the normal functioning of
municipal service:
• The quality of municipal services is low;
• There is no new development and no modern equipment;
• It is not possible to work in accordance with BAT;
• Budget funds vary from municipality to municipality;
• A proper information system has not yet been developed.
2.2 Instructions for the formulation of prices
In January 2000, the Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning published
the Instructions for the Formulation of Prices of Drinking Water Supply Services
by Compulsory Local Public Services
The instructions set two types of prices:
• The in-house price of services is the price that covers the costs of the existing
method of supplying drinking water.
• The justified price of services is the in-house price of services plus the minimum
costs that ensure the execution of a program to guarantee the prescribed 
quality of drinking water and the supply of drinking water.
The following costs shall be covered by the in-house and justified prices:
• Direct costs : cost of electrical energy, cost of fuel, other material costs, cost
of services, labor costs, direct sales costs, other direct costs;
• Indirect production costs: depreciation, investment maintenance, other indirect
production costs;
• General costs : indirect supply costs, indirect administrative costs, indirect
sales costs, indirect interest costs;
• Profit.
The justified price shall be charged for services if the existing method of
supplying drinking water is inadequate and the local community has formulated
a program to achieve a supply of drinking water appropriate to central guide-
lines. In the same manner, the justified price of services shall be charged in order
to finance the replacement of worn-out sections of the network thus reducing
water losses in the water supply network.
The difference between the justified and in-house prices shall be formulated
on the basis of the estimated costs of the program for achieving the prescribed
supply of drinking water and the timetable envisaged for its execution.
The revenues generated by the difference between the justified and in-house
prices may be used only for the expansion of the drinking water supply.
At the present time, prices for water are determined at the municipal level. 
It is expected that the prices will approach real market levels in the future. According
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to the statistics and to the report made by the MESP, the municipal services do not
reach high levels of quality, at present, presumably due to the low prices charged. If
the prices are to be set on the basis of market levels, they will most probably rise.
Such an increase in prices will allow a higher quality of public services as a positive
consequence. However, a rise in inflation and a consequent rise of interest rates
could ensue.
Nevertheless, the mainstream economic view is that this policy will not lead
to a rise in inflation. The rate of inflation is determined by macroeconomic vari-
ables such as the money supply, fiscal deficit, exchange rate, etc. For a given
package of such policies, micro-economic control of individual prices simply
makes other prices increase in an offsetting fashion with no impact on true infla-
tion but a high cost in economic inefficiency. Even if this view were inaccurate,
the price of municipal services is thought to be minor as a component of the aver-
age consumer's market basket so its control would only have the most modest
overall impact.
3. CONCLUSION
The Fund has no direct influence on pricing policies in the water sector. The
Fund provides loans for environmental protection investments at favorable inter-
est rates on the basis of application for tender. The main goal of the Fund is to
support pollution reduction projects. 
Administratively controlled prices had a positive influence on the inflation rate
in the past. One of the main consequences of this policy has been a lack of funds
for new investments and for covering maintenance costs. Nowadays market prin-
ciples are much more involved in the price determination mechanisms.
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What role for water pricing: ten actions for
internalising sustainability
Charlie Avis, WWF International, Danube-Carpathian Programme , Dr. Chris Tydeman, WWF-UK, 
and Eva Royo-Gelabert, WWF European Freshwater Programme
This paper presents suggested actions for ensuring that the future implemen-
tation of the Water Framework Directive — in Central and Eastern Europe as well
as in the current Member States of the European Union — pursues the specified
path of sustainability and achieves it. 
In the opinion of the authors, water pricing is a useful tool (or set of tools)
for promoting and encouraging the fulfillment of the environmental objectives of
the directive, but in itself is not the solution. 
After a brief review of recent policy developments and events, the ten
actions are presented, grouped into five broad headings: economic, financial,
management, process, and integration. Particular attention is paid to the need for
full internalisation of environmental costs into water pricing systems, with exam-
ples of wetland and floodplain goods and services in Estonia and Slovakia.
INTRODUCTION
WWF has for some time been engaged in the policy debate surrounding the
development, and eventual adoption, of the Water Framework Directive.
Furthermore, WWF's European Freshwater Program is organising a joint series of
seminars with the European Commission, focusing on, for example, agriculture,
wetlands and river basin management. This series aims at providing practical
approaches and tools for the implementation of the directive, leading to the draft-
ing of a non-statutory guidance document for river basin managers to be pub-
lished by the end of 2001. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, WWF has argued that the directive offers real
potential for the promotion of sustainable approaches to environmental manage-
ment and decision-making, for example within the countries of the Danube river
basin (Avis and Weller 2000). 
Water pricing is clearly a key element of this new policy. WWF supports the
moves towards introducing proper water pricing, in that for too long the 
environment has been subsidising the provision of water at below full costs. This
has been done mainly through habitat loss, ecosystem degradation, and wetland
drainage. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) the relatively rich biodiversity,
particularly wetland and floodplain habitats, is therefore at quite some risk unless
water pricing acts to promote sustainability rather than to undermine it.
This paper identifies a series of actions, ten in total, which the authors of this
paper believe are pre-requisites for the successful introduction of water pricing
systems in CEE. These actions will lead to the development of sustainable water
management practices, which WWF argues is really the underlying spirit of the
new directive.
However, progress to date, in the existing Member States, regarding the design
and introduction of water pricing strategies, has been rather limited. At the
European Commission sponsored conference on pricing water in Sintra, Portugal
(September 1999), more than 30 presentations were made from all over Europe:
north, south, east and west. Only one (Tydeman 1999) concentrated on true, ‘full’
cost recovery, that is cost recovery which incorporates and takes account of the
environmental cost of water supply, treatment, and management. This is rather dis-
turbing, given that the recently published European Commission Communication
on Pricing Policies for Enhancing the Sustainability of Water Resources specifically
demands that environmental costs be integrated into water pricing strategies.
But much has happened in the twelve months since the Sintra Conference.
Before presenting the ten key actions, some relevant recent policy developments
or events are recalled, in order to set the scene.
• 02/2000, Brussels: first WWF/EC Seminar on the Implementation of the
Water Framework Directive, with more than 100 participants, many of whom
were from CEE.
• 02/2000, Budapest: first meeting of the Danube Convention (ICPDR) ad-hoc
Expert Group on river basin management and the implementation of the
Water Framework Directive.
• 07/2000, Brussels: publication of EC Communication on Pricing Policies for
Enhancing the Sustainability of Water Resources.
• 09/2000, Brussels: European Parliament and Council of Ministers adopts
Water Framework Directive following lengthy consultation procedures.
• 09/2000, Budapest: third meeting of ICPDR ad-hoc Expert Group on WFD
agreed action program/timetable for compliance with directive (internation-
al aspects) in Danube basin countries, and proposes that a sub-group be
formed to deal with economic issues.
• 09/2000, Lille: Conference on Water Pricing which discussed, inter alia, the
development of guidelines on water pricing.
• 09/2000, Szentendre: EC/REC conference on water pricing, perhaps the first
of its kind in CEE.
TEN ACTIONS FOR INTERNALISING SUSTAINABILITY
1. ‘Economic’
1.1 Water must not be treated as just another economic good
Within this new policy and philosophical framework, water is treated as an
economic good. This allows it to be priced, but not without controversy. Most
objections to this notion, which often come from environmental groups, relate to
questions over the guarantee of fair and equal distribution and access, particularly
where water has been treated as a ‘basic good’ that has been provided by the
state. How can the poor, it is asked, gain access to enough water to meet their
basic requirements, if the supply and provision of water is left to the full force of
the ‘free’ market?
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This quite sympathetic objection, based loosely around a wider conception of
water as one of the fundamental human rights, is seemingly unpragmatic, however.
Somebody must bear the costs incurred for water provision and treatment and it can-
not continue to be the environment through loss of ecosystem functioning nor hid-
den subsidies. Is there a serious alternative, in management and investment terms,
to treating water as an economic commodity? In today’s economic and political cli-
mate, the answer must be ‘no’, but, we need appropriate models. Many economists
seem to treat water as they would any other commodity; but it is not.
In theory, while it is renewable, we are not treating it as such; no other
product scores higher on the scale of human needs, it is therefore demand
assured and, unlike other commodities, it is not replaceable and therefore not
subject to standard market forces. The last ton of coal on the planet may
become worth a considerable sum (but there are other energy sources), the last
ton of available water would clearly not, since once we get to that level there
would be few people around to take advantage, even the so-called ‘fat cats’ of
the UK water industry.
Thus, whilst water is certainly to be treated as an economic good, it must be
recognised that it is very different to other commodities and therefore exceptional
strategies and instruments need to be developed in order to manage its pricing
effectively.
1.2 Planning and pricing must ensure sustainable use, not just ‘efficient use’ 
Article 9 of the directive states that, by 2010, governments should ensure
‘water pricing policies [which] provide incentives for users to use water
resources efficiently’. A distinction needs to be drawn here between ‘efficient’
and ‘sustainable’.
If the overall goal of the emerging European Union policies is to ensure a 
sustainable Europe, then, clearly, water pricing should be used to ensure (long-
term) sustainable use of water resources rather than simply (short-term) efficient
use. This itself requires a fundamental realisation: that the environment is the 
service provider of water, but is often currently regarded at best as an alternative
user. Until ‘the environment’ is recognised as the service provider par excellence,
instead of being relegated to the status of ‘user’, it risks being ignored and therefore
degraded by preference being given to other, more persuasive or powerful user
groups or sectors. Sustainability, enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty, needs proper
definition in terms of water resources, such as that provided by Gleick (1996):
The use of water that supports the ability of human society to endure and
flourish into the indefinite future without undermining the integrity of the
hydrological cycle or ecological systems that depend on it.
The development of sustainability goals and indicators is now a major policy 
priority and it requires emphasising the integrity of water resources and the flora,
fauna and human societies that have developed around them. The management
of river basins, aquifers, coastal zones and the marine environment have often
been seen as separate problems but they are inextricably linked through the
hydrological cycle. Also, concerns about the water quality of both freshwater and
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sea water, historically treated as separate issues, must now be seen as requiring a
unified management approach.
Water use efficiency needs to be increased, in particular that of the agricultur-
al sector in regions suffering from ‘water stress’. There are many such regions, par-
ticularly in southern Europe. According to the European Commission (2000: 7)
‘over-abstraction of water has put the sustainability of many aquifers at stake’ and
that ‘50 percent of wetlands have ‘endangered status’ due to groundwater over-
exploitation’.
However, this drive for efficiency should not constitute the ultimate aim of
water pricing policies, as highly efficient water use does not necessarily imply
sustainable use. For example, there are places in southern Europe where irriga-
tion schemes are 90 percent efficient, but where there is still sever ‘water stress’
i.e. abstraction form groundwater is greater than recharge. In a paper delivered at
the recent Lille conference, Maestu (2000) detailed such instances for modern,
high-investment irrigation schemes in Spain. The study concludes that ‘even
where crop prices have been favourable and where investments in technical effi-
ciency have taken place, there have not been improvements in the management
of aquifers in the absence of a regulatory framework. The lack of incorporation
of external effects into decision-making then leads to unsustainable water use’.
1.3 Full cost recovery for water services includes the costs of damages to the
environment
As recognised in the Communication, where the costs of ‘producing’ water
are considered, it is rare for anything but the internal costs to be taken into account
i.e. those localised within a management unit (these include collection, transport,
treatment and distribution). Even so, not always the full costs are taken into
account; for example, maintenance of water treatment plants, which can have a
very long lifespan, or maintenance of distribution systems are often ignored.
External costs, i.e. those excluding the above and which concern the com-
munity as a whole as a consequence of water use, are rarely taken into account.
Such externalities include impact on the environment which effectively means
that loss of nature is a subsidy to both suppliers and users of water, industry, agri-
culture, consumers. 
In general terms, these come under the heading of ‘ecosystem services’, that
is, the processes through which ecosystems and their component species sustain
and fulfil human life. They maintain the production of ecosystem goods such as
food, forage, timber, natural fibre and industrial products, as well as maintaining
biodiversity. In addition, ecosystem services represent actual life support func-
tions, such as cleansing, recycling and renewal as well as intangible aesthetic and
cultural benefits.
Ecosystem services are generated by a complex of natural cycles includ-
ing biogeochemical and hydrological cycles. Human beings depend com-
pletely on the continuation of these cycles for their very existence. The nature
and value of these cycles have been noticed largely through their loss. For
example deforestation has brought to light the critical role of forests in the
hydrological cycle, in particular in mitigating floods, drought, and erosion. As
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Daily (1997) put it: ‘Society is likely to value more highly [ecosystem] services,
and to discover (or rediscover) an array of services not listed, as human
impacts on the environment intensify and the costs and limits of technological
substitutions become more apparent’. The benefits provided by freshwater
ecosystems have been characterised by Barbier, Acreman, and Knowler (1997)
through economic valuation using a total economic value framework (TEV)
(see Table 1).
Ecosystem services are critical, but, establishing direct links between human
activities and losses of aquatic ecosystem services in specific locations is difficult
and complex. When undertaking economic analyses, they are frequently omitted
because they are not marketed or are difficult to price. Nevertheless when these
services are lost, society is forced into ‘defensive expenditure’ to replace them. 
An example from the United States is the Mississippi River valley where the
draining of wetlands and alteration of river channels (at some significant original
cost) destroyed a large portion of the river system’s natural flood protection ser-
vices. The loss of these services was partially responsible for the massive flooding
that occurred during 1993 which caused property damage estimated at USD 12 mil-
lion (Myers and White 1993). In addition to that cost, a considerably larger amount
TABLE 1
Value and freshwater ecosystems
After Barbier, Acreman and Knowler, 1997
Direct use value Indirect use value
Quasi and 
quasi-option value Existence value
• Fish
• Agriculture
• Fuelwood
• Recreation
• Transport
• Wildlife harvesting
• Peat/energy
• Nutrient retention
• Flood control
• Storm protection
• Groundwater
recharge
• External ecosystem
support
• Microclimate
stabilisation
• Shoreline stabilisation
• Potential future uses
(as per direct and
indirect use)
• Future value of
information
• Biodiversity
• Culture, heritage
TABLE 2
Habitat values of Estonian wetlands and flood plains
After Andreasson-Gren, Ehrlich and Pedersen, 1999
Harvest values Recreational values Life-support values Biodiversity
• Reeds
• Grazing land for
cattle and sheep
• Fish
• Bird watching
• Bathing
• Sport fishing and
hunting (which can
also be regarded as
harvest values)
• Beautiful wetland
nature scenery
• Nutrient cleaning
• Waste assimilation
• Flood protection
• Wind protection
• Ground water
cleaning and provision
• Biodiversity
• Functional diversity
• Resilience
• Information
• Genetic pool
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is having to be spent in restoring the river to its original state. Elsewhere in the US,
in a classic study, it was shown that the wetlands along the Charles River reduced
the peak river flow by 65 percent, and delayed the peak flow from a particularly
violent storm by 3 days (quoted in Turner, 1988).
WWF has undertaken specific research in this area, specifically with regard to
two of its European sub-regional programmes — the Baltic (Andreasson-Gren,
Ehrlich and Pedersen, 1999) and the Danube Carpathian (Andreasson-Gren and
Groth, 1995). One of WWF’s NGO partners in the region, Daphne of Slovakia, has
also undertaken field-based economic analysis of wetland benefits (Rybanic, Seffer
and Cierna 1999). Some results from these studies will be discussed briefly to high-
light the costs which traditional water pricing systems have failed to integrate or
‘internalise’.
The Baltic study concentrated on the very valuable Estonian coastal and
floodplain wetlands. These are highly productive, both in terms of biodiversity
and with respect to services of value to human society. Such wetlands help to reg-
ulate nutrient inputs thereby mitigating damage from eutrophication.
Estonian wetlands also help to reduce the effect of floods, and large surfaces
of inundated flood plains make a considerable contribution to the qualitative and
quantitative regeneration of groundwater. The climatic function of some types of
wetlands can be very important as they affect the mesoclimate of nearby land by
increasing evaporation and absorbing heat during periods of drought. Tracts of
wetland forest can act as barriers against strong winds, thus preventing the drying
up of agricultural land.
The study concluded that the Estonian coastal wetlands and floodplains are
likely to produce the following, interlinked, classes and items of environmental
services of use to society (Table 2).
While it is relatively easy to carry out quantification of harvest values and even
recreational values, this is not the case with life support services or biodiversity. For
life support services, this is because these services are usually obtained by humans
through other ecosystems. For example, eutrophication of the Baltic Sea has had an
adverse effect on populations of cod, which has a higher commercial value than fish
species favoured by eutrophication. The drainage of wetlands is one of the many
factors that explains the substantial leakage of nutrients from agriculture to the Baltic
Sea. Besides that, drainage has brought about large scale conversion of wetlands to
further agricultural land, which has not only further reduced nature’s own nutrient
retention and reduction capacity but, in addition, the nutrient load has increased
through a greater volume of fertiliser input onto a smaller area of wetland.
Some exported life support services to other ecosystems may occur at a large
distance from the wetland under study. For example, loss of migratory bird species
can impact adversely on the control of harmful insect species many thousands of
miles away.
The study found that the value per hectare (ha) increased rapidly at reduction
levels exceeding 40 percent. At these reduction levels, high cost measures, directed
towards airborne emissions, must be used to compensate for the nitrogen reduction
carried out by Estonian wetlands. When the reduction requirement is 50 percent, as
in the ministerial agreement under the Helsinki Convention, the value of coastal 
wetlands correspond to EEK 8,000/ha/year and of flood plains to EEK 3,600/ha/year
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(at 1994 prices). The estimated total values were arrived at by summing the totals for
the separate service values, which is probably not entirely valid, but, given the lack
of models which deal with interaction between the single service sectors was the
approach taken necessarily. The total average value of the coastal wetlands amounts
to EEK 4.7 million. The corresponding value for floodplains is about five times
greater at EEK 20.6 million. There is, however, a considerable range and the figures
are given in Table 3.
Thus, the estimated value of Estonian wetlands is considerable. These wet-
lands are a critical part of the hydrological cycle and, not only is it essential to
consider in situ effects through cost benefit analysis of changes to those wetlands
and the services they provide specifically, but, also at what cost will those services
have to be replaced, and that includes effects on the provision of water?
More recent work carried out in Slovakia on the Morava floodplain (Rybanic,
Seffer and Cierna 1999). looks at a comparison between sustainable use (mostly
through traditional practices) and alternative uses, for example, using it for grow-
ing arable crops or for gravel mining. Unlike the studies in Estonia, which looked
at the denitrification properties of floodplains and coastal areas, the Morava study
looked at the denitrification achieved only by plant growth.
The traditional form of agricultural management in the Morava floodplain is
the production of hay. Farmers usually mow the meadows once or twice per year,
depending on flood conditions. Direct market prices were used in calculating the
benefits of hay production and yields obtained from farmers and agricultural
firms. The substitute market approach was used to obtain the value of nitrogen
reduction in the lower part of the Morava floodplain. The value of this nitrogen
sink (equal to around 434 tons of nitrogen removed annually) on an area of 1727
hectares can be expressed in monetary terms as the operational clean-up cost for
the same amount of nitrogen in a conventional waste-water treatment plant with
the biological elimination of nitrogen. The capacity of wastewater treatment
plants (WWTP) is measured in equivalent citizens (EC). Every EC produces about
11 grams of nitrogen per day. The efficiency of the cleaning powers of a WWTP
with the biological elimination of nitrogen is taken to be 50 percent. If this is
extrapolated to the meadow complex, this area would incorporate 50 percent of
864 tons of nitrogen per year into its biomass.
The amount of 434 tons of nitrogen which is removed annually represents a
yearly production of around 216,000 ECs. Therefore the monetary value of the
nutrient sink in the study area is equal to the operational cost of WWTP of this
capacity. Operational costs for this sort of WWTP (labour, energy, chemicals for
cleaning process, sludge deposits, sludge transportation) were estimated at EUR
1,900 per day, or EUR 690,000 per year.
This shows that the estimated monetary value of the nitrogen sink to be
around EUR 690,000 per year. It should also be noted that the cost of building
such WWTP would be approximately EUR 6,900,000.
A cost benefit analysis was carried out using two scenarios, an optimistic one
based on two good cuts of hay (4 tons/ha from first mowing and two tons for the
second), and a pessimistic one based on two poorer cuts of hay (three tons for
the first mowing and one ton for the second cut). Net benefits were quite similar.
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The total social economic benefit from the conservation and sustainable use of
the Morava floodplain amounts to between EUR 400 and 460 per hectare,
depending on the scenario used. These figures were also significantly higher than
those for corn cultivation in either a ‘good’ (exceptionally dry) year or ‘average’
(moderately wet) year.
Thus, from these studies, it is clear that wetlands play a valuable role in water
management and are a valuable economic asset. From these somewhat pioneer-
ing studies, it also becomes clear that under normal circumstances, such goods
and services are not taken into account when draining wetlands or converting to
arable agriculture.
Furthermore, these studies show that alternative strategies can be considered
when seeking to reduce pollution loads within the context of river basin planning.
This has begun to be recognised by funding agencies: for instance, the GEF/UNDP
Pollution Reduction Program for the Danube river basin includes several projects
aiming at wetland restoration in order to play similar roles, environmentally and
economically advantageous, to those described for Estonian and Slovak wetlands.
2. ‘Financial’
2.1 Significant proportions of water charges must be earmarked for
environmental improvements
Monies generated by the implementation of full cost recovery for water services
should be gained and used in a way that reflects the environmental objectives
underlying the purpose of the scheme. For example, domestic water users in a given
area where groundwater reserves have been overexploited, may be currently
charged at a higher rate because of the distribution costs involved in bringing water
from elsewhere. In this case, the implementation of full cost recovery, in order to
address the damage to the resource, should ensure that those responsible for the
overexploitation would pay these extra costs. In addition, some of this money
should be directed towards measures which further the relevant environmental
objectives of the directive in that specific region i.e. recharging of aquifers. 
Only in this way will water pricing provide an incentive to users and suppliers
to reduce over-abstraction and pollution (and therefore costs) and enhance the
environment in which they live or operate. 
TABLE 3
Estimated annual economic values of coastal wetlands and flood plains
FLOOD PLAINSCOASTAL WETLANDS
Services
Value/ha 
EEK
Area, 
ha
Total value
(mill. EEK)
Value/ha 
EEK
Area, 
ha
Total value
(mill. EEK)
Hay, grasslands 469-871 792 0.37-0.69 450-2520 2562 1.15-6.46
Reed 835-5435 570 0.48-3.10 - - -
Fish - - - 8716 1480 12.9
N-sink 76-8000 2945 0.02-23.56 34-3600 7867 0.27-28.32
Total 295-9303 2945 0.87-27.4 1817-6061 7867 14.3-47.68
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Furthermore, water pricing should be seen as an incentive not only for fulfilling
the environmental objectives of the directive but also for fulfilling all the water and
environment-related directives listed as the first step towards compliance (eleven in
total). This is, in fact, the first obligation of the directive. This is where the directive's
very influential provisions on river basin management play a significant role. For the
first time, water charges may be used for securing sustainable land-use practices,
restoration of degraded areas, creation of artificial wetlands for nutrient removal, and
so on, thus providing the foundation for fully integrated management.
But of course this requires that the budgetary necessities are made available,
and hence the need for ‘earmarking’ funds for environmental improvements.
2.2 Social considerations must be provided for 
The social aspects of the directive must not be underestimated. Users have
become accustomed to subsidised charges for water, particularly in the agricul-
tural sector. There is often a strong cultural or societal belief that water is ‘sent
from God’ and that everyone has a right to use it, perhaps also for free.
Strong political lobbies oppose the introduction of water pricing.
Furthermore, economic difficulties in many countries and regions make the
imposition of full costs recovery on many groups in society problematic, to say
the least. The directive does not rule out the introduction of social security pro-
visions to protect those on low incomes, nor does it deny governments the
opportunity to ‘phase in’ pricing regimes.
Vulnerable social groups must be protected from excessive and unaffordable
water charges. One way of ensuring this is achieved is to avoid cross-subsidising
sectoral uses and charging the domestic users, who are predominantly urban. It
is unacceptable that domestic users should subsidise others e.g. agriculture.
Other useful strategies include the provision to users of a ‘block’ or quota of
water supplied at very low cost or for free, above and beyond which charges are
required. In Flemish parts of Belgium, for instance, a daily allowance of 120 litres
per person is guaranteed.
Many pricing strategies are being investigated so that equitable systems can
be introduced. One such strategy is the ‘rising block’ system of charging, which
encourages demand-side savings of water for the supply company and savings
of money spent to the domestic user. As consumption increases, so does the per
unit cost of water supplied. Thus a modest user pays less per unit of supply
than does a more intensive user. This is, of course, directly opposite to the usual
marketing principle of ‘buying in bulk’ to secure savings in price. Significantly,
many countries have employed the latter, harmful and contradictory ‘decreas-
ing block’ systems, for many years, including Spain (Fernandez-Lop and
Asuncion 1999).
What is clear is that social opposition to the imposition of increased water
charges is likely to be less significant if the public as a whole understands 
why they are being asked to pay more for their water. Hence there is a greater
need for public participation and education than water companies and govern-
ments have recognised in the past. These are themes which the paper will return
to a little later.
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3. ‘Management’
3.1 Different scales require different decision-making structures
Water pricing, as an element of integrated river basin management, clearly
must take into account questions of scale and geography. Costs must be borne by
those using (or polluting) and not by others e.g. those downstream, a factor
which becomes more complicated when attributing costs for cross-border
impacts. 
The definition of the basic unit, the river basin district, would be the most
appropriate level at which to organise water pricing systems. Yet in CEE, where
river basins are often highly international in nature, this is particularly problematic.
This requires strong international cooperation and coordination, in particular,
concerning the sharing of information. In the catchment area of the river Danube
and its many tributaries, which is the most international river basin in the world, the
secretariat of the Danube Convention, the ICPDR, would be an appropriate body
to undertake this.  
3.2 Implementation requires a fundamental switch from supply- to 
demand-side management
Water has to be treated as a finite resource, and decision-makers, including
politicians in favour or opposed to water pricing, need to be persuaded to con-
sider it as such. In all areas of policy, the move towards sustainable paths requires
a recognition and adaption to the concept of ‘full world economics’, realising that
our planet is full and resources are scarce. This is in contract to ‘empty world eco-
nomics’, where the reverse was (relatively) true and in which context most eco-
nomic theory, particularly of the liberal or free-market variety, was developed,
tested, and accepted as dogma.
It is apparent that it is cheaper, easier and more equitable to improve the effi-
ciency of current uses as a means to achieve sustainability of water resources than
to try to continually increase supplies (assuming they are even available) to meet
inefficient demands. Investments in the upgrading of distribution networks and
more efficient technologies are two examples of this. Furthermore, not only will
such approaches save water, they might also reduce budgetary pressures in
regions where capital for large new infrastructure projects is scarce and where
environmental conditions are particularly sensitive. Of course, water pricing is
recognised as one method of inducing demand management, but there is much
more to demand management than simple economic instruments.
Demand management requires a fundamental change in societal and individual
behaviour, and in WWF's opinion such changes cannot be brought about, avoiding
social problems, by economic instruments alone. Thus, it again becomes clear that
there is a great need for information, education, and participation.
4. ‘Process’
4.1 Investments are required in education and public awareness
Following on naturally from the above, investments are needed, not only in
wastewater treatment plants and in economic analyses, but also in designing and
implementing strategies which will increase the acceptability of water pricing to
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the general public. Such strategies have to concentrate on demonstrating to
domestic users why they are being asked to pay more for their water than they
have become accustomed to.
Lack of awareness of the real cost of water means that users are uncommitted
to improving use efficiencies. Proposals for price increases will be similarly met
with hostility and reluctance to pay.
WWF and its partners have undertaken some pilot projects which have
demonstrated the impact of public awareness raising activities upon water 
efficiency, and therefore demand. Generally these feature training programs
and seminars; leaflets and educational campaigns in schools; exhibitions on
water; press and media work through newspapers, radio and local television
stations; cross-sectoral outreach to industry and commerce; and novel activities
like prizes and awards for water saving.
In Spain for example, a LIFE-funded project in the municipality of Alcobendas,
north of Madrid, has introduced a series of demand-management initiatives, which
are projected to reduce overall consumption by 15-20 percent. Investments in water-
saving devices are expected to be recovered within just one year. After that time, net
savings on water expenditure will begin (Fernandez-Lop and Asuncion 1999).
Normally reductions can be expected in the order of five to eight percent.
The first NGO-driven initiative in Spain took place in Zaragoza, in 1996, with the
target of saving 1,000 million litres of domestic water. By February 1999, the pro-
ject had exceeded this target and had achieved a reduction of 1,176 million litres,
or six percent of total annual consumption (Fernandez-Lop and Asuncion 1999).
All these activities cost money, and whilst the NGO community is often very
keen and willing to design and implement such programs, NGOs are just like all
other types of organisation, in that they need to cover their costs and, therefore,
need to be funded. Examples like these from Spain, however, show that investments
in the human capital can also pay back a healthy dividend, through saving water.
4.2 Participation is a must, and it is needed immediately
Closely connected to the need for public awareness, is the need for public
participation, which is almost the same thing. Of course public participation is
enshrined within the Directive, meaning that, often for the very first time, water
authorities and companies will be required to consult with the public before, for
example, determining management plans for river basin districts. This is, of
course, only right and proper.
However, for water pricing, the need for participation is also acute. As men-
tioned above, resistance and perhaps hostility to increases in water charges can
be anticipated in many parts of Europe. As demonstrated for Spain, the provision
of information and raising of awareness can help to change habits concerning
water consumption.
The public, especially through the organisations often loosely termed ‘civil
society’, needs to be consulted from the beginning concerning water pricing.
Only in this way can those civil society organisations be expected to play the
valuable leadership role of ‘smoothing in’ the transition to higher water charges.
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The European Commission recognises this, and is attempting an open strategy
towards water pricing, as evidenced by the Sintra conference, joint Seminar Series
on Water with WWF, and this conference in Szentendre. 
Still other opportunities exist. Most parties have welcomed the Commission's
decision to draft and distribute guidelines on the development of water pricing
strategies. But at the recent Lille Conference on water pricing (September 2000),
it was suggested that a small, exclusive network of water company officials would
develop these guidelines in association with the Commission, without significant
public participation.
Where civil society has a contribution to make to the water pricing debate,
including the development of what will become influential Commission guide-
lines, it must be allowed to do so. The development of these guidelines should
be conducted in an open and transparent way, and NGOs with an interest and
expertise in this subject must be invited to put forward their views. 
Where civil society does not have a contribution to make, it should be targeted
with education and awareness programmes, as described above.
5. ‘Integration’
5.1 Conflicting policies must be harmonised and all sectors properly integrated
In addition to the principles discussed earlier, there are some other very
basic principles that need to be addressed: user pays; polluter pays. These two
are, of course, inextricably linked. In many cases, not only is the user paying for
the privilege of obtaining drinking water but also for cleaning it to the level to
make it safely drinkable. The latter requirement may well be due to contaminants
arising from agricultural practices where, clearly, the polluter is not paying.
Furthermore, the agricultural practices may well be subsidised, a further call on
the user’s expenditure, and the supply of water to the farmer may well not only
be free but also subsidised in the form of water transfers, such an example would
be tobacco or cotton in Greece.
There are many examples of such conflicting policies. In Spain, unsustainable
water demand has traditionally been driven by such conflicts, with the environment
playing the role of hidden subsidiser. The EC Common Agriculture Policy (CAP),
which has subsidised and favoured irrigated production rather than more tradi-
tional (and sustainable) forms of land use such as extensive olive production, com-
bined with the use of EC Structural Funds for dam and hydropower development,
has driven the agricultural demand for (scarce) water resources upwards. 
Not only are such forms of agriculture environmentally harmful, but the 
historical lack of proper cost recovery has meant that there are incentives to use
more water rather than less. The investment costs of the Biscaurres dam in Aragon,
for example, have been estimated at ESP 3.6 million/ha of irrigated land, whereas
farmers are asked to pay only ESP 5,000/ha per year. Cost recovery for such infra-
structural developments in water supply range from only 0.4 percent to 1.0 percent
(all data from Fernandez-Lop and Gutierrez-Monzonis 1999).
In Austria, seen by most in Europe as relatively water-rich, standard agricul-
tural practices have led to nitrate and pesticide concentrations in groundwater in
excess of national and EC legislation. Almost three-quarters, 73 percent, of
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Austria’s groundwater regions have therefore been designated as in ‘need 
of restoration’, and water cannot be directly used for human consumption from
these aquifers. Water suppliers, bound to provide clean and healthy water to
users, have had to make significant investments in order to counteract this prob-
lem and avoid prosecution. The additional costs of dilution and treatment for pol-
luted groundwater have either been borne by the companies themselves or passed
on to domestic users. Clearly, the polluter is not paying (Lughofer 1999).
In Central and Eastern Europe, there is a significant danger that some of the
mistakes from the present day Union will be repeated. WWF has already recently
highlighted ‘pre-accession’ projects in Poland (Oder and Vistula dam projects) and
Bulgaria (Trans-European Network motorway through Kresna Gorge) which
threaten to impose similarly unsustainable and conflicting schemes upon the envi-
ronment and national citizens of those countries. These cases, which have attract-
ed much opposition within the countries concerned, have been brought to the
attention of the European Parliament and Commission.
Such conflicts in policy, and especially the unsustainable use of public funds,
whether EU or domestic, need to be eliminated and avoided if water pricing policies
are to be fair.
6. Conclusions
The development of appropriate water pricing systems, aimed at promoting
sustainability of water management and the full cost recovery for water supply
(including environmental damages), offers much potential for achieving the envi-
ronmental objectives of the Water Framework Directive. However, as shown
above, a number of other considerations have to be taken into account, and it must
be emphasised that water pricing alone is not enough. There needs to be a blend
of other appropriate policies and actions, including the promotion of public partic-
ipation and education.
WWF believes that the ten actions outlined above would go a significant part
of the way towards introducing policies, including water pricing policies, capa-
ble of safeguarding European freshwater resources, north, south, east and west.
As a conservation organisation, WWF, together with its governmental and NGO
partners throughout Europe, will continue to promote the sustainable use of
water resources, and continue to support the development of policy tools and
approaches necessary for sustainability, in an open and participatory manner.
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Abstract
The poor performance of many water utilities (vodokanals) in towns and
cities across the Newly Independent States for the Former Soviet Union (NIS) is
incurring high social costs, especially for the most vulnerable. Further, the finan-
cial situation of many of these vodokanals is unsustainable. Fundamental, and
long term, price, regulatory and financial reforms are required to improve their
delivery of sustainable water services. However, long term changes in water
prices, tariffs and financial management structures are difficult to achieve politi-
cally and institutionally, especially within the lifetime of most donor-driven water
service commercialisation projects. Also, it is not conceivable that every city in
the NIS will be able to collaborate in an externally funded water pricing reform
project. It is therefore useful to identify some short term, achievable, price reform
measures that can be taken without external assistance and that can help to trig-
ger the longer term commercialisation process required to improve urban water
services in the NIS.
This paper presents a summary of some recommendations for such short
term water pricing reform measures for cities in the NIS.
1. INTRODUCTION
From 1999-2000, a project entitled Opportunities and Obstacles to
Commercialising Urban Water Services in the NIS was undertaken by the
International Development team at Environmental Resources Management (ERM)
Ltd. The project was funded by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID), in close co-operation with the OECD EAP Task Force. The
objectives of the project were to:
• Present an overview of the current status and common problems and features
of urban water and wastewater management in the NIS which would affect
commercialisation; and
• Identify some of the most significant policy, institutional and financial obstacles
and opportunities for commercialisation, including the types of reform which
were likely to be most effective.
1. This paper is a synthesis of some findings from a UK DFID supported project entitled ‘Obstacles and Opportunities
to Commercialising Urban Water Services in the newly Independent States (NIS)’, that was carried out recently by ERM
in co-operation with the OECD EAP Task Force. In September 2000, the main results of the project were 
presented and discussed at a conference on Economic Instruments and Water Policies in Central and Eastern Europe:
Issues and Options, hosted by the Regional Environmental Centre at Szentendre, Hungary and supported by the
European Commission DG for the Environment. This paper is based on that presentation.
The project was designed to achieve these objectives through a combination
of research, analysis and a large amount of local consultation, including case
study visits and a major stakeholder workshop. 
2. CURRENT SITUATION AND THE NEED TO REFORM 
2.1 Availability and distribution of water
The percentage of households across the NIS with access to safe water and
sanitation is relatively low compared with worldwide norms (Table 1). Access to
safe water is, on average, some 15 percent lower than most other countries in a
similar income bracket, and access to adequate sanitation is almost 30 percent
lower (World Bank 1999).
2.2 Health related problems
The deterioration of water supply and wastewater treatment facilities across
the NIS has meant that many health problems are now more akin to those of
developing countries. Such problems include a prevalence of diarrhoeal diseases
and gastrointestinal illnesses associated with unsafe water, particularly in the
more Eastern NIS. Several studies, have shown that micro-biological contami-
nants are present (or are believed to be present) in drinking water in the NIS.2
2.3 Physical condition of assets
Water supply losses of 50 percent or more are common throughout NIS
cities,3 and there can also be considerable variation in supply between different
users. Inadequate water supply within cities is often attributable to poor mainte-
nance of pumps (or lack of funds to pay for the electricity to run them), particu-
larly in highrise buildings, where residents above the second or third floor often
do not receive any supply (Montgomery Watson 1998). 
The region’s municipal wastewater treatment facilities are typified by either
a lack of treatment altogether, or a limitation to primary treatment alone. Even
where systems provide secondary treatment, poor maintenance, high electricity
costs and limited financing often reduce system efficiency.4
2.4 Who carries the cost of poor water services?
Many socio-economic studies have been carried out in the NIS, particularly as
an adjunct to the various vodokanal (water utility) reform projects, supported by
international donors. These studies have generally confirmed that the groups most
affected by poor water supplies tend to be women (who usually bear responsibility
for securing alternative supplies), the elderly, those living on higher floors of apart-
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2. For example, the Baku Water and Sewerage Masterplan Study identified that bacteriological quality levels in water
in the city are consistently well in excess of WHO standards (Montgomery Watson 1998), and a household survey in
the Aralsk and Kazalinsk Rayons of Kazakstan, indicated that over 75% of households boiled their water before
drinking (World Bank 1996). 
3. For example, in Tbilisi, Georgia, it was estimated that up to 700 km of pipeline were seriously deteriorated, and as
little as one quarter of supply actually reached the consumer (GIBB 1999). In Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, 25% losses
were recorded, but metering was not widespread and real losses were estimated to be closer to 50% (London
Economics 2000). In Dushanbe, Tadjikistan, losses were estimated to be as high as 70% (World Bank 1999). In the
Aral-Sarybulak system in Kazakhstan (which serves 60,000 people), it was estimated that as much as 50% of the
system needed to be urgently replaced due to excessive supply losses (Danilenko 1998). 
4. The problems with the wastewater infrastructure were well illustrated by the three main towns of the Aral Rayon in
Kazakhstan, where wastewater treatment facilities had been all but abandoned due to lack of funds for maintenance
(Danilenko 1998), and Tbilisi, Georgia, where it was estimated that less than half of wastewater generated by the city
reached the main Gardani Treatment Plant, and where it was judged that effluent leaving this plant was at least as
polluting as the sewage inflow (GIBB 1999).
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ment blocks and the residents of peripheral communities. As would be expected, all
of these groups have developed coping strategies, whether it is boiling water, stor-
ing it during limited periods of supply (for example in baths), or procuring supplies
from private vendors. However, it is also clear that some households effectively
spend many times the cost of their monthly water bill on alternatives.5
3. OBSTACLES TO REFORM
The key obstacles associated with water pricing reform in the NIS seem to be
related to: water pricing policy, tariff setting, collection of payments, tax obligations
and inflation, municipal financing and subsidies. Each of these are looked at below.
3.1 Water pricing policy
Water is still viewed and treated as a public rather than an economic good in
most NIS countries. Consequently, vodokanals remain wholly state-owned and
are often managed according to social (and political), rather than financial or eco-
nomic, objectives. Reform is often sluggish therefore, as political constraints to
price changes commonly take precedence over cost recovery or efficiency objec-
tives.6 As a result, prices for water are often set unrealistically low.
5. For example, households in Baku were found to spend up to 17 times the cost of their monthly water bills on
alternative water supplies (World Bank 1995). In addition, it is also the case that the poor spend a significantly higher
percentage of their income on strategies to cope with inadequate public water supplies than wealthier families.
6. In many provinces in Russia, for example, the water tariffs for households, are usually set directly by municipal
authorities rather than the vodokanals. As a result, (waste) water prices are often considered not as an important financial
tool for vodokanal development, but as a political instrument for maintaining popularity among local residents.
TABLE 1
Access to safe water and sanitation in the NIS
SAFE WATER
Armenia 3.8 85 - -
Azerbaijan 7.9 - 36 -
Belarus 10.2 - - -
Georgia 5.4 - - -
Kazakhstan 15.7 - - -
Kyrgyz Republic 4.7 75 - 87
Moldova 4.3 56 50 96
Russian Federation 146.9 - - -
Tajikistan 6.1 69 62 83
Turkmenistan - 60 60 70
Ukraine 50.3 55 49 70
Uzbekistan 24.1 57 18 46
High income - 97 92 -
SANITATION
Percentage of 
total population
with access (1998)Country
Percentage of 
total population
with access (1995)
Percentage of 
urban population
with access (1995)
Population 
in millions 
(1998)
Sources: World Development Reports 1998-99, 1999-2000; World Development Indicators 1999
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3.2 Approaches to tariff setting
Most approaches to tariff setting for water in the NIS do not allow the
operator to fully charge for the service it supplies, and as a result costs become
difficult to cover.
An average cost pricing approach is generally used to calculate water and
wastewater tariffs in the NIS. The total anticipated cost of supplying water for the
forthcoming year is divided by the projected output of water to be supplied. This
means that it is difficult for the company to charge either an economically effi-
cient or a financially viable price per cubic meter of water.7 A cost-plus method-
ology is often used to regulate water prices8, with the allowed profit margin being
set at anywhere between 10 and 40 percent or more (and then often taxed). This
means that there is no incentive for the operator to improve efficiency, as rev-
enues would be reduced if costs decrease.
The state (at municipality or national level) usually decides what fixed or
variable costs can be included in the (waste) water tariff calculation. In order to
keep costs low (so the customer faces a lower price for water), this often means
that the recovery of costs incurred is constrained. For example, bad debt is often
not included in the calculation of charges, depreciation charges are often set at a
very low rate, and inflation is rarely factored into the equation.
Further, individual meters in apartment blocks rarely exist, and are difficult to
install. The average cost per cubic meter supplied is usually, therefore, subject 
to multiplication by a series of (often unrepresentative) norms — for example, 
estimated consumption per person per day, or number of people per household
etc — to produce a water and wastewater bill. 9 Effectively this means that cus-
tomers face a monthly tax for water services, and have no incentive to use water
economically. In most cases, industrial and state enterprise customers are 
supposed to have water meters and be charged on a volumetric basis. In reality,
however, it is common for their meters to be broken or not in place and for state
enterprises especially not to pay their bills.10
Finally, the operator is then often obliged to discount these low (waste) water
tariffs still further for various consumer groups on the basis of a wide series of social
objectives. The result can often be that a large proportion of domestic consumers
can obtain up to a 30 percent or more reduction in their bill. However, the state
rarely fully compensates the water operator in cash for these social reductions.
Also, water charges for domestic consumers are often cross subsidised by higher
tariffs for industry. These differences can range up to a factor of ten or more, often
creating conditions which can stifle the competitiveness of industries, or where
7. In the sense that often the allowable operational costs do not reflect all long run costs of supply.
8. This means that tariffs are calculated on the basis of an agreed set of costs, plus an allowance for profits. The profit
allowance is set as a percentage of costs. This methodology is usually used when an operator is state-owned and the tariff
and profit level is determined by the government, however, it can also apply to private operators.
9. In Tbilisi, Georgia, for example, the norm assumed that people use 800 litres (l) of water per capita per day, and
the domestic charge per cubic meter of supply was then multiplied accordingly. However, user studies suggested that
the true figure was closer to 250 litres per person/day. In Baku, Azerbaijan, the vodokanal assumed a monthly per
capita water consumption of about 400 litres per person/day. This figure was used as proxy for the calculation of
water tariffs, however, user surveys found that actual water use was comparatively low (80 to 120 l/day).
10. In Baku, Azerbaijan, the purchase and installation of water meters has been obligatory for all enterprises with
specified consumption limits since the start of 1989 (around 80 percent of all Baku enterprises). However, by the end
of 1989, only 56 percent of the enterprises surveyed had meters which were working. A further survey in 1995,
indicated that the situation had hardly improved (World Bank 1995).
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industries simply do not pay their bills. While policies to reduce cross subsidisation
do exist in some of the NIS, actual changes in the tariff have been rare. 
3.3 Collection of payments
The water and wastewater bills for urban domestic consumers are often 
collected as part of a wider service charge bill by a separate collection agency.
These agencies often have an incentive to retain a proportion of the collected
water and wastewater fees, over and above their allotted amount.
There has been a historically low collection rate for water and wastewater
charges, especially from state enterprises who are predominantly the worse
debtors. They face no incentive to pay their water bill in cash, and often eventu-
ally settle through barter and offset arrangements. This means that in many cases
the average cost of supplying water and wastewater services is actually often
higher than the revenue received.11
3.4 Tax and inflation
Operators often have to include a large range of obligatory payments or
taxes to the state at city, oblast or national level, within the water tariff. Although
many of the operator’s tax payments are permissible as operating costs, most tax
payments are calculated on the potential, rather than the actual revenues
received. Taxes are also often levied on the allowed profit margin as well, in the
form of a ‘profit tax’, which can range from 20 percent to 40 percent of the
allowed profit margin. Generally, all of these taxes must be paid in cash and are
often required in advance of revenue being received from customers. Heavy tax
burdens are a key issue, especially when payments to the vodokanal are made
significantly in arrears, in non cash form, or when bad debts are substantial. The
implication is that revenue shown in the cash flow statement tends to be signifi-
cantly lower than income shown in the profit and loss statement. Corporation tax
and VAT can then impose serious burdens on cash availability for the vodokanal.
The situation often arises whereby a vodokanal is operating at a significant loss,
but is still obliged to pay a significant tax on its ‘profit’, thus creating serious con-
sequences for its ability to re-invest.
High levels of inflation over the past ten years or so have proved problematic,
worsening the cash situation for water and wastewater operators, as tariff adjust-
ments have been typically sluggish and ex post. The prices of key inputs such as
fuel and electricity can be particularly affected. Likewise, there is no standard
method for adjusting charges for inflation, and (often quarterly) wholesale changes
to the tariff to ‘catch up’ with price changes to key inputs can take a long time to
calculate, process and approve.12
11. In Chisinau, Moldova, for example, a survey found that of the 15 main water industrial consumers in the city, it
appeared that only four paid their water bills. The remainder, mostly state enterprises, had accumulated large debts. In
Russia, payments made by budget organisations and industry were usually in the form of barter, offsets and promissory
notes. Non-cash payments from budget organisations could reach 90 percent of the amount due. At present, the
majority of Russian vodokanals collect less than 40 percent of their billings, some less than 20 percent. Furthermore,
bad debt provisions are only allowed once the debt is three years old, or where the debtor is liquidated.
12. In the Ukraine, for example, the vodokanals’ projected production cost figure which is used to calculate tariffs for
all customer categories are based on figures indexed to anticipate inflation, energy cost increases, etc, during the period
for which the tariffs are being calculated, except for the domestic sector. When a particular vodokanal in the Ukraine
submitted similarly indexed figures for calculating tariffs for the domestic sector, the State Price (continued overleaf)
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3.5 Municipal financing for water and wastewater investments
Most urban water and wastewater supply networks in the NIS require urgent
capital investment. Most assets are almost fully depreciated, and inadequate asset
calculations, severely constrained depreciation charges, maintenance funds and
profit margins mean that the revenue-based finances required to sustain, let alone
improve, the current networks, are simply not available.13 14 The key sources for
new investment for the vodokanals are either the state budget (city, oblast or
national) or the allowable profit margin within the tariff. State resources are in
almost all cases severely constrained and investment from this source thus
remains erratic and based on crisis rather than long term management. Within the
tariff, the profit margins that are allowed, particularly when coupled with high
taxes and poor rates of revenue collection, are often too small to finance anything
other than minor investments or repairs. It is also difficult, and often illegal, for
the operator to use these profit margins to debt finance investments in the water
supply network.15
As a result of these investment problems, none of the vodokanals looked at
in this study were operating on a sustainable basis, prior to an externally financed
reform process taking place. 
4. OPPORTUNITIES AND PATHWAYS FOR REFORM 
4.1 Long term financial reform
The research showed that, in the long-term, water pricing reforms should aim
for full cost recovery; commercially oriented urban water service providers should
be able to make their own management and operational decisions; their prices and
performance should be regulated by independent bodies; there should be room for
others to compete for parts of the market; and there should be a well-targeted state
subsidy system. These long term recommendations are non-controversial, and are
generally supported by many agencies and studies (e.g. World Bank 1996, Pezzey
and Mill 1998, EBRD 1999, OECD 1999, London Economics 2000). 
(12, continued from previous page) Control Inspectorate (SPCI) determined that the vodokanal had violated the Law on
Prices and Pricing (the inflation-indexed figures were characterised as unauthorised production costs). The position of
the SPCI was that tariffs for the domestic sector should be based on projected production costs for the most recent
months for which figures are available, rather than on estimates for the current year, but with no indexing for inflation. It is
difficult, therefore, for vodokanals in the Ukraine to ensure that adequate revenue flows will accrue to them from the
domestic sector over time, even if collection rates are 100 percent. 
13. In Russia, for example, the maintenance fund is supposed to cover the operational and maintenance costs of 
providing water services to the customer. However, the maintenance funds of the Russian vodokanals have often been
run down over time. This is because they have traditionally been used by the water companies as the cushion to soften
the blow of municipality decisions to lower the overall water tariff. Hence, most vodokanals have depleted or 
inadequate maintenance funds and a limited ability to ensure their gradual development again over time. 
14. In Chisinau, Moldova, the vodokanal’s fixed assets were heavily undervalued in order to help keep the tariff low
for consumers. Although depreciation rates were in line with industry norms (15-20 years for plant and machinery, 40-
50 years for pipes and reservoirs) the depreciation charges allowed in the tariff were wholly inadequate. For example,
in 1996, depreciation for the Chisnau Vodokanal was submitted in the tariff at less than MDL 1 million per year. A
restatement by consultants for EBRD suggested a figure of MDL 60 million per year was more appropriate. They also
recommended a re-valuation of the Chisinau utility’s assets at MDL 4.0 billion based on replacement costs. The
Chisinau local authority consequently re-valued the utility’s assets in 1996 and came up with a lower gross asset value
of MDL 1.5 billion. This was still a seven to eight fold increase on the previous valuation. The final EBRD loan required
a depreciation charge of MDL 38 million per year to be set as a minimum.
15. In Russia, for example, the assigned profit level of 25% for vodokanals, is the source from which enterprises are
expected to finance their ‘small’ investment programs from. Fixing the profitability level at 25% is seen to secure a
‘simple reproduction’ of the physical assets of the vodokanal, but only in a situation of low inflation, and where an
equal proportion of labour can be used to match the level of capital required. Even taking the constraints of this
approach into account, the payment of interest charges on any long-term loans is also expected to come out of the
assigned profit component (net of tax payments due on it). Debt financing from this profit margin is thus discouraged. In
reality, therefore, the major share of the assigned profit is spent on urgent repairs and not on investment or expansion.
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However, the challenge for implementing such sustainable pricing reforms is
to recognise that the problems are not only financial ones, but that there are also
complex economic, institutional, legal and political issues to consider as well.
The political and legal ramifications of implementing a wholesale change to the
water pricing, tariff and regulatory system in every NIS city are huge, and would
take many years of commitment to achieve. In the short term, meanwhile, many
city populations are facing high social costs from poor urban water services. What
practically, therefore, should a pricing reform process recommend?
4.2 Short term financial reforms
To help facilitate the long term transition process, the study found that there
are a range of pragmatic, short-term actions which can be taken, which do not
necessarily involve sudden, unpopular change or incurring municipal debt for
financing. In summary these were identified as follows:
4.2.1 Water policy reform
• Start developing a financial policy for water services. Keeping the cost-
plus regulatory framework, the city administration, together with the
vodokanal should decide upon the level of cost recovery the vodokanal
should aim for in the short term, (and hence the levels of investment the
city needs to provide if full costs are not to be recovered), as well as a
method of realistically calculating these costs, which moves away from the
constraints of the existing norms.16
• Set some performance targets. Short term (realistic) targets for the vodokanal to
work towards should be set, together with the supporting actions that will be
taken by the City administration. These targets should be embedded within a
clear performance agreement.17
• Clarify ownership and use of assets. The ownership of the water infra-
structure assets should be clarified, and clear responsibilities for managing
them identified.18
• Start the commercialisation process of vodokanals. The city administration,
should help to ensure a smooth transition for the vodokanal to corporate 
status, by providing an enabling environment for the process.19
16. For example, in the short term a move toward allowing full operating and maintenance costs (including tackling
the bad debt and inflation indexing issues) could be viable. This would create a responsibility for the state to
provide investment funds. In the longer term, of course, a minimum target price for water that covers operation and
maintenance, plus depreciation and provision for long term liabilities, should be aimed for.
17. For example, by year X certain targets of service improvement should be met by the vodokanal, provided the
city accepts water tariffs based on an agreed level of realistic, inflation-indexed costs, rather than outdated norms. 
18. For example, a statement could identify the vodokanal as responsible for operating and maintaining networks
(and thus setting the tariff and planning expenditure on this basis), but for the City as owner of the networks, to
provide funds at defined stages for key capital investments to replace parts of the asset base. If this information is
transparent, then if the performance falters it should be clear where responsibility lies.
19. For example, when granting the Vodokanal corporate status, the City should create a management structure which
is at ‘arms length’ from the political authorities, and empower the Vodokanal to make its financial and investment
planning systems more account specific and transparent, update its management and human resource systems and
start to produce business/corporate development plans. Support from the Vodokanals themselves is vital to make this
process succed. Also, encouraging Vodokanals to take such actions may also stimulate public debate, bringing other
realted issues in to the public arena, and making vodokanls raise their awareness of public relations management.
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4.2.2 Tariffs 
• Move away from the norms. The city administration should allow real costs
to be charged, as part of the cost-plus formula, to recover the level of costs
agreed within the agree financial policy. 
• Allow the tariff to react to inflation and bad debt. Key cost components
within the tariff calculation (eg fuels, electricity) should be indexed to infla-
tion, rather than the tariff updated as a whole. Bad debts should be dealt
with. For example, if, say, five percent of amounts due will not be received
than this should be factored into the cost recovery mechanism.
• Tax obligations. The ability for the vodokanal to pay tax on cash revenue
received rather than revenue due is a useful first step that can be taken. As
the worst debtors are usually other state owned enterprises, the drop in tax
revenue to the City should encourage the administration to look at improv-
ing the financial management of its other enterprises. 
• Think about moving away (or adapting) the cost plus price regulations for
water. Central and city government need to develop appropriate incentives
for the vodokanals to reduce short and long term costs. Tariffs could be reg-
ulated and kept at an affordable level by developing systems with consumers
to collect up to date water consumption statistics and using them to regulate
tariffs and index them for inflation. Consumer groups should assess their own
consumption levels against others, and exert pressure to make improvements
to the norms if necessary. Ways of factoring incentives for increasing produc-
tive efficiency to the cost-plus price structure could also be developed.20
• Dual accounting. A dual accounting process could be initiated to indicate to
the city what the difference is between the tariff calculated within the existing
constraints and the tariff that should be charged, if certain costs were to be fully
covered. In this way, the real costs to be recovered can be identified, modelled
and discussed more gradually, during a tariff transition period.
4.2.3 Collection
• Increase revenues through increased collection rates. Vodokanals should be
provided with the right to collect payments directly from customers and to
be able to cut non-paying customers off. The city administration should
develop a programme to ensure that the bills of budgetary organisations
(hospitals, schools, etc.) are paid in cash from city funds. If such payments
are not made promptly, a mechanism could be developed whereby the
vodokanal withholds payments of taxes to the city reflecting the amount due
in outstanding charges from other city institutions.
4.1.4 Investment
• Make an up to date inventory of the asset base. This would allow a definitive
assessment of what exactly the investment requirements are for each sector
of operations and how urgently they are required. 
20. A system could be whereby any decrease in operational costs is reflected within a larger allowable profit margin.
Thus costs may decrease, but the overall price charged stays the same, ensuring the vodokanal does not lose out on any
revenue as a result of reducing its costs.
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• Develop short-term solutions to meet urgent investment needs. Temporary
or emergency investment funds could be created by the central or city 
government to help provide the vodokanals with the capacity to address
urgent investment issues. This can take the form of earmarking some of the
obligatory payments Vodokanals pay the state into defined maintenance,
depreciation and renewal funds, or drawing on resources available from
environmental funds.21
• Re-invest cost savings. The vodokanal could develop short to medium-term
action plans for cost savings and negotiate with the city government to allow
them to keep and/or re-invest these savings. 
• Debt financing. Well targeted, performance related grants or soft loans could
be sought to provide transition assistance during the vodokanal’s early reform
period. These could come via international assistance or from internal finan-
cial sources, such as municipal or city banks. The ability of the city to act as
guarantor on these loans emerges as a key issue here. A concrete first step
therefore, could be for the city administration to establish its creditworthiness.
4.1.5 Other reforms
• Undertake affordability and willingness-to-pay studies. Guidelines for the
preparation of affordability and willingness to pay studies could be developed,
and the city and vodokanal encouraged to include them as a standard element
of any investment preparation and/or tariff re-calculation. Information gained
from such studies could help revise the norms used and the levels of service
provided for the different customer bases.
• Unravel and rationalise subsidies for poor customers. This is a critical area
for short term reform. National, oblast and city governments could seek to
rationalise the social subsidy system, by providing transparent budgetary
information on the resources (and the means of their calculation) that will be
allocated to municipal services for social services. The city can make great
improvements in the efficiency of the allocation of these subsidies by re-
identifying who is eligible for a subsidy, how their subsidy can be paid
directly to the service provider, or the recipient, and guaranteeing when the
subsidy will be paid. Consumer groups and NGOs could help assist local
government and vodokanals to identify those most in need.
• Create a mechanism for exchange of information on restructuring and
reform. By using existing government networks and by developing new
networks (for example a cross departmental vodokanal reform PMU), the
city or oblast can learn from the experience of others, or share their experi-
ence, on the vodokanal price reform process. This action can also help to
create a single contact point and area of responsibility for those interested in
the reform process, rather than reform (and responsibilities for reform) being
dispersed across a range of city or oblast administrative departments.
21. Temporary financing solutions can be found through analogues from the NIS and the CEE, such as the proposed water
fund in Lviv, the use of maintenance, depreciation and renewal funds as in Romania, or the creative use of environmen-
tal funds (via soft loans) to help generate urgent short-term finances or help pay the water bills of the cocially vulnerable
during the transition period, (as in Estonia).
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• Analyse the suitability of private sector participation in vodokanal operations.
Becoming more sensitised to the private sector participation options on offer,
and what would be most appropriate for the particular city or vodokanal,
would be a credible short term aim. National, oblast and city government
could decide upon the longer term changes in legal and institutional frame-
works, that will be necessary to facilitate the level of private sector participa-
tion identified as most useful to aim for (if any) in the short to medium term. 
• Strengthen, clarify and simplify customer complaints procedures. National,
oblast and city government could establish and encourage mechanisms for
consumers to exercise their rights relating to service provision, while the
vodokanal could be encouraged to develop customer complaints procedures
and set short term targets to strengthen their in-house procedures. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The poor physical condition of water and wastewater infrastructure in
urban areas is one of the main challenges in the environmental service sector
currently facing the NIS. This problem is a large contributor to poor public and
environmental health, as well as the high social costs associated with irregular
and insecure water supplies. Often the burden of these social costs fall dispro-
portionately on the poorest. In general, the financial problems for the urban
water sector in the NIS stem from a history of gross under-investment, and from
water tariffs that are set too low for operators to recover even basic costs.
Discussions on water finance reform in many NIS countries are often trig-
gered by international development banks or agencies, who encourage the
restructuring of vodokanals with their assistance. These projects generally focus
on the use of debt finance for investment, the raising of tariffs to cover opera-
tional costs and the new debt, and the restructuring of management in order to
allow more commercially-orientated decision-making. 
However, few of these reform projects have been entirely successful to
date. Often, the pricing and financing reforms these projects require can only
be realistically achieved by following a process of long-term change. Yet many
projects call for reforms within a much shorter period, particularly on issues
such as raising tariffs. Raising tariffs alone does not guarantee that more rev-
enue will be collected, that more investment or debt servicing will be made, or
that the vodokanal will become a more efficient operator. Further, the political
commitment to raising tariffs in the long term can vary greatly. Finally, even if
these obstacles could be overcome, it is not feasible that every vodokanal in
every NIS city can rely on accessing the finance and assistance of a develop-
ment bank or agency, in order to reform.
Instead, it seems important to identify a number of pragmatic short-term
actions which can be taken by NIS city governments and vodokanals to initiate
the commercial reform process, which will both contribute to improving the
water and wastewater services in the short-term, and improving the circum-
stances for any subsequent long-term sector reform plan. Moreover, the majority
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of these actions should, as far as possible, provide a tangible political benefit for
the city administration (through the improvement of water services) as well as
requiring little finance or technical know-how.
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Some insights into the social 
aspects of water pricing
Irena Lucavetchi, Compania Nationala Apele, Bacau branch, Romania
This presentation represents the opinion of a working group gathered by Solidarité Eau Europe in Paris,
September 2000. The group consisted of the following persons (in alphabetical order): C. Bismuth, Solidarité
Eau Europe, Strasbourg, France; P. M. Grondin, Programme Solidarité Eau, Paris, France; R. Jost, Solidarité Eau
Europe, Strasbourg, France; I. Lucavetchi, as above; A. Morel à l’Huissier, CEREVE, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et
Chausées, Marne la Vallee, France; L. Robaux, Office International de l’Eau, Paris, France.
INTRODUCTION, PRINCIPLES
Water is a fundamental element of life, constituting a common heritage of all
nations and all people. However, not many countries recognise water as part of
the national patrimony in their legislation. 
Access to drinking water and sanitation is a fundamental human right. 
Even fewer countries recognise a legal right to water. 
Equitable access to water has to be guaranteed as an element of social policy.
The management, preservation, distribution, treatment and cleaning of water
generate costs, which the user has to pay. 
Water prices must be established according to consumption models, and must
be equitable and non-discriminatory.
INFLUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT ON WATER POLICY
The present economic context of Central and Eastern Europe is characterised by
significant inflation, the closure of non-performing enterprises, the rise of
unemployment and a widening gap between rich and poor. Furthermore, these
states are undergoing a process of revision in their institutions and organisations.
In this period, privatisation in all sectors is the principal political strategy,
applied to stimulate the efficiency of enterprises, or in order to find financial
resources outside the national budget.
Which choice should be made in the water supply sector? Public or private
management? Should there be an intermediate solution? How can social policy
be served in a newly designed water sector? Pricing can have two objectives,
sometimes contradictory:
• Economic efficiency;
• Social equity.
Political choice determines the manner in which these objectives are combined. 
The evaluation of social needs is difficult, and, all too often, public systems will be
maintained, primarily, by those least equipped for the task, less well off people.
This also occurs when revenue does not cover all the costs of the service, making
subsidies necessary. 
THE STATE, GUARANTOR OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE WATER SECTOR
Breakdown of organisations involved in water pricing
• The water service establishes the costs and calculates the prices and the
tariffs. ‘Social’ pricing is not its problem.
• The regulator establishes the general principles of water pricing and
approves the price and the tariffs, in order to ensure social equity.
Should regulation take place at the national or the local level? 
This depends on the political situation and institutional arrangements in each
country. 
Local level is, necessarily, the first level of regulation in countries with
decentralised water management. 
The trend to decentralisation in the CEE countries makes it necessary that the
State provides the municipalities with the means to play their role. 
Regions could be the second management and regulation level, particularly river
basins. 
The highest level remains the State (Romanian examples: the Office of
Concurrence, the National Agency of Regulation for Energy).
User’s role in water policy
Another stakeholder, who has been neglected for a long time, has or should
have an increasing role: the user.
As a beneficiary and as a ‘client’ (if he pays his water bill), he must be involved
permanently in all of the different issues (technical choices, management trends,
costs, choice of priorities, necessity to apply the norms).
He must receive complete and objective information. Water services must
demonstrate transparency as regards policy, costs, incomes, etc.
The user has the right to know ‘who’ does ‘what’. The character of the rendered
service must be exactly defined for the user. 
The user must have the possibility to contribute to choices.
Point of departure — the demand
In case of water or financial resources scarcity, as is the case in the CEE
countries, choices must be made.
Water system development will not be affordable and sustainable if it is based
only on norms and not designed and managed to meet the needs and demands
of the final users.
The issue of the actual demand must govern the decision-making process. Any
analysis of social objectives must set out from the demand side more than from
the supply.
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All users must be considered. Moreover, within every type of use, different
segments of demand must be identified and taken into account (for example,
according to socio-economic criteria).
Demand can be analysed by several methods:
• Observation of willingness to pay and surveys have proven to be very
helpful, but are often long and expensive.
• Other methods are available, based on service data or on the consultation of
users (focus groups for example).
Being of the appropriate scale for a management based on demand, basin
committees could have an important role to play. 
CONCLUSIONS
The hydrographical basin: the most appropriate scale for water
management
This allows improved co-operation between the different stakeholders, inside
the basin committee (or similar institution), and it also enables decentralisation.
It allows global management of the resource and transboundary collaboration.
This leads to a concerted search for solutions within a participatory process. 
This way, the basin committee can approach possible conflicts between
competing users.
The need for transparency and the establishment of an ethical code in
water policies
The transparency of choices and decisions has to be ensured. This is a strong
social demand.
The State, as the principal guarantor of a social policy, has to establish a charter
of ethics for all the procedures and aspects of water management and must
supervise its application by all the stakeholders.
The need for professional training and sharing of experience
This need is the result of fundamental changes in professional practices, existing
or desirable, in water management.
The need for new organisation and financial means 
New organisation and financing are necessary, in order to realise the goals of
social policy in water management.
Financing can be carried out at the local level, but only if well organised and
managed, responsible associations are created.
Financing has to ensure the access of the poor to the water services, though it’s
often difficult to know who is really the poorest.
The ultimate aim of social policy in water management must be the access of the
poor to drinking water and sanitation, in satisfactory conditions.
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Annex 1: Conference programme
Economic Instruments and Water Policies in Central and Eastern
Europe: Issues and Options
Szentendre, Hungary. September 28-29, 2000.
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Miroslav Hajek (Ministry of Environment, Czech Republic) 
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Member States of the European Union
Chair: Eva Kraav (Ministry of Environment, Estonia)
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Andreas Krämer (Ecologic, Germany )
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Erik Mostert (Delft Hydraulics , The Netherlands ) 
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Programme, Hungary)
The impact of pricing on the household water demand:
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The environmental impact of water charges: 
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Economic Policy, Romania )
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17:15-17:30 Economic instruments for water management — the role of 
research in the EU: Irene Gabriel (European Commission, 
Belgium )
19:00 Conference Dinner at the REC
Friday, September 29, 2000
09:00-10:45 Session 4. Moving towards pricing that better account for 
economic and environmental principles
Chair: Jean-Paul Rivaud (Ministry of Environment , France )
Rapporteur: Erich Unterwurzacher (DG Regio, European 
Commission )
Pricing water for enhancing the sustainability of water resources:
Pierre Strosser (European Commission, Belgium)
Water pricing and support policies at the EBRD: Jens Mathiesen
(EBRD, United Kingdom)
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The Environmental fund in Slovenia: Igor Cehovin (ECO Fund 
of the Republic of Slovenia, Slovenia )
What role for water pricing: ten actions for internalising
sustainability: Charlie Avis (WWF Danube-Carpathian 
Programme, Hungary )
General discussion
10:45-11:15 Coffee
11:15-12:30 Session 5. An illustration of the issues and options related to 
pricing policies — water charging in the city of Gdansk (Poland)
Chair: Bernard Kaczmarek, (Agences de l'Eau, France )
The views of different stakeholders
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ON THE COVER:
en•dan•gered spe•cies (en dān’jerd spē’shēz), 1. a species at risk of extinction in Central and Eastern Europe because of human activity, changes in climate, changes in 
predator-prey ratios. 2. Ardeidae: the family of long-legged, long-necked waterfowl, 
known as herons. Platalea leucorodia: a wading bird with a flat spoonlike bill, 
commonly called a spoonbill. 3. Croatian Ornithological Society: an NGO working 
to save a mixed colony of herons and spoonbills in the Jelas fishponds of Croatia with 
the financial support of the Regional Environmental Center.
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THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE (REC) is a non-partisan, non-advocacy, not-for-profit organisation
with a mission to assist in solving environmental problems in Central and East-
ern Europe (CEE). The Center fulfils this mission by encouraging cooperation
among non-governmental organisations, governments, businesses and other
environmental stakeholders, by supporting the free exchange of information
and by promoting public participation in environmental decision-making. 
The REC was established in 1990 by the United States, the European Commission
and Hungary. Today, the REC is legally based on a Charter signed by the govern-
ments of 27 countries and the European Commission, and on an International
Agreement with the Government of Hungary. The REC has its headquarters in
Szentendre, Hungary, and local offices in each of its 15 beneficiary CEE countries
which are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Yugoslavia.
Recent donors are the European Commission and the governments of the United
States, Japan, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom, as well as other inter-governmental and private institutions.
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